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ABSTRACT
~!ince the discovery of diamonds in South Africa, Government has played an active role in
the establishment of a local processing industry, aimed at the adding of value to locally
.:
wthed rough diall)onds.
this stlldy evaluates the influence of .,Qovernment support and regulation in the
,/1.J ;i
performilnce of South ,Africa's diamond indl.Jst!)'.
Stati~~ticswere supplied mainly by the South African Diamond Soard, the Minerals Bureau
and the departments of Finance, and Trade and Industry. Discussions with prominent
diamantalres wefe also undertaken to contrast statutory repor,ting with informally sourced
"
facts.
South Africa's diamond industry undetperforms, particularly the processing industry which
L
benefits from state sUP:Jort at the expense of the other diamond sectors. Government's
indirect support of the processlng' sector cannot b~ justified in view of its dismal
performance.
The entire diamond industry should be deregulaled, and State involvement in the
processing sector (with special emphasis on the taxation structure) re-evaluated.
iii
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1CHAPTER 1
1 INTRODUCT,.ION
1.1 Statement of the Problem
In South Africa, ~ near monopoly on rough diamond production exists in that De Bee~;s
Consolidated Mines controls approximately 95 per cent of local annual output. Considering
the importance of diamonds for the country as a whole, Government became involved in
the diamond industry in a supporting and regulatory manner. In particular', the State
intervened in diamond beneficiation through the establishment of a diamond processing
(cutting and polishing) industry in the 1920's.
Currel1!1y,the South African Diamond Board (SADB), a body provided for in the Diamonds
At:.t (No 56 of 199B), regulates and monitors South Africa's diamond industry.
Fundamentally, the Iaw encourages rough diamond producers to first offer their output to
the local industry before being allowed exemption of a 15 per cent export duty.
Since Government propagates free-market economic principles, this supporting\\~nd
\:'\
regulating role of the State has increasingly come under attack, The lack of indus~~
performance, in particular that of the processing sector, is questioned in view 0\1.
Govemment's continued involvement.
1.2 Purpose tOf the StI::dy
This study evaluates the influence of Government support and
regulation in the performance of South J\frica's diamond industry.
This examlnat'on is intended to establish objectively the relative importance of the diamond
mining, trading and processing sectors for the country as a Whole, but more importantly,
advise Government in its effort to create an environment wherein South Africa's diamond
resources could be optimally utilised.
1.3 JUstifICationof the Project
2Of the approximately 60 major mineral commodities mined presently in South Africa,
dia~honds ranked fourth largest in terms of total sales value in 1991. Owing to this, the
forel~n exchange generated through rough diamond exports and beneficiation, l.e, thE.
adding of value through processing, is of utmost importance,
Also, since the inception of the SADS in October 1986, Government has sought to
examine its role to establish whether South Africa's diamond resources are optimally
utilised, Through the new Minerals Act (No 50 of 1991), the State purposes to assist the
local mining industry by allowing easier access to resources, and also, to minimise
Govemment involvement through a. process of deregulation. This study endeavours to
direct Government's future role in the diamond industry.
Several Commissions of Enquiry have been directed at South Africa's processing industry
since its'\establishment. Key issues addressed were the lack of profitability in this sector
and its contribution to the South African economy.
1.4 Limitations of the Project
The statisncsof the processing industry presented in the dissertation are applicable to a
short time-period, viz., three years (1988-1990).
In addition, limited data is available on rough and polished diamonds processed, and value
added figures are suspect. A severe problem has been the compiling and verifi()~tion of
contidentlal statistics.
Most importantly, confidential diamond statistics (particularly of individual companies) had
to be replaced with genera! data, ,in order that the dissertation be allowed publication.
1.5 Previaw of the Organisation ()f the RemAinder of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 commences by historically reviewing State involvement in the diamond industry.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of economic theories on government intervention in an
economy as well as the CSO's policy of single channel marketing of rough diamonds. In
chapter 4, local rough diamond supply is addressed followed by an examination of the
diamond trading structure (Chapter 5) in South Africa. Diamond proceselnq is examined in
chapter 6. and the performance role of the entire industry in chapter 7. Governl1lent
3support and regulation follows in chapter 8 and conclusions and recornmendatlons in
chapter 9.
1.6 Resume
No detailed and analytical studies of South Africa's rough diamond mining, trading and
processing industries have been published, principally because of the confidentiality of
statistics. However, Go" .nment launched several Commissions of Enquiry into, in
particular, the diamond processing industry. ~joteworthy were the enquiry by the Browne
Committee (Komitee van Ondersosk na Deviesebeheer- en Belasfingwanpral<tyke in die
Diamantbedryf, 31 Julie 19aO) which stressed that the processing industry underperformed
in terms of foreign exchange and income tax revenues.
. A Departemeritele Kornitee van pndersoel< na Seketa Aspekte Rakende die
Diamantbedryf, 27 September 1984', and the 'Verslag van die Kommissie van ondersoek
lnsake die Diamantbedryf van die Rep~~bliek van Suid-Afrika en die Gebied
Suidwes-Afrika, 16 November 1970', have also been Undertaken. Where deemed
applicable, information frorrrthese enquiries has been used in this study.
1.7 Sources of Data
Principally, data was sourced from the SADB and thE! Minerals 8ureC::..lof South Africa, in
addflon, statistics were supplied by the Diamond 80UI'se of South Africa, the departments
of Finance, and Trade and Industry. Interviews Were conducted with several prominent
rj
producers, dealers and cutters.
Also, statistics apd comments furnished by prominent and respected diamond analysts of
local broker firms were used to fill the gap of non-lndexable contldentlal data.
4CliAPTER2
2 HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DIAMOND
iNDUSTRYAND GOVERNMENTS IN\.OLVEMENT
This chapter highlights Government's involvement in South Africa's diamond industry,
principally through supporting and regulating measures.
2.1 Industry Development and Government's Involvement
In 1866, the first discovery of diamonds in $oifth Attica occurred. Shortly thereafter, from
1869 to 1611,alluvial and kimberlite deposits were found in the Kimberley .area-. These
discoveries coincided witl1 the opening of the Jagersfontein and Koffiefontiein diamond
mines.
In 188a, amalgamati.on of the individual producers by De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd
took place. Two years later, the Wessallon Mine commenced production. The Diamond
Syndicate (a consortium of large diamond dealers with the necessary overseas contacts)
purchased rough diamonds from large, local producers on a contractual basis. They
bought enough rough diamonds (in volume) on the open market to secure a degree of
.price stability. The forerunner of the eso (founded in the 1930's; discussed in chapter 3)
was established.
The Premier Mine started up. in 1902, ahead of the Norld recession of 1907. During the
1914-18 First World War, in 1915-16, the export duty ..... rough diamond exports was put
into effect. The duty w::.s calculated on a sliding scale with five per cent of the rough
diamond export value as maximum. The duty \'Vasmainly intended to contribute to State
venues, but Government agreed that the duty Should facilitate the development of a local
processing sector. The export duty was, however, only levied on rough diamonds that
originated from kimberlite mlnes. During this period, De Beers secured the controlling
interest 1n the Premier Mine.
In 1919, the rough diamond export duty increased to 10 per cent (now also applicable to
rough diamonds from alluvial deposits). The 'Ac~ on Diamantslijperijen' Nas flnalised, Of
the many regUlations set out in the Act, two were of special siQnificance:
5(i) The Minister could command a producer/dealer to supply rough diamonds
according 1..:>a cutter's demands, if the cutter failed to successfully negotiate its
requirements.
(ii) The Minister must dictate the prices of rough diamonds channelled to the cutter,
including the concession prices that the local cutters enjoyed, which were 10 per
cent less (on aVerage) than the London 080 prices, i.e. international prices.
The Uchtenburg alluvial fields were discovered in 1925. Act 39 of 1925 was finalised,
allowing Government the control of mine (kimberlite) diamonds only; not alluvial stones.
In 1927, the third world recession took place. Another local diamond discovery occurred,
that of the Namaqualand alluvial fields. lts.the same year the Precious Stones Act (No 44
of 1927) came into effect, this time allowing Government control ever alluvial diamonds.
Despite the good fortunes enjoyed by the processing sector, it still remained small.
In 1928, Government congealed all private prospecting on Namaqualand alluvial fields and
entered the diamond production fold through the establishment of the State Alluvial
Diggings. Further Government assistance was at hand. in an agreement:.'ith a Belgian
cutter (Rosenstrauch), the State finalised the founding of the first foreign cutting firm in
Kimberley, instructed to train 500 South African cutters. At this stage, the local processing
workforce totalled 775.
During the world recession of 1930-33, De Beers abandoned its mining activitt/s at the
Premier Mine, owing to the weak cash position of both its mines and selling organisation,
and a massive rough diamond stockpile, Consoquently, the Minister of Mining ordered a
Commission of Enquiry into the local diamond industry (aborted in the same year).
In 1934, the Diamond Producers Association (DPA) was established. Diamond producers
and Government were represented mainly to control local diamond production and
marketing. Officially, De Beers' Oentral Selling Organisation (eSO) was sanctioned.
The diamond processing workforce in 1938 totalled a mere 211. Durh',g the Second World
War (1940-45) the Belgian processing seci,').,rcame to a st~mdstill. As a consequence,
RSA's processing sector moved to the foreground as a key, and important, supplier of
polished diamonds.
6In the 1950's, the Belgian processing sector regained its lost status. fputh Africa's
processing sector, however, encountered its first (of many) conflicts with Ia.bour disputes.
As a result •.the processing sector contracted.
OUting 1953. the Minister of Mining commissioned a,j'Fact Finding' Committee to assess
the status of, and to address discrepancies in the processing sector. The findings of the
Committee led to the introduction of a quota system (constant volume o~rough diamonds
to cutters) accepted by the CSO as well as the MDCA (Masters Diamond Cutters
Association), in 1956.
In 1955, The Diamond Cutting Act (Act 33 of 1955) replaced the Act on Oiamantslijperijen
of 1919.
Up until 1956.•.all rough gem diamonds from 'associated suppliers' (part of the CSO) wp,re
supplied to( Iroctassing sector on the basis ofthe amount of workers in service of a firm.
This criterion of supply, combined with the cutters' opinion that a shortage of rough
diamonds existed that could be profitably polished, led to fierce labour competition
between firms (normally done through salary adjustments). With the introduction of the
quota system, diamond cutting firms now received an allocated assortment of rough
diamonds on a constant basis, the Minister being a decision maker on the qualities and
quantities the cutters received.
In the early 1960's, the processing sector in South Africa started growino slowly due to
growing diamond supplies (De Beers estimates of rough gem diamond supply improved).
In 1961, the.workforce of local cutting firms totalled 756.
in 196213, the Finsoh Diamond Mine commenced production.
In 1966, the export duty on rough diamonds was increased from 10 to 15 per cent.
Government continued its support of the processinq sector by issuing new diamond
licences with the provision of a quota of rough diamonds from the eso. The CSO agreed
to supply local cutters with London goods at London prices; during that year only 25 000
carats were supplied. The following year, the CSO continued its supply I 'Qm London; a
total of 50 000 carats, In 1908, the mass had reached the 100 000 carats mark.
Government granted permission for more apprentices to enter the processing sector in
1969.
7Up to 1970, the South AfriC'.anprocessing sector had received ali r()ug{gemeegj~monds
",:.;:;;:_~~-"";.-:::;:--- "-~"~
locally ~r()duced equal to, and above, 0,9 carats, The sector held a monopol~~\on
bape-yello~ gems, which amounted to about 63 000 carats annually (originating frornJ\he
then South Westl\frica). Lice sed diamond cutting firms totalled 55. About 28 concerns
employed e total of 13 so-called 'business schemes', i.e, mutual agreements in terms of
diamond trade, finances, use of same premises, same directors etc.
In 1911, the workforce of the processingsector'totalled 1603.
In the seven years from 1966-72, only 26 000 carats of the 175 000 carats of rough
diamonds imported form London, were polished locally. mostly by the oigger firms. Cutters
stated that the imported roygh diamonds:
(i) Were less profitable to work than lo.calgoods.
(ii) Contained classes of diamonds that the local cutters did not specialise in.
(iii) Produced lower yields than South African goods owing to their shape.
In '1979, the Diamond Cutting Act {No 89 of 1979} appeared. On 1 October, the Diamond
Cutting Board, its predecessor being the Diamond Cutting Industry Board, was
inaugurated. Seven years later, on Octob~~} 1986, the SOuth African Diamond Board
(SADB) took over,
Up until 1 October 1985, i.e. the period before the inception of the SADB. rough diamonds
were e~'Portedafter payment of a 15 per cent export duty. Da Beers had been granted a
special formula for calculating the taxable export values on its rough diamonds Which came
into effect since the formation of the DPA in 1934. The formula was:
SSV x (98/100 x 100/115), where SSV == CSO's Standard Selling Value for
rough diamonds.
Effectively, H meant that 15 per cent duty was paid on 85,2 pier cent of the SSV price.
Historically. Government exempted also the Premier. Koffiefontein, Helam, Star and Rovic
diamond mines from the export duty, as these mines were deemed marginal, i.e.
unprofitable should the export duly be paid by the mines.
8,)
However, on 4 March 1987, the SADB and D~ Beers (a~er strong opposition from Ol?
Beers) finalised an agreement whereby De Beers' rough diamond output be first offered to
local cutters before allowed exportation, exempted from the 15 pet cent export duty. Alpo
f()r the first time, De Beers' entire production was classified into three categories, viz., SA,
which are diamonds' that can be economically precessed locally (including so-called
'sp~cials', i.e, stones of 10,a carats and larger, as well a$ 'fc:{~ci(i)S',i.EfI,' coloured and
differently shaped gopds); CONDITIONAL, stones Which are cop:!fidered by some cuners
(not all) to be economical to process locally', and UNCONDITIONAL, tough dlamonds
exported duty free because they are considered uneconomlcal to pr()ce~<l!ocally.
, " \
(_·~i"
Ano'ner almost identical agreement between the SADS and Trans Hex Group Ltd (Trans
Hex) was reached on 4 February 1988, whereby all Trans Hex's rough diamond output
must be first offered on. the Diamond Bourse of South Africa (DSSA) on a tender basis
using a 'Reserve Price' system. In short. this system allows the produc~r to set a price on
his rough diamond parcel whereon invited cutters tender (Without. knowing the Reserve
Price). The high6~t bid is accepted as EI true reflection of the market value of the
diamonds. An unsuccessful sale leads to immedit;itte exportation, duty free. The
repatriation of the foreign sale is verified by the SADS (in conjunction with the SA Reserve
Sank) within agiven period (1 month),
In September 1987, the OSSA was estab!~shed"
In 1990, the De Beers Venetia Qiamond Mine commenced its mining operations. Recent
\\
assessments indicate that by 1993/1994, Venetia's annual QutP4t will total 5-6 million\i " '-".
carats, making it the largest ever diamond mine in the Republic.
9CHAPTERS
3 ECONOMIC tHEORIES ON GOVERNMENT INV0lVEMENT IN AN ECONOMY AND
SINGLE OHANNEL MARKETING
Many I~onflicting ldeas exist regarding the rol~ of the State in a free market economy, So
siso, is the concept of single channel marketing of a commodity, which in this instance is
diamonds.
This section aims to address these issues from a theoretical viewpoint. Where deemed
relevant, factual reVieWSon State Policy and eso operations are given.
3.1 Government Involvement in the Economy of a Country
To what extent should the Government of a nation be involved in the role of i'egulation and
support?
I
Politically, the South African Government supports a free market economy, Whereby
individuals and groups are allowed freedom of entrepeneurial choice. South Africa is, ih
Addition, a country richly endowed with important minerals.
In the case of rough diamonds, a near monopoly on production exists (by De Beers) Which,
from a free enterprise viewpoint, may be marketed according to De Beers' policy. The
question surfacing now is whether or not State intervention in the diamond industry is
acceptable, unwanted, or in fact a necessity.
3.1.1 The Mineral Policy of the South African Government
The White Paper on the Mineral Polley of the Republic of South Africa (Govflrnment
Mineral PoliCY Framework, 1986, p 3), under the 14 point plan (of which six are deemed
applicable) of the Government's Mineral Policy Framework, states the following:
(i) The Government reaffirms its endorsement of the free enterprise system, which
is regarded as a prerequisite for the continued health and growth of the
country's mineral industry.
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(ii) The Government believes that every effort should be made to advance the
[~,!
existing spirit of co-operation between the State and private enterprise with
regard to the development of the mineral inclustlY.
(iii) It is the Government's"conv;ction that direct State intervention in the mineral
industry would not be in the national interest and that its itwolveme~t must be of c,
a complementary nature.
(iv) The Government considers it of fun~,lhniEmtal importance that the mineral
industlY should f nprove its productively in order to enhance its comp2titiveness.
(v) The Government .reafflrms its commitment to the promotion of balanced
economic growth. in terms of which no individual sector should be developed or
benefited at the expense 01' another.
\'
(vi) GOV6;'i'ilTlent reaffkms.to further private initiative and effective competition.
ie,
In addition, Government's viewpr:>int, addressed under its Beneficiation Strategy
(Government Mineral Policy Framework, 1986, pp 12"14) is aimed primarily at:
"...the optimal utilisation of all minerals produced in South Africa, subject to
sound economic principles, with a view to increasing both domestic economic
activity (coupled wit:) the creation of additional employment opportunities) and
foreign exchange earnings ...".
The Paper also includes a nine point list of the requirements of the mineral community to
enable this process, For the purpose of this study, attention is focused on four:
(i) The provision and maintenance by the State of an adequate physical
infrastructure to satisfy the requirements of the mineral beneficiation sector.
(ii) Government promotion of the use of mineral commodities beneficiated in the
RSA as substitutes for imported products,
(iii) Realistic fiscal measures and incentives to stimulate the establishment of new
beneficiation plants and the expansion of those already in existence.
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(iv) Encouragement by Government of foreign participation in local beneficiation
projects, with a view to the augmentation of domestic capital sources, the
importation of technology, and the establish! (lent of a broader-based overseas
market.
3.1.2 Economic Systems
Samuelson (1976, pp 146-149) states that the 19th centl,lry in America was one of rapid
material progress and an environment of individual freedom, l.e, an economy in that state
of laissez-faire which Carlyle called 'anarchy plus the constable', There were also periodic
business crises, wasteful exhaustion of irreplaceable natural resources, racial and sexual
discrimination, extremes of poverty and wealth, corruption of GOvernment by vested
interest groups, and at times the supplanting of self~regulating competition by monopoly,
No longer does modern man seem to act as if he believed "...that Government governs
best which governs IC)st...ll,
Samuelson continued that gradually, and in the face of continuing opposition, the
constitutional powers of Governmp. J were interpreted broadly and used to 'secure the
'; :1
public interest' and to 'pollee' the economic system, Utilities and railroads were brought
under State regulation; in 1087, the regulation of rail traffic across State boundaries; in
1890, laws against monopolistic combinations in 'restraint a trade'; after 1913, the
regulation of banking, the Federal Reserve Bank set up to serve as a central bank. In the
early 1900s food and drug acts were passed; loan sharks came under regulation;
stringent regulation of financial markets following the abuses of high finance before and
after 1929. He stressed that with the passage of time, the radical doctrines of one era
became fhe accepted and even reactionary beliefs of a later era. State and federal
legislation was expanded to include minimum wage laws; compulsory workmen's accident
compensation insurance; compulsory unemployment insurance; old age pensions; public
subsidy for medical care; maximum hour laws for children, women and men; regulation of
factory conditions; compulsory collective bargaining, and fair labour relations acts.
What Samuelson implies is that private property is never wholly private, free enterprise
never wholly free.
Unfortunately, not until long after the event will history tell us whether or not a given
expansion of Governmental authority was a good or bad policy, Past history does seem to
suggest this: Unyielding conservatism defeats its own purpose. Suffice to say, iron
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without "give" will break suddenly under strain; flexible steel willbend. Brittle economic
systems without the flexibility to accommodate themselves in an evolutionary manner to
accumulating tensions and social "changes, however strong such systems may appear in
the short run, are in the greatest peril of extinction. It a system is to continue to function
well, social institutions and beliefs must be able to adjust themselves to these ch,anges
(Samuelson, 1976, p 150).
In Hayek's "Serfdom Revisited" (Vaughn, 1984, p 122), K.l. Vaughn defines an economy
as a spontaneous order Which emerges from the purposeful actions of individuals but is, as
a whole, intended by no-ons, It cannot be said to have a purpose of its own, but only
serves the purposes of the indiViduals whose actions create the order. SlJch an order is
only possible, however, because individuals follow rules that make certain features of their
behaviour predictable. .;,Rules are important to set the framework within whi(~h the
:ndivlduals can make their plans find pursue their interests. To a large extent, therefore,
the kind of spontaneous ofc!'1rwhich emerges depends on the rules individuals follow both.
,', t".
in their private dealings with one another and in their dealings with the State.· H#I" 141the
importance of designing the 'right' rules. The immediate implication of HayeRs 'work on
defining the rules of a liberal society was the.t Govoernments interfere in the particular
operations of the spontaneous order at their (and their citizens') peril. Attempts to repl§l9~
a spontaneous order with a conscious, comprehensive plan for society simpl.y cannot work
according to the planners' expectations.
Following on this, W.J Samuels (1979, p 223) writes that Governmental law influences the
decisions made by 'private orders.' Every entrepreneur, in deciding how to invest his time,
energy and money, calculates the proms expected from the course open to him. Every
calculanon includes an assessment of the law's impact on profits; subsidies make some
investments more attractive while Jaws that force the entrepreneur to absorb the 'external'
costs of an activity make that activity less attractive. To each entrepreneur, then, the law
appears as a factor which a.ffects his decisions but over which he has 0.0 control.
Thus, as S.H Schlicter (Samuelson, 1973a, p 14) stated:
u••• every economic system must provide some way of doing three things ...
(i) Getting goods produced.
(ii) Determining what share each p6~$Onshall have in the total product.
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(iii) Regulating the consumption of goods, that is, detennining who shall
consume these goods ...".
The manner in which these three basic economic processes are performed stamps the
economic system with its most essential characteristics.
Following on this, Hayek (Burton, 1984, p 92) stressed that:
n... nothing indeed seems more plausible, or is more likely to appeal to reasonable
people, than the idea that our goal must be neither the extreme decentralisation of
free competition, 'nor the complete centralisation of the single plan, but some
judicious mixture of the two methods ...",
Hayek (Burton, 1984, p 93) continued, saying:
u... both competition and central direction become poor and inefficient tools if they
are incomplete; they are alternative principles used to solve the same problem, and
a mixture of the two means that neither will really work and that the l'esulh'.;'i11be
worse than if either system had been consistently relied upon. Or, to express It
differently, planning and competition can be combined only by planning for
competition, but not by planning agair, ~ompetition ...u.
3.1.3 Free Enterprise
The free private enterprise system (Samuelson, 1973a, pp 14-19) is organised in an
industry, in effect, by saying to an individual "you e e free, st;:Jject to a few restrictions, to
do as you desire." Under it the Government confines itself in the main to the suppression of
fraud and violel1ce and to the enforcement of contracts. The State d=es not itself engage
in or attempt to guide the course of industry. It pursues a "1etalone" or "hands off" policy.
Competition, according to theory, is the great regulative force in a free private enterprise
which establishes effective control over economic activities.
The most striking aspect of the theory of 1ree enterprise is its assertion that intervention of
Govetnment in economic activities is unnecessary. The theory does not deny that
restraints on human selfishness are needed. It simply asserts that we can trust
competition to provide them. Closer enquiry reveals, however, that defenders of free
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enterprise do not trust competition l? do all things (Samuelson, 1973a, pp 19-20). Free
compemion may protect consumers egail'lst harmful foods, but it does not enfo~'l;:~
contracts or prevent fraud,
Because the theory <lif fr~e enterprise, invented several years ago to justify the demands of
v.. -. _\
business men for the release from f.tggressive legal restrictions, assumes that competition
is needed to prevent freedom from being abused, it must also assume that competition is a
tt"'i't're economical method of production than monopoly. In many instances, however, it
seems reasonably certain H'.at monopoly is more economical than competition. 'Octopus'
industries, i.e. power, wf.ter, railway for example, would make competition uneconomical
due to the cost of dupliCation (SaHlUelson, 1913a, p 20). Therefore, although the theory
that Government intervention in industry is unnecessary presupposes the existence of
competition, the very absence of State interference often results in monopoly.
Consequently the l~ovemment may find itself compelled to intervene either to enforce
competition or to rElgulate monopoly. Either policy is a departure from the principle of free
enterprise.
The 19th century ",'as viewed as an age dominated, at least until its final quarter, by the
principle and practise of lalssez-falre (free market economy), expressed in terms both
economic and soelnl as "...the less Government lntervennon there was in the sphere the
better ...11 (Taylor, 1978, p 13).
It is frequently arglled (Samuels, 1979, p 219) that the more the State plans, the more
power is placed in the hands of 1he planners, Socia.l engineering begets power, and power
tends to corrupt. The classlcel response has been the celebration of the free market
economy, Social engineering and planning are perceived as the very opposites of the free
market; intervention is the opposite of non-intervention. The legal expression of social
engineering. :~ perceived as a set of commands directed by the State to various citizens.
The legal expression of the free market is perceived as facilitative law, of which the Jaw of
contract is the archetype. As social engineering is the opposite of a free market, $0
command law is the opposite of facilitatiVe law.
Hayek (Burton, 1984. p 130) elaborates on this point, saying that:
"...unconstrained democracies provide an open invitation to special-interest groups
to compete for ways to use Government to further thelr own ends at the expense
of the general welfare of the community ...".
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From this, K.I. Vaughn (Burton, 1984, p 131) .t)ntinued that interest groups have much to
gain by lobbying for special favours from Government, while the average individual oitlzen
stands to lose very little by their actions. Hence, interest groups have a much stronger
incentive to organise to seek gain through preferential treatment than indiyiduals have to
stop them. More importantly, no interest group ever lobbies publicly for its own direct
benefit; it always claims that its activities are in the public interest in some sense.
Be that as' it may, Ch~ncellor Helmut Kohl issued this warning (Day, at al., 1983, p 411):
l\
"...particularly in these trying times it is necessary to keep the domestic markets,
on ali sides, free from (trade) restrictions .. International trade must be qple to fulfil
its role iI) maintaining the competitive edge of our industries and in creating secure
jobs ...".
3.1.4 Government Involvement
No Government can remove itself entirely from involvement in the normal orocesses of a
nation's economic life. All to a ~Ireater or lesser degree are c. onsumers, aU raise taxes and
budget for their disposal. Sut above the minimal level the degree of Governmental
participation can be, and historically has been, enormously varied (Taylor, 1978, p 59).
Halrn (1968, p 104) reports that normally, the activities of the Governlnent should support
private enterprise. Where the State needs the products of privets industry, tax money.
spent in procuringl the needed material, flows right back into the private sector, State
regulation of private economic c:lctivlty should, wherever possible, be indirect (ather than
direct and should support the forces Of the market rather than interfere with them,
Worthwhile to merit-ion here is the statement by Abraham Lincoln:
" ... 1 believe the Government should do only that Which the priVate citizens cannot
do for themselves, or which they cannot do so well for themselves ...",
Samuelson (197310,pp 78-134) reversed Lincoln's formulation:
" .. .1. believe the private economy should be left alone to do those activities Which,
on balance after netting out all advantages and di. advantages, it can best do ...",
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Samuelson elaborated on this in the following example:
u... traffic lights coerce me and limit my freedom, don't they? Yet in the midst of a
traffic jam on the unopen road, was I really 'free' before there were lights? And
has the algebraic total of freedom, for me or the representative motorist or the
gl'oup as a whole been increased by the introduction of well-engineered Stop
I,·'
Lights? Stop'flights, you know, are also Go Lights ...".
Samuelson also questlons Stiglers attack on the defects of certain GoVernment' action
(Samuelson, 1973b, pp 73-:78). He stresses that, by itself, that is like pointing out certain
defects of marrie.ges. It' is purely a lucky accident that so much of economic life can be
performed reasonably weH by markets. In fact, there are important sasea where
economics suggests that Government should intervene. For instance:
(I) Monopoly must be fought t061h and nail.
f
(ii) 'Externalities', which are those sectors that pollute the environ!Y;4rt, cry out for
laws, ~oning ordinances, concise rules of the road, tsxes and sub~lli~ies.
(iii) The distribution of income and of opportunity demands that Governmental
measures should be undertaken to reduce inequality.
Samuelson concluded by saying:
"...There are no rules concerning the proper role of Government that can be
established by a priori reasonir)g ...".
In other words, deductive reasoning from a general principle to expected facts or effects
will not enable the formulation of rules concerning the proper role of Government.
Following on this, he emphasised that 'to state the rule that there are no rules' may sound
like a self-contradiction. However, Samueison's Law does not claim to be established b~1
reason, but mereiy to be a uniformity of experience, l.e. his experience.
It can be said that traditionally, '{he fear of monopoly explOitation led to the establishment of
a vast network of publio requlatlon. Particularly in this sphere, Governments have reacted
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in a controlling and legislating fashion. As Samuelson points out, the State should be
involved in an economy threatened by monopolies through:
(ir The maintenance or restoration of competition by suitable merger prevention
policies.
(ij) Where substantial competition cannot be achieved, the 6,1tl)' into the field
should be controlled by the State.
(iii) In the f6W cases in which monopoly cannot be eliminated it must be left alone-
simply because there is no known method of effective control.
G.G Stigler (Samuelson, 1973b, pp 13-18) commented .~tlt!l.tl't -!¢mmic V $ks the State
should do, be considerably less than it could d%;
concerning feasible' economic controls. These rules l
Flule 1:
Rule 2:
Rule 3:
Rule 4:
Rule 5:
j\~d plauc..ible rules
The State cal, 101 do an)rthing qlJici<ly.
When the national State performs detallsd economic tasks, the resporslble
political autherlties cannot possibly control the manner in which they are
pertorrned, whether directly by Governmental agencies or indirectly by
regulation of private enterprise.
The demooratlc State strives to treat all citizens in the same manner;
individual differences are ignored if remotely possible.
The ideal public policy, from the viewpoint of the State, is one with
identifiable beneficiaries, each of whom is helped appreciably, at the cost of
many unidentifiable persons, none of Whom is hurt much.
The State never knows when to quit.
Those rules, and others that could M added, do not say that the State cannot socialize the
growing of wheat or regulate the washing of shirts. What the rules say is that political
action is eoolal action, that political action displays reasonable stable behavioural
characteristics, and that prescriptions of political behaviour which disregard these
characteristics are simply irresponsible.
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Hayek (Burton, 1984, pp 95-96) continued on the creation of interest groups by
Government intervention. He stressed that virtually all acts of Government create a group
of (net) beneficiaries and another group of (net) losers", For example, subsidies to
declining 'smokestack' industries are welcomed by their management and employees, but
at the cost of delaying adjustme(~t to the rest of the ecorfomy. Minimum wage laws are
beneficial to employees who retain jobs, but harm people Who are made unemployed by
the measure. The inflationary financing of GC1vernmentexpenditure by expanding the
money supply Will, during the initial period when the inflation is not fully anticipated,
redistribute wealth from creditors to debtors. Social security systems provide income for
recipients and welfare administrators, but the costs have to be borne by tax payers. In
short, there is no such thing as a free lunch provided by Government inteht~ntiol1:
somebody has to bear the costs. Almost by definition, the two groups created by
Government intervention, the beneficiaries and the losers, are likely to feel differently
towards it, provided they appreciate what is halppening. The beneficiaries will tend to
favour the intervention and press for its retention and/or extension. Losers, if they are
aware of the burdens imposed upon them, are likely to be much less enthusiastic, if not
actively hostile. They have an inherent incentive to resist the burdens imposed on them,
and, if they cannot resist them politically, to escape them by other means. Modem
democratic Governments long ago discovered that, to st~y in power by currying the
support of a majority of the electorate, it is necessary to construct a plethora of
interventions to retain the backing of important groups of beneficiaries, While hiding the
costs to the losers, by dispersing them as widely as possible, even to generations yet
unborn.
(* Economists envisage that Government provision of pure public goods, i.e. goods having
technical features which prevent them from being marketable could possibly render all
members of society net beneficiaries provided Government could judge the optilnal supply
correctly. This latter condmon is impossible to implement in practise. Moreover, what
some people judge to be a public good, others may judge a public 'bad' (a. negatively
valued good). Thus, if they are forced to pay for its provisiop by taxation, they are net
losers. For example, while national defence is often considered a classic good, pacifists
consider it a 'bad' and resent having to pay taxes to finance it.)
In ccnclusion, it can be said t~at the exact pin-pointing of GOVt unem's role in an
economy, particularly in such a diversified and complex one in South Africa, cannot be
easily done. But, Government unquestionably needs to be involved to such a degree
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shaping the economic environment that will allow the optimal utilisation of a commodity, in
this case diamonds.
Thus, State intervention should protect consumers (and the locai industry) within an
economy through regulation whilst remaining suppor~ive, and should rather be defined as
'the creation of an acceptable opportunity' for those sectors that constitute the economy.
The State has the responsibility or fostering economic growth by means of capatilistic
market forces whilst intelligently policing the country's unique resources. Government,
therefore, should always endeavour to fulfill a complimentary role.
3.2 THE eso AND ECONOMIC THEORIES ON SINGLE CHANNEL MARKETING
The Central Selling Organisation (CSO) is synonymous with. the diamond industry.
Established by De Beers Consolidated Mines (pty) Ltd, the CSo controls the supply of
rough diamonds worldwide.
The following section reviews the worl<ings and structure of the CSO and provides a
theoretical background to the concept of single channel marketing.
3.2.1 Review of the eso
A short review of the history, objectives and structure of the CSO follows.
3.2.1.1 History of the eso
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, the diamond market was subject tp successive
boom/bust cycles of about eight years duration, However, the Great Depression OT ~he
early 1930s brought the entire diamond industry to an almost complete halt. Demand for
diamonds suddenly collapsed and the over-supply situation was exacerbated by the then
newly discovered alluvial fields of Namibia, Namaqualand and Lichtenburg, which had
begun producing large quantities of high quality diamonds at relatively low cost.
Throughout the early 1920S, the diamond market was contracting and yet newly mined
output Was expanding. Due to producer conflicts, the public's faith in diamonds was
reduced even further. As a result by 1934. De Beers' Kimberley mines had closed down.
It was the Great Depression which engineered the concept of the CSo as we know it
today. In princlple, the CSO endeavours to control rough diamond world supply and
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regulate sales, thereby attempting to curtail large price fluctuations. Others believe that the
eso creates a manipulated, artificial industry, where demand is controlled via the
availability of certain categories of rough diamonds. (Miller, 1987, pp 37-38)
Nicholas Oppenheimer (De l3ee~, p 3), the current eso chairman, said in his address to
the Botswana {3overnment recently:
"...history has shown that the level of diamond sales is linked to economic
cycles and that without a single body regulating supplies to the market.
diamond prices would fluctuate violently during these cycles. The CSO
operates as a buffer pool between the producers a;1d consumers, absorbing
surplus production when market demand is weak, and providing an orderly and
disciplined supply when the market is strengthening. The eso exists to give
producers and consumers confidence and to ensure the long-term stability of
the industry ...",
In 1929, the re-actlvated London Diamond Syndicate ceased its actillities as a marketing
channel and was replaced in 1930 by the Diamond Corporation, which Sir Ernest
Oppenheimer absorbed into what became the CSO. All the Significant producers at that
time, Angola, Ghana, Namibia and Zaire, together with De Beers, agreed to sell exclusively
throl.lgh the esa in London. The key principles underlying this new marketing policy were
guarantees given by the eso to buy all productions under set quotas at fixed prices, and
to stockpile, together with its producer partners, When market condltlons so required (De
Beers, p 1~).
3.2.1.2 cso Objectives
In 1936, Sir Ernest Oppenheimer wrote in his foreword to Hadley Chilvets' "The Story (If
De Beers" (James Capel Mining Research, 1992, p 9):
1I, .. in the purely diamond sphere (Cecil) Rhodes laid down as the policy of De
Seers to acquire the control of diamonds in South Africa; and to arrange, in so
far as possible, for the entire diamond production of the world to be marketed
through one channel. These remain the fundamental aims of De Beers and
principles on which the diamond trade is based. It was, moreover, now
possible to design and conduct mining operations systematically and
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economically, and what was of still greater importance. to regulate output
according to market demand ...",
Diamond prices have been successfully upheld as a result of single channel marketing,
and this is the reason why the eso has survived where other organisations involved with
commodity stabilisation agreements have foundered. The example of OPEC and the price
of oil is worth eXamining closer. Without ever being a central selling channel, OPEC tries
to operate in many ways like the eso, partioular!y in regard to harmonising preduction and
consumption, and in SfA.bilising prices. However, most, if not all the OPEC producers
exceed their agreed production quotas and, although this does not constitute a large
percentage of total oil sales, it is enough to undermine oil prices, Perhaps one should also
I~i
mention the collapse in October 1985 of the International Tin Oouncil which, overloaded
with high-priced stocks. removed its support from the market, with disastrous
consequences for the price of tin. Because the major producers freely consent to sell
exclusively through one channel, the eso is able to preserve an orderly market by
matching rough diamond sales closely to final consumer C:~mand. Diamonds that are
surplus to the market's requirements and which would depress prlcesjf made available,
are kept in reserve. By selling through the eso, the producers are protected against
short-term price fluctuations and have the benefit of guaranteed sales at stable prices, an
aspect critical for diamond mines .
.These features of single channel marketing, and the matching of supply with demand,
ensure price stability of rough diamond prices, and remain as valid today as they did some
sixty years ago (Miller, 1987, p 46). They are fundamental to the operations <.,f De Beers'
CSO. According to the eso's PR brochure:
"...the Central Selling Organisation provides the mechanism for the orderly
marketing of the world's diamonds in line with demand in order to ensure stable
market conditions. The eso is best described as a producers' co-operative
whose main role is:
(i) To purchase an agreed minimum quantity of di&monds from majol'
producers.
(ii) To maintain substantial financial resources, which enables it to
stock any surplus quant7ties of rough diamonds which the market
cannot absorb.
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(iii) To market rough diamonds on behalf of major producers,
(iv) To advertise and promote the sale of both gem and industrial
dlarrends on a global scale, utilising its unrivalled creative skills and
knowledge of consumer markets ...".
During De Beers' Investor Presentation to the financial community at the Carlton Hotel in
Johannesburg, South Atrica (De Beers, 1990), the rollowing benefits of single channel
marketing were highlighted:
(i) Steady and sustained growth in diamond prices.
(ii) Confidence throughout the industry leading to stability and continued
prosperity,
To participating producers De Beers offers:
(iii) Advertising, promotion and market research,
(iv) Financial strength and buffer stock operation.
(v) Guarantee of purchase.
(vi) Hesearoh and development.
(vii) Expertise in sorting, valuing and marketing.
(viii) Knowledge of the diamond pipeline.
(ix) A history of success.
Naturally, the demand for diamond jewellery is continuously stimulated by the CSO's
sophisticated consumer advertising and promotional campaigns that cover 30 countries,
and which are supported by a substantial annual budget (more than US$160 million for
1993) (De Beers, 't992, p 41).
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3.2.1.3 Structure of the eso
The eso is an associatlon of diamond trading companies controlled ~y De Beers. De
Beers attempts to control supply and not produci~;'; since foreign pr~ducers have the
option of either cutting back production or stockpiling at their e~ense. Such producers
may not normally offer any excess production over their quotas for sale elsewhere. Supply
of diamonds to the eso, subject to quota impositions, is made attractive by the price
received by the producers. This is general:y a discount to the csa official prices received
at sights, in the region of 12 per cent, which is a small price to pay for the CSO marketing
and advertising expertise and the guaranteed sale of at least a portion of-the production. It
is also significant that the eso has never actually decreased the price of rough diamonds
across the board. Whilst defection from the CSO and independent'~elling could perh:':"ps
result in increased sales volumes for e< producer, such sales will probably be at a
substantial discount. They may even be bought at that discount by the eso, as happened
to Zaire during its short defection in the early 1980s (Bright, 1987, p 70).
Bright continues (1987, p 75), :?tating that few inefficiencies have been exposed in the CSO
system for regulating world diamond markets and hence prices during its nnany years of
operation. Should another party be successful in obtaining large quantitles ()f stones from
non-oso producers or defectors, De Beers with its immense stockpile, div91'Sityof stones
and huge financial resources could disrupt any competitor or sustain a price War. A
considerable proportion of the world's quality diamond output comes from third world
countries having few other sources of foreign exchange. De Beers' contracts ensure
long-term income stability. However, a problem exposed in the CSO's system in recent
years was that of dangerously low levels in diamond stocks (1977 to 1980). J:.leingunable
to supply sufficient quantities of certain types of diamonds to a world gripped with 'diamond
fever', some producers became sceptical that they were getting the best possible deals
from De Beers, and have since split their production, selling a portion outside Clf the eso.
G$O sales are market-led and reflect the state of the market itself. Simplified
lnternationally, De Beers' Diamond Producers Association (DPA) formulates policy and
seeks to set output quotas. The Diamond Trading Company (DTC) buys gem diamonds
iro{(1 the DPA through the Diamond Purchasing and Trading Company (PUR'rRA). The
DTC then sorts the diamonds and offers them to the general public at sales which are
known as '<:lights'. These sights occur 10 times per annum at the eso's head office in
London at 17 Oharterhouse Street. Smaller sights take place in Johannesburq and
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Lucerne, but these only account for about five per cent ef the CSO's total sales (Miller,
1987, pp 38-40).
Roughly 80 per cent of the world's diamond production passes through the CSO. The
remaining 20 per cent (the so-called 'outside market') consists mainly of widespread
alluvial deposits in Africa, South America and elsewhere (De Beers, 1992, p 33).
The eso employs 1300 staff in London, 600 of Whom are sorters. Some 14 tons of rough
diamonds each year (around 650 million stones) are sorted into well over 5000 individual
oateqorles (depending, mainly on size, shape, colour and cla.rity) (De Beers, 1992, P 3,t::.\.
The full marketing channel (De Beers, 1990) that a diamond passes through on its journey
from the earth to its final owner is commonly called the 'diamond pipeline', shown below.
Market research, Advertising, Promotion &. Publicity
Major
Diamond
Producer
Cutting
Centres
(CSO clients)
Polished Jewellery
Wholesalers Manufacturers
and Wholesaler
Trade Liaison and Market Surveys
In South Africa, rough diamond distribution by De Beers is as complex as that of
international diamond distribution. Diamonds produced by De Beers mines, those from
producers contracted to De Beers and other sources (diggers for instance), find their way
to the Harry Oppenheimer House (HOH) in Kimberley where they are subsequently sorted
and priced by CSO Valuations staff. From here, the rough di~,rr'()'1dsdeemed economical
to process locally go first through PURTRA, which sells XCi "), The DTC sells at
regular 'sights' (10 times per annum as is the case in London) to ).JeBeers sightholders, of
which there are 20 (of the estimated 160 worldwide) in $iouth Africe, However, local
sight holders do not deal with CSO brokers as is the policy overseas. 'Ihe DTC also sells to
the Diamond Development Company (DIAMDEL) which again sells to non-sightholders.
Diamonds deemed uneconomical to process locally are exported through the Diamond
Corporation (DICORP) and De Beers Industrial Diamonds (PTY) Ltd (DEBID).
3.2.2 Economic Systems
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The concept of singl~ channel marketing, particularly in the case of rough diamonds, have
received extensive praise and ridicule since the establishment of the eso.
A concise review of those factors and market systems relev~I'lt to the diamond industry,
which have often been misrepresented, is discussed below.
3.2.2.1 Background
\\
\\
Koutsoyiannis (1982, p 154) describes perfect competition as a markek structure
II
characterised by a complete absence of rivalry among individual firms.
In any economic system the production of goods take place, i.e. the creation or supply.
Stonier (et al., 1972, P 33) states that supply depends on scarcity and whether a good is
economically scarce depends on its relation to the demand for it. The answer to why
goods are scarce then is that goods can only be prochIced with the help of the factors of
production, e.g. workers, equipment, entrepreneurs etc, and these factors are themselves
limited in amouot.
The traditional theory of demand (Koutsoyiannis" 1982, P 13) has concentrated on four
determinants; the price of the commodity, other prices, income and tastes. However,
demand is a multivariate relationship, that is, it is determined by many factors
simultaneously, Some of the most important determinants of the market demand for a
particular product are its own price, consumers' income, prices of other comrnoditles,
consumers' tastes, income distribution, total population, consumers' wealth, credit
availability, Government policy, past levels of demand, and past levels of income.
It can be said that the eXisting diamond industry in South Africa mirrors the international
diamond industry, though, of course, much smaller in terms of production and
consumption. De Seers contributes approximately 95 per cent to Scuth African production.
Most interesting about the diamond industry is that the regulation of supply ultimately
determines the level of demand. Moreover, it is the manipulation of supply that leads to
the creation of an artificial industry. Often the mistake has been made by assuming that
rough diamond production equals rough diamond supply. This is not the case.
Internationally, De Beers only accounts for about 30 per cent (including Debswana, l.e,
Botswana's diamond mines, and, Namibia) of natural rough diamond production. It is
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contractually !ir,ked to producers in Australia, the CIS, African Oountries such as Zaire,
Angola, Guinea etc and others worldwide which enables De Beers, through the OSO, to
supply soms 60 per cent of rough diamonds to tn3market. FrClr,j>;'lere, the eso 'prepares', '
the consumer market by adverlising and 'polished diamond promotion campaigns.
3.2.2.2 Cartels
"!\
Within cartels, two ccllusive forms are found (Koutsoy1annis, 1982, pp 242-243); non-price
competltlon agreements (member firms agree on a common price) and determining of
'J
quotas (agreement on tho quantity each member may sell),
Miller (1987, p37) explains that tor cartels to be able to survive the.test of time, a
sufficiently high share of production, or the price of the product (or commodity) needs to be
controlled. A. decline in the majority share of output undermines the global price and if the
price is too high. substitution or conservatlon measures tend to erode the overall level of
market demand. Inevitably. in weak markets cartel members become involved in
competitive price-cutting. For a cartel to be successful, it must have a flexible (fair) price
mechanism which:
(i) Discourages the creation of new supply unless it can be simultaneOllsly
generate sufficient new demand.
(il) Provides little impetus for research into SUbstitution and conservation.
'" herefore, for a cartel to continue to expand, it must conform to the above criteria, but must.
also be able to;
(iii) Demand that members reduce or stockpile production during periods of 10 !If
economic activity.
(iv) Finance the holding of excess supplies which may be needed during periods of
lean demand.
In summary, a cartel must act in' a way which is to the long term benefit of the majority of
both producers and consumers. If otherwise, it is bound to fai .~
3.2.2.3 Monopolies
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A monopoly (Koutsoyiannis, 198:::, p 17'1) is a market structure in which there is a sin91e
seller. there are no close substitutes for the commodity it produces and there are barriers
to entry. "he main causes that lead to monopoly are:
(i) Ownership of stra.tegic raw materials.
(ii) Exclusive knowledge of production techniques.
(iii) Patent rights for a product or for a production process.
(iv) Government licensing or the imposition of foreign trade barriers to exclude
foreign competitors.
(v) The size of the mar'« i may not be able to support more than one plant of
optimal size,
Importantly, Stonier (1972, p 200) stresses that many firms which are described as
monopolists in discussion in the press, radio or television are not monopolists at all in the
economist's sense of the word, i.e:
"...for a monopolist to exist, the only condition required is that within the
relevant market area there shall be no close substitutes for the products of the
firm in question ...",
(
Monopolies have always been seen as sOl11ethillgsinister and undesirable. Undoubtedly,
some are. But. it cannot be claimed that De Seers has a monopoly of production since it
only represents about eight and 16 per cent of the world's output by volume and value,
respectively. This increases to 28 and 53 per cent resp~lctively if Botswana and Namibia
are included (James Capel Mining Research. 1992, pp 9-11).
3.2.2.4 Oligopolies
An oli30poiy is a market form of imperfect competition. A monarchy has a single ruler, an
oligarchy has a small group of rulers. The simplest case of Oligopoly occurs when there
are only two sellers and is known as duopoly (Stonier, 1972, p 2~17).
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Koutsoylannls (1982, pp 237-238) further emphasised that in terms of an oligopoly, two
distinctive market industries ar'" Cou)1d; non' collusive and collusive oligopol}/. The two
!
main types of collusion are cartels and price leadership. Cartels imply direct (although
secret) agreements among the competing oligopolies with the aim of reducing uncertainty
arising from their mutual interdependence. In this particular case the aim of the cartel is
the maximising of the industry Goint} profit. The situation is identical with that of a
multiplant monopolist who seeks the maximising of' his profit. In this study, we concentrate
on a homogeneous or pure oligopoly, l.e, an oligopoly where all the firms produce a
homogeneous product. The firms appoint a central agency, to which they delegate the
authority to decide not only the total quantity alld the price at which it must be sold so as to
attain maximum group proms, but also the allocation of production among the group
members of the cartel, and the distribution of the maximum joint profit among the
participating members. The authority of the central agency is complete. Clearly the central
agency will have access to the cost figures of the individual firms.
Price leadershlp (Koutsoyiannis, 1982, pp 244·248) is a form of co-ordinated behaviour of
oligopolist$ where one firm sets the price and the others follow it because ff is
advantageous to them, or because they prefer to avoid uncertainty about their competitors'
reactions. It may be practiced either by explicit agreement or informally. Price leadership
is more widespread than cartels, because it allows the members complete. freedom
regarding their product and selling activities and thus is more acceptable to the followers
than a complete cartel. There are various forms of price leadership. The most common
are:
(i) Price leadership by ~ low-cost firm.
(ii) Price leadership by a large (dominant) firm, also a 'partial monopoly'.
(I:i) Barometric price leadership,
The price-leadership model will lead to a stable equilibrium if the leader has the power to
make the other firms in the industry follow his price increase or price decreases, and
provided that there is some agreement (or other means) for sharing the market, so that the
followers produce the 'right' quantity. that is, the quantity whioh is required to maintain the
pries set by the leader. In order to have the power to impose his price the leader must be
both a low-cost and a large firm. In the case of a barometric price leader, it is f6rm~lIy or
informally agreed that r~1Ifirms will follow (exactly or approximately) the changes of price in
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a firm which is considered to have a good knowledge of the prevailing conditions and can
forecast better than the others future developments in the market. In short, th.e firm chosen
is considered as a barometer, reflecting the changes in economic environment.
Probably the most accurate description of the workings and structure or t:.e eso has been
given by M von Saldem (Resources Policy, 1992, pp 45-58) in the process of acquiring his
Ph.D thesis titled 'Forecasting rough diamond prices: A non-linear optimization model of
dominant firm behaviour'.
He explains that the eso, acting as a dominant firm, controls about 75 per cent of the
wor;lr,!supply of rough diamonds and exercises substantial market power. By announcing
non-negotieble prices and manipulating supply and demand through stockpiling and
advertising activities, the eso acts as a price setter at. 'lot as a price taker.
All major producers have found it in their economic interest to enter into sales agreements
with the eso for the benefit of stable and higher prices than would otherwise prevail.
Typically, the eso currently charoes a 10 per cent commission for its services, which
includes the actual sorting and marketing of .a producers' entire product line, price
supporting activities such as buffer stocks, and a major global advertising programme.
While the eso in effect guarantees minimum revenues to the producers and thus
significantly reduces their downside market risk, it also retains the right to enforce
production quotas. The eso continuolJsly faces the challenge that producers prefer to
enjoy the benefits of higher prices without contributing to the costs of buffer stocks and
global marketing. This is especially true of smaller producers who tend to market their
goods independently since they evaluate their market risks differently from larger
producers and enjoy a 'free rider' situation. Nevertheless, only about a quater of the
world's rough diamond production eludes the eso. Thus, the interface between the
extraction of rough gem diamonds and the further processing of these stones in cutting
centres represents a bottle-neck at which the eso commands substantial market power.
According to Von Saldern (Resources Policy; 19!~2,pp 47-48) out of the mr,lny economic
theories describing non-competitive market structures the definition of an oligopoly I with
the eso acting as the dominant firm facing several competitive fringe producers, best
portrays the given particularities. The eso, end not De Beers, was chosen as the
dominant firm because it is at the marketing level of tough gern-quality diamonds rather
than at the production level itself that competition is most severely curtailed within the
industry, The eso faces fringe producers who market their production or portions of their
.30
production outside eso channels. The dependency .between the dominant firm and all
other suppliers of rough diamonds (the 'fring~') can be multifaceted. For the sake of
simplicity the Von Stackelperg theory of price leadership was chosen to describe such
interaction. According to the Von Stackelberg model the competitive fringe is assumed to
be a price-taker, while the dominant firm acts as a price-maker who considers the reactioh
of the competitive fringe. In accordance with these assumptions, the dominant firm
maximises its profit by applying, the monopoly solution to its net demand. Net demand is
gefined as the residual demand obtained by subtracting the quantity supplied by the fringe
,\ '.~
f?~\mtotal demand; thus net demand represents the demand facirlg the dominant firm.
As a concluding statement, one can do no better than quote Mr Harry Oppenheimer,
former Chairman of De Beers, when questioned as to whether De Be,ers operated a
monopoly:
It, •• but if it does. it is certainly a monopoly of a most unusual kind. There is no
one concerned wnh diamonds, whether as producer, dealer, cutter, jeweller or
customer, who does not benefit from it.r It protects not only the shareholders of
diamond companies, but also the miners they employ, and the communities'
that are dependent on their operations (James Capel Mining Research, 1992,
,
P 11)...",
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CHAPTER 4
4 ROUGHDIAMONDSUPPLY
This chaptsr examines primarily the quantity and quality of rough diamonds mined from the
variou~deposits in South Africa. The importance of De Beers Consolidated Mines is also
evalua,l;ed.
4.1 ;Occurrence of Diamond DepclSits
In:South Africa, the largest proportion of dlamond production oriqlnatea from kimberlite
pipes and fissures, followed by alluvial and then marine deposits.
The major kimberlite diamond mines in South Africa are the Finsch Mine (located in the
Cape Province, near Lime Acres), Premier Mine (in the Northern Transvaal, near C"Jilinan),
the I<imberley 'Pool' Mine9 (Dutoitspan, Bultfontein and Wesselton in Kimberley) and the
newly started Venetia Mine (at Alldays in the far Northern Transvaal}.
The prinolpal alluvial deposits in South Africa are those found around the confluence of the
Vaal and Harts Rivers (Prieska to Potohefstroorn), those on the plains of the Western
Transvaal (Lichtenburg and Ventersdorp districts). and those on the Namaqualand coast,
from the mouth of the Orange River southward. Some minor occurrences of alluvial
diamonds are also found in the Northern Transvaal, east along the Vaal River (Standerton)
and further east, up the Orange River to Aliwal North.
Manne (coastal) deposits are mined on the West Coast, from Alexander Say at the mouth
of the Orange River, southwards. A total of 20 demarcated concession areas stretch from
"
Alexander Bay down south past the Olifants River to Cape Columbine. Approximately 30
companies are active in these concession areas,
4.2 Production by Type of Deposit
Figure 4.1 depicts the kimberlite, alluvial and marine rough diamond production of South
Africa from 1980 to 1990.
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FIGURE 4.1 ~RSAOIAMOND PRODUCTION BY TYPE OF DEPOSIT, 1980'1990
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In 1990, South Africa's: annual rough diamond production amounted to 8,71 million carats;
fifth largest worldwide.
From 1980 to 1990, a total of 103,4 million carats were mined from kimberlite, alluvial and
marine diamond deposits in South Africa (see Appendix 1). This equals about one year's
current natural rough diamond production in the world.
4.2.1 Kimberlite Diamond Prodl.lCtion
!n 1990, 1,4 million carats of kimberlitic diamonds were produced. Its share of total output
amounted to) 85 per cent.
From 19~1 onwards, the share held by kimberlite mines is expected to increase due to
mining of the Veretia diamond deposit. Venetia's output of 5-6 million carats per year is
expected towards 1993/1994. Theoretically, South Africa's diamond production should be
boosted to some 14-15 million carats per annum. However, declining output from the older
mines, particularly those belonging to the Kimberley 'Pool' group, l.e. the Dutoitspan,
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Bultfontein and Wesselton Kimberley mines and Premier Mine, is expected to suppress
higher output levels.
With the exception of Venetia, all South African kimberlite mining is currently underground.
These mines are still expected to playa major role in the supply of gem-quality diamonds
locally. But, it is expected that fewer gems will be recovered, due to deeper underground
mining, and combined with this, an expected deterioration in quality and overall size.
Diamonds recovered from the Venetia Mine are moderate to good gem-quality material.
These stones may (still to be proven) be profitable to cut and polish locally. The stones
from Venetia are assumed to be similar to Australian diamonds in terms of hardness (and
twinning), making them more difficult and time consuming to process.
4.2.2 Alluvial Diamond Production
In 1990, alluvial output amounted to 1,2 million carats, or 14 per cent of total production.
The approximate 400 alluvial diggers currently active make a valuable contribution to local
rough diamond supply that is economically profitable to process locally.
On average, more than 80 per cent of alluvial stones are gem-quality. The stones are
normally more rounded (which allows a greater yield percentage than normal crystal
structured stones) and higher in terms of quality, i.e, more homogeneous in clarity and
size with good colour.
4.2.3 Marine Diamond Production
Dlamonds, recovered from marine deposits, in volume terms, are minimal when compared
to kimberlite and alluvial deposits. In 1980, marine diamonds mined totalled a mere 45 002
carats. As operations are dependent on weather conditions, output is more varlaple than
kimberlite or alluvial mining. In 1990, marine diamond production more than doubled from
1989, to 130064 carats, or 1,5 per cent of the year's total diamond output.
As in tile case of alluvial diamonds, marine stones are typically gem-quality. with an
average gem percentage (in volume) of 85 per cent. lIJIarine diamonds recovered from
coastal gravels (including those found in submerged trenches and gullies) contain more
crystal shaped (octagonal) stones than do alluvial's. They are generally also smaller, and
in some cases extremely hard. The majority of marine output is locally processed.
FIGURE 4.2 - STRUCTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S DIAMOND MINING INDUSTRY, 1990
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4.3 Mining COmpanies; structure and Production
Figure 4.2 depiotaths structure of South Africa's diamond mining industry.
In 1990, there were 72 mines operating in the country (excluding about 400 alluvial diggers
operative in the Transvaal, Cape Province and Orange Free State). Of these, 27 mined
kimberlites, 18 alluvial deposits and 27 marine areas.
I)
Contributing. 8,15 million carats (or 93,6%) to South Africa's total diamond output in 1990,
De Beers Consolidated Mines is the most important diamond mining company in South
Africa (Figure 4.3). The non-Of' t}eers sector comprises a few moderately sized producers
St ,II as Trans Hex Miningi.\ Irans Hex), Alexander Bay Development Corporation
(Alexkor), Carrig Diamonds and Helam Mining, smaller companies and the alluvial diggers,
Trans Hex and Alexkor accounted for 134 100 carats (1,54% of the total) and i73 697
carats (2%), respectively. Some 68171 carats (0,8%) originated from alluvial diggers.
FIGURE 4.3- CONTRIBUTION TO DIAMOND OUTPUT BY PRODUCERS
Put in perspective, the non-De Beers sectors' total diamond output (in carats) from 1980 to
1990, approximates merely 7'1 per cent of De Seers' 1990 production.
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4.3.1 RSA Gem Diamond Production
James Cape! Mining Research (1982, p 30) reports that 62 per cent of South Africa's entire
rough diamond natural production (for the years from 1986 to 1992) is of gem (25%) and
near-gem (3'1%) quality. The balance, those diamonds of industria! quality, totals" 38 per
cent.
However, rsrspeoted and knowledgable diamond analysts (Kartun, K., Brown, P., 1992,
personal communication) estimates a higher gem and near-gem percentage share; more
in the order of 70·75 per cent.
In terms of the gem: industrial world diamond output ratio (excluding Namibia), South
Africa could wen ra~k first in the world. However, the substantial share of gem diamonds
to industrials, must be seen in perspective.
Gem-quality diamonds are determined principally by the economic value of the stone, At
present, low, cheaper quality stones (classified as industrials a few years ago), are called
'near-gems', The continual increases in rough diamond prices, a trend never reversed in
the diamond industry, boosted low priced goods into competitive margins. Low-cost
processing firms in countries such as India· are able to profitably process these stones.
Along With that, demand for small, low value polished diamonds lnoreased in the Pacific
Rim countries, owing to more aggressive marketing from De Beers.
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CHAPTER 5
5 DIAMONDTRADING
Rough diamond trading in South Africa is complex, This chapter purposes, ou the one
hand, to evaluate the consumption of rough diamonds by local dealers and cutters mined
from the various deposits by local companies in the Republic. In addition, it aims to
examine the role of the principal players, i.e. ,.lror..iucers,dealers and cutters in South
Africa's diamond trading network. It is therefore pertinent that the sales of rough diamonds
by producers from kimberlite, alluvial and marine deposits are examined, followed by a
revision of the trade profile of diamond dealers, producers and cutters.
5.1 Structure of Rou!~hDiamond Trading
Figure 5.1 depicts the movement of diamonds in South Af!'ba's trading industry.
5.2 Examination of Diamond iJeposit Sales
5.2.1 The 'Avel'Bge Price/Carat' Factor
Diamonds are traded in US dollars internationally, and in South Africa. The exchange rate
naturally plays an important role in diamond trading as dollar accounts iocally are not
allowed.
The average diamond price. i.e, the unit value, is expressed as $Ieara! (m~\inly), and
Rlcarat and applied as an indicative faQ.tm:implying a trend of development in ~; specific
category, i.e, gem-quality diamonds, whether rough or polished. In the diamond industry
the use of 'average prices' can be misleading. Parcel 'make-up', or the so-called 'mix' can
differ greatly in terms of volume, mass, quality and shape, and still eqll8tC to one value.
5.2.2 Kimberlite Diamond sales
In volume terms, 51,2 per cent more kimberlite diamonds were sold locally in 1990 than in
1985 (Table 5.1). However, the 702,2 thousand carats absorbed by the local processing
FIGURE 5.1 - SOUTH AFRICA'S DIAMOND TRADING INDUSTRY, 1990
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industry in 1990, amounted only to 9,4 per cent of !otal kimperlite: sales, the balance
(90,6%} being exported.
In 199(), local sales of kin::Jeriite diamonds were -;3~~;5p~r cent higher than 1985'~ figure,
and 54 per cent of total sales. The R/carl:it price inCf9$,sedby 54,4 per cent (from 1gaG .to
~.. . . ~.. .~
1990), whilst the $/c~rat value improved~\Only32,8 pel'bent.
The cumulative nominal eso (London) price increases (from 1986 onwards) totalled 59
per cent.' The $/carat growth of 32,8 per cent from 1985 to t990 in South Africa, implies at .··"i . . . ..... - - -\
'Iower'fhcm average rough diamond price increase. This is evident by the growth in $Ic~~at
sales of alluvial and marine local gem diamonds viz., 81,2 per cent and 93,3 per cent.
}>
ii
Kimberlite diamond exports declined by 15,8 per cent to 6 71.,5,6 thousand carats in 1990
(8 008,7 thousand carats in 1985), whilst the revenue generated from the sales increased
by 62,9 per cent.
5.2.3 Alluvial Di~mond Sales
Alluvial local and export diamond sales followed a similar trend to that Qf kirnberllte
,I
diamond sales. For the six years (Table 5.1) up to 1990, sales vo!urnif and value
increased by 115;4 per cent (to 662 thousand carats) and 354,8 per cent, respectively. In
addition, alluvial diamond sales mass and value increased to 54,S per cent and '/'4,4 per
cent of local sales in 1990, respectively. The average price in 1990i'rcse by 81 ,2 per cent
from the 1985 figure.
Alh,lvial export sales (in 1990) decreased by ~2,9 per cent from 1985 (to 544 300 carats),
whilst its value (1990's) improved by 24,8 per cent. The reason for this was the 60,3 per
cent increase in export price from 1985 to 1990,
5.2.4 Marine Oiamond Sales
Since 1985, marine diamonds sold to local cutters increased by 333,9 per cent in volume
(to 112 800 carats), and 872,4 per cent in value in 1990 (Table 6.1).
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TABLE 5.1 ~ROUGH DIAMOND DEPOSIT SALES, 1885* ..1990
C=;aSRLlTE OlAMONDSALES~~~-_. -
LqCAL EXPORT
,,', %Car]~YEAR t'1arOOO %cat %R car 000
1985 464,4 51!" 45,1 8 008,7
"
I 94,5 154,9
1986 510,5 6,0 ! 42.,5 7942,4 94,0 67,5
1987 t)83,8 5,9 1,3,9 9 234,1 94.1 511,1
1988 952,1 12.5 61,8 6 667,2 87,S 38,2
1,989 784,2 10,6 53,9 6 579,9 89,4 46;1
1990 702,2 9,4 54,0 6 745,6 90,6 4\3,0
TOT :3 991,3 8,1 51,2 45 178,1 91,9 48,8
ALLUVIAL DIAMOND SALES .-
t.OCAL EXPORT
YEAR car 000 %car %R
I
car'OOO %car %R-. -
'1985 306,6 27,4 44,4 811,3 72,6 55,6
1986 437,8 26,8 45,2 1 194,3 73,2 54,8
1987 480,4 34,1 52,6 929,3 65,9 47,4
1988 800,3 58,7 76,5 562,0 41,3 23,5
1989 787,8 65,2 79,6 421,4 34,8 20,4
1990 662,0 54,9 74,4 544,3, 45,1 25,6
TOT 3474,8 _L43,8 66,5 4 462,5 56,2 33,5.~- ....-
MARINE DIAMOND SALE:S ,
~OOAL'--~
....----:'
EXPORT
.....-.-
I%car
'----YEAR car'OOO %car %R car 000 %R
'1985
'.,.......
26,0 58,1 64,2 18,8 41,9 35,8
196.:. 23,8 63,6 72,6 13,6 36,4 27,4
1987 23,0 62,7 64,5 13,7 37,3 35,5
1988 47,3 80,7 91,0 11,3 19,3 \~,Q
1989 73,5 96,4 98,9 2,8 ;_t1'11990 112,8 92,0 97,5 9,8 B.O 2.5
TOT 306,4 81,4 91,3 69,9 18,6 8,7"_
Source: The Minerals Bureau of South Africa, 1992
Notes:
car
%
·~arats
PercentagE' share
Earlier records made no provision for kimberlite,
alluvial and marine diamond sales
'/
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In terms of total marine production, the share absorbed by the local industry improved)Tom
58,1 per cent (1985) to '92 per cent (1990) in volume. Similarly, 97,5 per cent of the ~~t1ue
of marine diamond sales was absorbed locally {1990), at an average rough diamond price
which was 93,3 per cent higher than that of 198B's.
Exports of marine.diamonds dropped significantly. Rough dlarnond mass, value and price
decreased from 1985 to 1990 by 57,9 per cent in volume (9 800 carats), 53/(p~r cent in
/r
value and 26,1 per cent in price ($/carat), respectively. The price decline W4~ probably the
result of lower gem-quality diamond exports.
5.2.5 Total Diarnond Sales
Total local rough diamond sales from kimberlite, alluvial and marine deposits to local
lndustry were 800 000 carats in 1985 (Table 5.2). Growing steadily, and peaking at 1,8
million in 1988, it levelled off to 1,48 million carats in 1990. Although diamonds from
kimberlite deposits still feature prominently as a supplier of economically outtable gems to
South Africa's processing industry, its domination (in the short period from 1985 to 1990)
has faded. In terms of mass and value, I<imberlite diamonds contributed 58 per cent and
68 per cent to local de:.land, respectively. But, in 1990, however, its contribution
decreased to 48 per cent (in mass) and 50 per cent (in value). Since total local demand
has lnorsased, the importance of alluvial and marine stones for local consumption has
heightened. Reasons for this could be the expected decline in quality and caratage
produced by kimberl~e diamond mines.
Marine diamonds' contribution to local sales, in 1985, almost trebled to eight per cent in
1990, both in terms of mass and value,
The average dollar/carat price for all three types of deposits improved steadily; a 47,7 per
cent increase from 1985 to 1990.
The strong impact of industrial diamond sales on local and export sales, and on the overall
diamond contribution from kimberlite' deposits is noticeable. Some 85 per cent of total
sales mass of industrial-quality diamonds originated from kimberlite diamond deposits.
From Figure 5.2 it can be seen that the volume of diamonds absorbed locally from
kimberlite deposits is mirrored b~'the local alluvial diamond sales volume. A steady
increase in marine diamond consumption also occurred as overall production improved.
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TABLe 5.2 - TOTAL DIAMOND DEPOSIT SALES,'1985-1990
'171'
k' LOCAL DIAMONIl SALES
))
:1
Year carlOOO Kshare A share M share
%car %R %car %R %CetY %R
1985 797,0 58 66 39 30 3 3
1986 972,2 53 63 45 35 3 2
1987 1087,2 54 65 44 34 2 2
1988 1 799,8 53 58 45 39 3 3
1989 1645,4 48 51 48 44 5 5
1990 1477.0 48 50 45 43 8 8
TOT 7778,5 51 56 45 40 4 4
LOCAL AND eXPORT DIAMOND SALES
Year car'ooo Kshare A share M share
%car %R %car %R %ca.r %R-
1985 9635,8 88 68 2 31 1 2
1986 10122,5 84 65 6 ~ <1 1
1987 11 264,2 87 69 3 30 <1 1
1988 9040,5 64 64 5 34 1 2
1989 8649,4 65 61 4 36 1 3
1990 8776,7 85 68 14 37 1 5
TOT 57489,1 86 63 14 34 ...) 3
Source: The Minerals Bureau of South Africa, 1992
Notes: car carats
% Percentage share
K Kimberlite diamond deposits
A Alluvial diamond deposits
M fI!1,· rine diamond deposits
-e Less than
In terms of lor.r I sales value, a similar trend is portrayed to that of local sales volume
(Figure 5.3).
Figure 5.4 shows that the $/carat value of kimberlite diamonds sold locally throughout the
six year period was higher than that of alluvial stones'. Whilst kimberlite diamond prices
decreased marginally from 1987 to 1989, those 'Of aiM ial diamonds steadily improv6d from
1985 to 1990. In addition. marine diamonds experienced the largest price increase during
this period, almost doubling in the $/carat price from 1987 to 19891 l.e, higher than
klmberlite prices.
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FIGURE 5.2· ROUGH DIAMOND CONTRIBUTION BY DEPOSIT TO LOCAL INDUSTRY
(in carats), 1985·1990
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FIGURE ~\3. ROUGH DIAMOND CONTRIBUTION BY DEPOSIT TO LOCAL INDUSTRY
(in value), 1985,'1990
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FIGURE 5.4 M FlOUGH DIAMOND CONTRIBUTION BY DEPOSIT TO LOCAL INDUSTRY
(in $Icarats), 1985·1990
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FIGURE 5,5 • ROUGH DIAMOND CONTRIBUTION BY DEPOSiT TO LOCAL INDUSTRY
(as a percentage), 1985-1990
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Figure 5.5 depicts the percentage contributions made by the three deposits; kimberlite,
alluvial and marine, to South Africa's local rough diamond consumption in terms of volume
and value. Kimberlite diamonds consumed locally have decreased in both respects 11 "11
1985 to 1990, Whilst the opposite occurred for alluvial and marine diamonds.
5.L.6 Company Contribution to Diamond Sales
The dominance. of the De Beers, aga\in, is reflected in the sales figures of Table 5.S.
As expecf:.',d,·De Beers dwarfs the two most prominent non-De Beers diamond mining
companies, Alexkor and Trans Hex in respect of diamond sales. However, Alexkor
achieved: ;the highest average $Icarat value for its alluvial and marine workings.
Importantly, De Beers markets Alexkor's entire production.
A low percentage of gem-quality rough diamonds of De Beers' production (in mass) is
consumed locally; a minimum of 7,1 per cent in 1982 and a maximum of 24.6 per cent in
1988.
The growth in local demand for De Beers' rough diamonds probably coincide with the
trends set internationally. In 1980, the diamond industry slump in rough gom diamond
demand was due to rough diamond oversupply and investor speculation. Whilst the strong
sales surge between 1986 and 1989, resulting in record breaking years for eSO sales,
reflected a stable rough gem supply on the one hand, and polished diamond offtake in
Japan and the USA.
5.3 Activitie..qof RSA Diamond Ijealers
The existence of rough diamond dealers is credited to the fact that their main function is
that of supplying diamonds o~;specific qualities to clients. Also, dealers supply the right
volume (which combined with the specific quality) make up the required pgrcel.m!~.
To cutting firms, the supply of constant volume of rough diamonds at consistent periods is
criticalto the effective running of a factory.
In the following discussion, emphasis is first placed on diamond dealers' purchases and
then their sales (Table 5.'3).
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There were 54 registered rough diamond dealers (h~cdr\g 1988 to 1990, of which five
recorded no trade during this 'period. Four of the 54 companies are subskliaries of De
Beers, vlz., Ihe Diamond Corporation (DICORP), the Diamond Developm~ni Cl)rporation
(DIAMDEL), be Beers Industrial Division (DESID), and De Beers i!;;~Q$.it12;;1Diamonds
Division. DICC'RP featured the most prominently in terms of rough diamonds traded (mass
and value).
TABU~ 5.3 - ROUGH DIAMOND TRADE BY RSA DEALERS, 1988-1990
/1 ..-
MASS VALUE PRICE
1----'
car\}:,;s R'OOO Rlcar $Icar#
Purchases by dealers
From other RSA* 34485 6977 949 182 73
Imported 849 235104 277 111
Other+ 1 867 66338 36 14.-
TOTAL 37201 7279391 196 79
,~Iesby dealers.
To. RSA dealers 17014 .2 525 085 148 60
To RSA CU\l",iS ,4542 3 298205 726 291
Exported 15296 1361348 89 36
TOTAL 36852 7184638 195 78--
Source: The South African Diamond Board, 1992
Notes: Excluding purchases by dealers from Diamdel
Inch;lding RSA digge~ and non- De Beers producers
+ Including m~i~ly other dealers as well as local cutters
:# Three year average dollar price, calculated at R2.49421$
*
5.3,1 D$amond Purchases t5jr Dealers
Rough diamond purchases by dealers from South Afr'ican producers. (alluvial diggers and
non-De Beers producers) from 19138to ·1990, totalled approximately R7 billion (34,5 million
l. ~rats). Expectedly, rough diamond dealers' main source ate diamond mines; amounting
to 96 per cent (in value) and 93 per cent (i11 volume) from 1988 to 1990.
ROl19h d~~ii';;~1l'"ire'~"j;'!"idl'(~m1988 to 1990 totQlled R23.1jmillion (849000 carats). Only 25
of the 54 dealers imported diamonds. With an import duty of 25 per cent on all pC\':~hed
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diamonds, it is assumed that the largest proportion, if not all, Wt::lre rough diamonds.
Besides isolated cases of industrial-quality diamond importe, the rough diamonds brought
";,
into the Republic, in terms of $Icarat, is higher than those stones purchased from South
African diamond producers, Demand by South African cutters for specific rough diamonds,
which should be more expensive, but more importantly, are not produced locally, may
explain the low volumelhigh value of imports.
Purchases between local cutters and dealers (also between c~el'S and dealers
themselves) amounted to R66,3 million (1,9 million carats) from 1988 to 1990. Only 10
companies were involved in this typepf activity, foremost being again D1CORP, accounting
for R53 million (80%) for the three years, at $161carat. DIAMDEL did not sell to any
dealers during this period. Acting as a dealer itself, DiAMDEL sells mostly to smaller
cutters (non-sightholders). This 'incentive' by De Beers commenced in the middle 1980's,
as smaller cutters requested a wider selection of goods, in order to obtain a 'windoW' on
local sightholders' 'sights'.
Total purchases by R8A dealers improved from 2,5 million carats (R1 billion) to 14;1' million
carats (R3,1 bilUon) and 20 million carats (R3,2 billion) in 1988, 1989. and 1990,
respectively, The price, however, deteriorated from $1681carat to $831caratand $61/carat,
respectively. This possibly was the result due to DICORP's increased purchases of lower
quality goods. (Note: DICORP mirrors the function of the DTC but only outside of South
Africa, i.e. it channels rough diamonds to the CSO in London. This negative trend may
imply that less good quality diamonds are coming from De Beers's Mines).
De Beers' share with regard to purc'sases (from 19U8 to 1990) amounted to 54, 95 and 97
per cent in volume terms, respectively, In terms of sales value, the company's contdbution
totalled 78, 91 and 97 per cent, respectively.
DICORP alone contributed 75 per cent (in mass terms) and $7 per Cent (value terms) t($
total dealers purchases for the three year period.
5.3.2 Diamond Sales by Dealers
From 1988 to 1990 dealers sold rough diamonds principally in U,·.~,eways; between
themselves, to South African cutters and, to foreign diamantaires.
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Diamonds sold by dealers intended for commission work, l.e, rough diamonds processed
by other factories locally or overseas, totalled -4 824 carats, valued at R67,1.million.
Rough selling between dealers from 1988 to 1990 totalled R2,5 billion; some 17 million
carats. DICORP's share was 93 per CS.lt of the total (by value). About 43 dealers
partloipated, contributing 46 per cent (mass) and 35 per cent (value) to the total. It can be
argued that such trade activity confirms the importance and need of rough diamond
dealers in the industry.
Rough diamond sales by dealers to South African cutters constitute the highest value of
the total, that of R:2,3billion (1988-1990). Yet, the volume sold (4,5 million carats) was low,
explaining the high average price.
Rough dealers' elxports amounted to R1,4 billion (15,3 million carats), principally by
,JICORP (82% of value and nine million carats in volume). At R921carat (about $30/carat),
the diamonds exported include gem, near-gem and industrial quality goods. Only 22
dealers exported rough diamonds from 1988 to 1990.
Featuring also prominently during this period was Trans Hex, the majority of its rough
diamonds absorbed by local cutters.
Total RSA dealers sales (from 1988 to 1990) amounted to 36,9 million carats (R7,2 billion).
Total dealers sales (for the three years) were marginally lower than total purchases, some
0,9 per cent and 1,3 per cent in mass and value terms, respectively.
De Beers' share of total sales were 55, 95 and 98 per cent in voiurne terms for the three
years. In terms of value, it totalled 79, 90 and 91 per cent, for the corresponding period.
Notably, the non-De Beers dealers sector (which only accounts for 1,7 per cent (mass
terms) and 10 per cent (value terms) of total sales) sold diamonds at $468icarat, some 156
per cent higher than its $1831carat purchase price. However, De Seers' dealers purchase
price ($731carat) and sales price ($721carat) showed marginal differences. Also, the
non-De Beers dealers average purchase price Were more than double than that of De
Beers'.
Whilst most dealers deal in gem-quality diamonds, the volume of De Beers sales coming
from DEBIDD, were of industrial quality.
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Overall, South Africa's rough diamo'iicl trade industry is dominated by De Beers' trading
companies.
5.4 The Role of the Diamond Bourse of South Africa
The Diamond Bourse of South Africa (OSSA) was established in October 1987, by virtue of
the Diamonds Act! 1986 (No 56 .r 1986).
The Bourse. a corporate body, is located in Johannesburg. It serves as a venue where
.ading of rt\\9h diamonds may be conducted between authorised diamond producers,
dealers and clutters. In the main, the rough diamonds on offer originate from producers not
contracted to De Beers, from rough diamond imports, and from stocks held by dealers and
cutters. Diamonds tendered are principally divided into two c?tegories; those selected for
local consumption, and those destined for export. Since its establishment, Bourse
membership has grown to approximately 160 members. It recently established a
centralised trading floor (on the premises) that may increase the level of activity in this
sector.
The Bourse is financed by a levy of 0,5 per cent on the value of a parcel locally sold; a one
per cent levy on the value of an exported parcel, and 1,5 per cent on the value of a parcel
with a price above Ri ,5 million.
In essence, the main thrust of the Bourse's activities lies in the creation of an opportunity
for RSA producers to competitively trade their goods (assuring an 'international' sale),
whilst tenderers (over a period of seven days) are offered a larger variety of rough
diamonds, differing in volume ana value, that otherwise would have been exported. De
Beers, of course, does not trade on the Bourse.
From 1987 to 1990 (Table 5.4), some 274 000 carats carats of tough diamonds were sold
through the OSSA locally, valued at R191,5 million, at an average price of $2781carat.
Parcels qualifying for export duty exemption totalled 770 000 carats, worth R306,9 million.
RSA diamond producers criticise the Bourse's (and for that matter the SADB's role therein)
trading practises in respect of the 'reserve price fixing' system, l.e. a producer must set a
minimum selling price (the reserve price), unknown to the buyer, on its rough diamond
parcel. The highest bid by a tenderer, equal to or above this price is considered a
successful sale, which also determines the 'acceptable market value' of the parcel. This
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system, producers aojue, prohibits the producer from earning 'top dollar for its rough
diamonds by forcing him (the producer) to sell his quality production locally, not being
allowed to compete internationally through a 'marketing window'. Not only is the 'run of the
mine' output, which can be defined as the rroduction-mix, drastically devalued (as cutters
absorb the best qualities through tendering), therefore burdening the producer with the
problem of marketing inferior qualities, but in addition, severe conflict develops when such
a producer learns that its own diamond production. in an unpolished state, is being
marketed abroad by a South African cutter.
"
TABLE 5.4· LOCAL SALES THROUGH THE DBSA, 1987·1990
carOOO I RMillion IRlcar I$lear
PARCELS SOLD LOCALLY
274 .1 191,5 I 700 I 278
PARQELS QUALIFYING FOR
EXPORT DUTY EXEMPTION
770 I 30t1,9 I 399 I 157'.··001",·n·ih_-
TOTAL ROUo..;H TRADED"
1 095 J 523,0 I 478 I 189
The Diamond Boul $$ of South Africa, 1992
Notes: * Excluding 'failures', i.e, where a parcel
did not nave a 'reserve price', and less
than three tenders were received on it
Unsuccessful sales, those that are allowec: exportation, need to be concluded at the
reserve price (the Reserve Bank allows about a two per cent margin) and also within a
short period to ensure the repatriation of the foreign sale.
Local producers demand that they be allowed the option to market their output as they see
fit, which they believe will realise higher prices outside of South Africa. However, since
local tenderers do not know the reserve price of a rough diamond parcel, a higher bid them
normal ofton takes place.
tJ
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CHAPTER 6
6 DIA.lI10ND PROCESSING
This chapter explains the structure and activities of South Africa's processing sector and
file beneficiation (the adding of value through cutting and polishing) of roug,::;diamonds.
6.1 Structure of the Processing Sector
Two distinctively different diamond processing groups arc; round in South Africa, so"called
'sightholders' and 'non-slqhtholders',
In 1990, there were 21 South African sightholders (1989=19; 1988=24). Each sightholder
consists of at least one, in most cases more, diamond cutting and polishing firms, referred
to as 'cutting concerns'. Exporting and sales companies (which market the polished
dlc.,11Ondsthat origina.te from the cuttLlg concerns) are directly linked to the slqhtholders.
Sightholders are large cutting concerns contracted to De Beers (eSO - Kimberley) for their
supply of rough diamonds. These sightholders, similar to those found overseas, receive
their parcels "10 times per annum, at so-called 'sights'.
Of the 21 sightholders, 49 clJ~ing firms make up these 'cutting concerns'. Polished, ,
diamond marketing companies total 12. Coincidentally, 12 sightholders do not employ any
marketing/sales companies.
Non-sightholders comprise those smaller cutting firma that do not qualify as slqhtholders.
De Beers determines these 'quallticaton' prerequisites in terms of, inter alia, the financial
record of firms, operating stability, workforce size and workmanship quality.
In 1990, approximately 140 South African cutting firms were registered (at the SADB).
About 100 are non-slqhtholders, of which an estimated 91)pp.r cent (of the 100) are fully
operational. These small cutting firms rely on the non-De Beers producers (including to a
large degree the alluvial diggers), rough diamond dealers, imports and\'the OBSA for
cuttable supplies.
6.2 Stn";ture Qf Sightholders
52
The ownership structure of South African sightholders explains the polishing and trading
policy of the various cutting concerns. Tabie 6.1 shows the ownership structure of
sightholders in South Africa's cuaing industry.
TABLE 6.1 - OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE uF SIGHTHOLDERS, 1990
SIGHTHOLOING GROI,JP FROM THE DTO,___
i' carats (%) Rand (%)"c, .~, '" ()
RSA controlled 24,9 17,2
~ ...___.
~SA controlled (non-resident Co director) 4,5 '7,0
I-------
RSA controlled with fore1gninterest of 40-50% 7,8 9,4
Foreign controlled with mInor RSA interest I 19,4 21,4
;.......
)':;'
[ Forejg~ controlleL_,. ~1,1 45,0
!
Source: The South Afriuan Diamond ~oard, 1992
Note: DT'c' Diamond Trading Company of De Beers
Sightholders ';~rlichQ'~ fully controlled by South Afric&n parties account for 25 per cent
(volume) and 17 per cent (value) oi DTC sales. Again~t this, sightholders which are fully
foreign controlled (mainly from Belgium, but also Israel, England, USA and Hong. Kong)
account for 43 per cent (in volume) and 45 per cent (in value) of DTO sales.
6.3 Activities of SightholdefS and Non'sighti1o!dcrs
As mentioned pr,~viously, RSA cutting concerns imply both sightholding and
non-slqhtholdlng cutting firms and their related marketing companies. 'table 6.2
summarises their trade pattern, i.e. purchasing and selling of rough/polished diamonds
from 196$ to 1990.
Ii'
Of the 4,9 million carats (vahied at \R4 billion) purchased by 9SA cutters during 1986-1990,
sightholders .uontriblJ.ter.:!.90 per cent and 81 per tJ·mt to the total, in volume and value
terms, respectively. the importance of De Seers' diamonde for sightholders is obvious,
supplying 82 per cent (in volume) and 74 per 'cent (in value) of siqhtholders' total
purchases.
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TA8LE 6.2 ~DIAMOND TRADE OF RSA CUTIERS, 1988-1990
ACTIVITY Si~HTHOL.DERS ~ON"SIGHrHOL.DERS ASACUTTERS
carOOO 8'000 $/car carOOO R'OOO $/car carOOO R'ooo $k.ar
ROUGH PURCHASES
TOTAL· 4S!i6 3476059 320 610 504 ()64 396 4866 3980123 328
ROUGHSAL.ES
Exported 208 73990 143 44 8494 77 2fi2 82484 131
To dealers 93 63371 272 63 79394 506 156 142765 366
To cu!ters 245 218815 358 34 30015 352 280 24S 830 357
TOTAL. 546 356175 261 141 117903 335 687 474079 277
POL PURCHASES
RSA cutters/deal's 52 106650 820 31 64428 826 83 171079 822
From Other+ 9 39440 1801 3 7644 1.208 11 47083 1668
TOTAL 61 146090 962 34 72072 854 95 218162 923
POL SALES
Exports# 57 97375 684 3 11163 ! 746 60 108538 730
Exports 1271 2650205 836 77 212897 1114 1348 2863102 852
RSA cutters 94 192023 822 35 90848 1042 129 282871 882
Local sales-ether 126 270316 862 38 93340 980 164 363656 890
TOTAL. 1547 3 ~09 919 832 152 408248 1074 1700 3618166 854
Source: The South African Diamond Board, 1992
Notes: car
<1
#
carat
Less than 1000 carats
Exports to Lesotho, Swaziland and independent
neighbouring black states
From DTe, DIAMOEL, other dealers, non-De Beers
producers, the DBSA and imports
Mainly imports
Polished Piamonds
RSA Diamond Dealers
*
+
POL.
deal'S
Though oautlon must be taken when examining these average diamond prices,' II is
significant to note that the $290/carat average price paid by sightholders for De Beers
rough diamonds from 1988 to 1990, is $10S/carat, $46/carat and $441/carat less than the
price of rough diamonds supplied to siqhtholders by DIAMDEL, other RSA, and imports,
respectively. The following comments deserve mentioning:
(i) How true is the statement made by sightholders that rough diamonds are
cheaper outside of the Republic if rough diamond imports are almost three times
more expensive (in terms of $lcarat) than rough diamonds purchased from the
DTe?
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(ii) In De Bs€;.3' attempt to control rough diamond supplies, it may fJe responsible for
inadvertently increasing the rough diamond prices of non-De Beers producers.
Unquestionably, non-sightholders do not have the financial muscle to outprice De
.,Beers offers on local rough diamonds,
Sightholders' unpolished diamond sales to dealers, other cutters and those exported
amounted to 13 per cent of its purchase total. ' Non-sightholders sales were even larger;
some 28 per cent of its purchases. Sightholders sold more rough diamonds to other RSA
cutters than they (sightholders) exported. Undoubtedly, those cutters who purchase
unpolished diamonds from sightholders realise a profit, Which implies that sightholders find
(In this instance) rough,dlal11ond trading more profitable. The following elaborates on this
aspect:
(i) RSA cutters generally specialise in cutting and pOlishing certain categories of
diamonds (discussed in chapter 7 (7.3.3». Due to this, cutters will channel rough
diamonds deemed ur~~conomical to process to other cutters. This could be a
reason for the above behaviour.
(ii) Bear in mind that RSA cutters have only recently been allowed (by the SADB) to
trade their rough diamonds at will. In the past, cutters had to process their entire
volume of purchases.
(iii) This. form of diamond trading has received severe criticism, particularly from
producers, since cutters (who theoretically should polish their goods) now enter
the markets of producers and dealers.
Reflecting on the above, it would be approplate to evaluate De Beers' rough diamond
pricing policy.
From industry sources, it is estimated that De- Beers would price its rough ciamond
production by discounting the eventual polished diamond end-product by 20 per cent from
the Rapaport Diamond Price list [The Rapaport Diamond price list, established by Martin
Rapaport (New York based) some 15 years ago, is an in\'ernational esteemed polished
diamond price list that reflects the asking prices of gems between dealers and cutters],
What is certain is that De Beers monitors the polished diamond markets to ascertain the
current (and projected) demand for polished diamonds. \Now, more than ever, the
processing industry worldwide criticises De B~ers' pricing p(Jlicy. Whilst rough diamond
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prices (on average) have increased by 77 per cent (nominal $/carat terms) from 1980 to
"1990, polished diamond prices, in general. have only increased by 20 per cent.
(i) The existing price conflict between De Beers and cutting firms (principally
sigh1holders) is mainly the result of De Beers' international perspective with regard
to the diamond industry, i.e. De Beers artificially manipulate demand for polished
diamonds by controlling rough diamord supplies. It monitors the polished diamond
consumption patterns worldwide int(.mooly, to determine the type of rough
diamonds that should enler the ma.tket thro~lgh cutters wile would achieve the
anticipated polished diamond yield. This global perspectiVe does not, and cannot
take into account the specifIC needs of individual cutting firms.
Polished diamond trade statistics locally shows that sightholding and nonsightholding
cutting firms purchased polished diamonds from one another, from dealers and also
imported some. With a 25 per cent import duty on polished diamonds, average prices are
substantially higher ($1801 i,arat for sightholders) than the average prices of polished
diamonds traded between cutters.
From 1968 to 1990, exports of locally processed diamonds totalled 1,35 million carats, with
a value of R2,86 billion. Since sightholders mostly export their polished diamonds, the bulk
of locally processed stones, viz., 79 pel' cent in volume and value, falls in this category.
6.3.1 Trends and Remarks on Activities of Sightf.'Olders and Non-sightholders
RSA cutters trade trends are portrayed in Tab/I.e6.3. In all three categories, l.e, mass,
value and price (Rlcarat, $icarat) , rough diamond purchases by RSA cutters increased
from 1988 to '1990, except fer sightholciurs' in terms of mass. The latter trend suggests
that fewer rough diamonds have been offered to t-ightholders by the OTC, i.e. that less
gam-·quality material is available; that sightholders have refused their parcels because
they deem it unprofitable to locally cut and polish; or the average price of rough diamonds
for sightholders has increased above lnternatlonal acceptable price levels.
In all three categories (as above), rough diamond sales by RSA cutters improved from
1988 to 1990, with a doubling of mass and value for non-siqhtholders' sales. It seems as
though cutters have negated their role as processors of rough diamonds. Cutters probably
find rough diamond dealing more profitable than diamond processing.
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In respect of polished diamond purchases, an opposite trend exists between sightl}old~r$
,,/~.;:::..-:- lV,
and non-siqhtholders in that sightholders' mass (and value) figUrE!~i/decreased
pronouncedly, though the average price per carat of their purchases more than doubled.
Non-slqhtholders, on the other hand, doubled their purchases (in mass and value) but at a
1990 average price (per carat) that is half that of 1988's.
TA61-E 6.3 - RSA DIAMONdrtRADE TREt-.OS, 1988-1990
t,
DIAMOND TRADE CUTTERS CARATS RANEJ'Rlcarat $J~arat
Rough purchased SH 0 I I I
NON-SH >1 >1 I :' IRSA <D >1 I Io
Rough sold SH >1 :>1 I I
NON-SH >11 >11 >1 >1
RSA >1 >11 :>1 >1
Polished purchased SH DO >0 II "NON·SH >11 >1 D D
RSA DO >D ( I
Polished sold SH D I I 1
NON·SH >1 >11 I I
RSA <0 >1 I
i\'
I
Source: The SOllth African Diamond Board, 1992
Notes: SH
NON-SH
D
DD
II
>1,>11
:;.;.D
De Beers sight holders
Non-De Beers sightholde,is
Denotes a decrease from 1988 to 1990
Denotes an increase from 1988 to 1990
Denotes half (or more) decrease from 1988 to 1990
Denotes double (or more) increase from 1988 to 1990
Where the 1989 figure is greater than 1990's
Where the 1989 figure is less than 1990's
Where the V~S9 figure is greater than 19B5's
6.4 Value Added ..the Concept
Value added is the total value of any industry's (or in this instance, ~utting firm's) output
minus the v~liue of all the intermediate goods and services consumed during production
within the sector. It is therefore equal to the labour remuneration plus the gross operating
1;
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surplus of the sector. i.e. what ~'}available for distribution to the faotorsof pr~~ction in the
," .. (~
form of wages and salaries, profits, rent, depreciation allowances, interest and dividends
(Botha, Z.C., at al., 1988, p 39, 8e).
Elaborating on this, value added can be described as either the.relafionshlp b~tween the
operating expenses (OE=processing cost (PC)+markup) and rough diamond input (RI, the
rough diamond price for instance); which can be defined as Method X below. h~.:Il1,ditior,
when expressed as the relationship pUl'ely between RI and the selling price (SIP) of trl'l'
finished product, Method Y below.
For clarification purposes, the fol!owiP9 example will suffice, RI (R~O),PC (820) and SP
(R100), and OE therefore, totalling R50. As formulae, then:
,,:, .-
VALUE ADDED
,;
Method X \" .•--I~ethod Y ._
SP-81(%)=~(%)=~Q(%)=1 00% SP-RI(%)=OE(%):::50(%}=50%
RI RI 50 SP SP 100--
where: SP = Selling Price
RI = Rough Input
OE = Operati:1g Expenses ,
Method X defines value added with respect to rough diamond input, implying a doubling of
the rough diamond input value (Axsel, K., et al., 1991, P 9).
Method Y, on the other hand, takes a different angle of approach by eq'Ja~in9 the
relationship between operating expenses and the products' selling price, i e. 50 per cent of
the selling price is accredited to beneficiation.
Both methods are fundamentally sound, with value added percentage differences (as shown
above) the result of rough diamond input or selling price approaches.
Owing to this; all value added figures that follow are marked X or Y; denoting method X or
method Y.
A Diamond Trading Company expert expressed his concern about added value as follows:
I,
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U .. ;without the manufacturing sector there is no business overall. And we see that
it shares w~ry little of the added value from rough diamond to retail diamond
sales ..." (Mazal U'Bracha, 1991, p 18). ;)
f1rofits (in real terms) for the manufacturing industry worldwide are estimated at two per cent,
and for the polished diamond trading industry, at least twice as high.
At the biannual talks between the Central Sellina Organisation (eSO) and Israel's Diamond
Manufacturers Association (IDMA), the DMA president reiterated that neither the price of
rough diamonds, nor the price of polished diamonds are under cutters' contro], Cutters are
therefore forced to operate between these two limits, and i,l)doing so, must take the financial
rh*s that accompany it. Additionally, it is the cutter that is expected to invest in
sophisticated technology, in the development of new markets and, in some cases, the
financing of its customers.
Much deliberation with regard to the development ota large processing industry in Bot~wana
(c;liamondsfrom Botswana have been processed since 1980 in Gaborone, on $tn:all scale)
are presently in progres,s. Being one of the largest diamond producers in the wo~d in terms
of volume (about 17 millit.n carats annually). and value (about $1 billion in 1990), the
Government of Botswana insists on its establishment. It believes that this endeavour will
create additional jobs, promote mining in the region, as well as adding further value to local
output,
Mr C M Lekaukau, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Mineral Resources and Water
Affairs, Republic of Bt1tswana, when questioned on the viability of such a. venture in('general,
commented (Mazal U'13racha,No 42, 1991, P33):
,,
"...we don't wan\~to encourage cutting for the sake of ,It, we want cuttin~ to be
viable. South Africa had incentives for investment, but those incentives are now
diminishing, and with it part of the industry. You really have to be careful about
giving handouts. We are forced to give handouts. We want to become
competitive on intemational terms - only in this way can we build a healthy
manufacturing centre in Botswana ...".
World rough diamond purchases in 1990 is estimated at $5,7 billion, and polished diamond
wholesale prices at $7,2 billion (Table 6.4). The margin of $1,5 billion, or a value added of
26 per cent, implies that the profit g[(ined on such transactions could not exceed this level.
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TABLE 6.4 - ESTIMATED ADDED VALUE MARGiNS Ii OF IN'i'ERNATIONAL
DEALERS/CUTIERS, 1988-1990 --
YEAR WORLD ROUGH WORLD POLISHED SALES MARGIN 1//,~ PURCHASES AT WHOLESALE P~ICES Value Added
/J ~.::-
----;o:-'~
$bil!ion $ billion $ billion
1988 5,2 6,8 1,6
1989
1'/
5,4 I 1,0 1,61990 I 5,7 7;2 1,5 ,
Source: Diamond International, May/June1990, p8Z
The followin'g theoretical example (Table 6.5) portrays the value added in the diamond "
processing industry.
TABLE 6.5 - THE ROUGH DIAMOND BENEFICIATION PROCESS
CASE RI PC RP YIELD PO WHOLESALE 6ETAIL
Mass Price Value Addoo Price Value Added
r---~ ::
$ $ $ % carats $ X(%) Y(%) $ ,~(%) Y(%}
'._1
\\ "
A 200 50 250 42/\ O,\~O8 254 24,0 21,S 339 69,5 41,0
8 200 50 250 45+ 01436 271 35,5 ,26,2 362 8i,0 44,8I,
C 200 40* 240 45 0~436 271# 3..1);5 26,2 362# 81,0 44,.8
Source: The Minerals Bureau of South Africa, 1992
Notes: Oase A
CaseS
C.a,seO
AI
PO
RP
Yield
PO
Wholesale
Retail
VA
+
*
#
Traditional technology
Modem technology (improved yield)
Modem technology (improved yield and I!?wer cost)
Rough Price -It is assumed that rough f.1li~fnOndspurchased from
the 080, l.s, the market pric,~, is 080-20%, in this case,
$250!carat-20%=$200!carat
Procasslng cost - Including fixed and operating c,sts
Rough Production- Purchase of rough diamonds and cost of
prvcsssing
In 1990, the average yield totalled 42% for R8A cutters
Polished Output ..2 x 0,5 carat less 3% (sawing) x 42%
yield x 2 = 0,408 carats
Rapaport polished diamor.u price less 25% (locally)
The Rapaport polished diamond price: (April 'j0, 1992,
Vo115, No 14; G-H cclour dlarnond, V8 clarity, large
melee (0"08-0,14 carats»)
Value Abdedj expressed in value andpercentaga
Improve yield by 3%
Decrease labour cost by $10
The Aapaport cat69orioos 8 to 14 pointers together as
one price group· .
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In South Africa in 1990, rough diamond purchases h~: RSA cutters averaged $328/carat.
For the purpose of this example, a price of $200/carat for two stones (50 pointers (0,5
carats), perfect octago~al crystal structure and of G-H colour and VS clarity) is assumed.
Each stone is sawn (3% weight loss), producing 4 x 24,25 pointers. Polishing them to four
modern brilliant gems of 58 faoits, a 42 per cent yield realises 4 x 10,2 pointers, The four
stones together (weighing 0,408 carats) command a Rapaport price (retail) of $831/carat,
i.e. $339 ($83'1 x 0,408). The wholesale price (the 'trading price' between dealers and
cutters) is set at Rap·25 per cent, i.e, $254/carat.
Case A demonstrates how. through tradltlona! technology, an added value of 27X (21,aY)
per cent can be attained on a Wholesale basis. Cases Band O's added values improve
(due to upgrading) to 35,5X (26,2Y) per cent. The improvement in processing
techniques/programmes allow cutters with similar added values to realise larger profits, i.e.
Case C saves $1a/carat more than does Case B.
The crucial. factor determining the eventual profitability of a cutter is the relationship
between the rough diainonq purcha,,'?§"'p'riceand the selling price of the polisheci diamonds.
A cutter can improve the polished diamond selling prices of his goods by changes in yield
(Case B) and input costs (Case C). and therefore the value added, which ultimately
determines his profit. However. it is understandable why so many diamond cutters
integtate both horizontally (assuming the role as rough diamond dealer), and Vertically
(supplying jewellery articles directly to the consumer). Naturally. the perception of the
resultant value of the polished diamond tinpugh grading (J, 'he unpolished stone is crucial
in assessing the profitibility of the transaction. Rough diamond evaluation is a skill
developed OVeryears, and fundamental to the succesful operations of a cu1tingfirm.
Also, an aspect often overlooked is that of historical 'price disparity'. Rough diamond
prices have never decreased, whilst polished diamond prices have. When diamond cutters
complain about the unreasonably high level of rough diamond prices, it must be viewed in
relation to this disparity. tt is not so much a question of how expensive rough diamonds
have bflcome due to price increases, but rath!~rthe CQI1tinUed, widening gap caused
through polished diamond price decreases. Since the Rapaport polished diamond price list
is accepted worldwide, it is pertinent to appreciate the ever-decreasing discount margin on
the Rapaport price list since its inauguration some 10-15 years ago. Whereas wholesale
polished diamond prices were that of the Hapaport price when it started, tcday some
categories trade at a discount of up to 50 per cent.
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6.5 Dia.mond Beneficiation; South Africa
6.5.1 Commissions of Enquiry into the Diamond Industry
The Browne Committee (Komitee van Ondersoek na Deviesebeheer- en
Belastigwanptaktyke in die Dlamantbedryt, 31 JUlie 1980) stressed that South Africa's
diamond industry does not perform satisfactorily in terms of foreign exchange and income
tax earnings. The study group showed. that for 1978's financial year, the diamond
processing sector reported after tax deductions, i.e. cutting and polishing, administrative
costs, overheads including salaries of R17,1 million, and tax allowances in respect of
equipment, buildings, a tax loss of R441 191.
The main thrust of all such Commissions of Enquiry undertaken has been that of the
development 6f an acceptable system whereby the value (if polished diamonds could be
ascertained; with specific focus on the adding of value between rough diamond purchases
and polished diamond sales. The studies, however, did not address the two factors unique
to the operations Qf a diamond cutting firm,
Firstly, diamonds are different to any other commodity in that they cannot be coded, i.e.
with a serial number, nor accurately assessed (in the rough diamond state) with regard to
its value being not homogeneous. Inventory values, therefore. fluctuate according to the
current market demand. Also, neither rough nor polished diamonds can be accurately
traced back to their origins. Diamond cutting firms, therefore, can oontroVmanipulate the
value of its rough dial'TKlnd stocks Onventories).
Secondly, during the- cutting, bruting, crossworking and brilliandeering of diamonds, i.e.
the whole beneficiation process, cuUing firms can regulate 'the eventual yield from rough
diamond input. Yield determines the weight of the finished product and, to a large degree,
the wholesale (or retail) price of the polished stone.
With this i'1 mind, it is important to know that most South African cutting firms (also the
practise internationally) make Jlsa of the c()st-plus operating system in their factories (an
illustration appears in Appendix 2). the cost plus system refers to adding a uniform
percentage mark-up above direct costs without careful assessment of the fixed and other
costs properl~ attributable to each produce line,
6,5.2 Value Added by RSA Cutters
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From the 1990 value added statements of RSA cutters (Table 6.6) (as prescribed by the
SADB) the following can be ascertained;
TABU: 6.6 - VAtUE ADDED BY RSA CUTTERS, 1986-1990
YF ACTIVITY SIGHTHOLDERS NON·SIGHTHOLDERS RSACUTTERS
/,:::
carOOO R'OOO $kar oar'O()() R'OOO $/oar car'OOO R'OOO $Icar
88 Rough inptJt* 133e 870488 287 1171 57720 359 1407 928218 290
89 1330 103875$ 298 176 199090 431 1507 1237843 313
90 1180 1129506 370 60 101610 658 1239 12$1116 384
88 Yield(%) 37,8 . - 34,6 - - 37,6 - -
89 38,9 - . 41,2 - - 39,2 - - ,:
90 42,2 - - 40,7 - - 42,7 - -
88 ValUe added(XIY) 6,0/5,7 52222 - -10,3/-11,5 -5931 - 5,3/4,8 46290 .
89 (%, R) 0,210,2 2478 - 3,61 3,4 7088 " 0,6/0,8 9567 -
90 4,1(3,9 45901 - 2,8/ 2,8 2857 - 4,8/3,8 48758 -
88 Polished output+ 505 922710 804 24 51798 933 534 974508 810
89 &17 1 041231 768 73 206178 1084 593 1 247410 807
90 498 1175407 912 24 104467 1664 524 1279875 947
, ,
Source: The South African Diamond Board, 1992
*
In 1990, RSA cutters' operating expenses totalled R85 903 442
Rough diamonds processed
Hesultant polished dlamonds processed from rough diamond input
Notes:
+
In 1990, RSA cutters processed; ,24 million carats of rough diamonds (valued at R1,231
billion). The resultant gem-quality polished diamonds (mainly exported) Weighing 524
thousand carats (yield of 42,7%) were priced at R1,28J billion. From this, the value added
amounted to 4,8X (3,8y) per cent or R49 million. However, operating expenses totalled
R85,9 million, implying that processing costs amounted to R69,3/carat on rough diamonds
.($26,7/carat) or R163,9/carat diamonds polished ($63,21carat).
On a cost-plas basis, some R1.317 billion (R1.231 billrbn (rough diamond input) +
R85,9 million (operating costs» were needed to produce polished diamonds worth
R1,280 billion, i.e. a net loss of RS7 million (negative profit). Reasons for the anomaly
could be:
(i) The SADB's method of value added data capture is inaccurate.
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(ii) The SADB's Value Added Statements allow cutters to either misinterp~,bt:;"~l1e
forms (and there are such technicalities that need modification; discussed in
Appendix 3) thereby producing incorrect statistics.
(iii) Cutters are blatantly manipulating their inventories at will, which affects rough
and polished diamond sales' mass and value.
HoweYf;:)r"outtersinterviewed have confessed that pr('~,:sare made, but only reflected (if at
all) by their marketing and retailing companies abroad. It has become increasingi}' clear,
that the modus operandi of the majority of cutters prevent accurate analyses of their
operations. Since this examination addresses mainly the formal diamond industry, it can
not quantify the clandestine operations of the infonnal diamond industry, i.e. those
operations that characterise the 'off-the-book' transaction structure of the entire industry.
6,5.3 Discussion of $ightholders
The value added by the five different groups of RSA sightholders is portrayed in Table 6.7.
For the three years analysed (1988-1990), the value added by sightholders totalled Ri00,6
million; R52,2 million (1998), R2,5 million (1989) and R45,9 million in '1990. Percentage
wise, their value added amounted to 6X (5,7Y) per cent, O,2X (O,2Y) per cent and 4,1X
(3,9Y) per cent in 1988, 1'089 and 1990, respectively.
Of the five sightholding groups, those cutting concerns fully foreign controlled contributed
approximately 50 per cent to total value added for the three years, i.e. R49,5 million.
Three instances occurred of negative added values; the largest, that of "R15,9 million, by
foreign controlled cutting concerns with minor RSA interest in 1989.
Sightholders complain about 'unreasonable' high prices that De Beers demand. As
siglltholders they are dependant on De Beers and therefore, are expe0,ed to take the
complete parcels that are supplied at the regular sights. ShoUld they! choose 10 do
otherwise, they may either lose their sightholder status, or in future receive 'worse' parcels.
This sightholders aim to prevent as the constant supply of the right volume and quality of
rough diamoonds is essential to the effective operation of their cutting firms. Do Beers, on
the other hand, sees this form of reasoning as another way of admitting (by sightholders)
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that they are incapable of competing internationally, and. because of a history of being
'spoon-fed' (through Government support), incompetent in respect of productivity
upgrading in their factories.
TABLE 6.7· VALUE ADDEO BY SIGHTHOLDING GROUPS, 1988-1990
~
SH GROUP YEAR ADDED V:(>'L.UE,'_-.:.:':'-:;
Added Value Added Value 3 Year Total
(R million) (%)(XIY) (R million)
RSA controlled 1988 1,1 0,6/0,6 I
1989 14,4 6,8/6,3 15,7
1990 0,2 0,1/0,1
RSA nonresident 1988 4,2 &-,017,4
Co director 1989 3,2 4,5/4,3 4,7
1990 -2,7 -3,4/-3,5 -',
RSA substantial 1988 0,1 0,1/0,1 Iforeign interest 1989 -4,1 -3,7/-3,9 0,9
(40"('.~%) 1990 4,9 4,014,4
Foreign Controlled 1988 33,9 20,4/16,9
with minor FISA 1989 -15,9 -7,7/-S,3 29,9
interest 1990 11,9 4,9/4,7
Foreign Controlled 1988 12,9 3,6/3,$
1989 5,0 1,1/1,1 49,4
1990 31,6 6,2/$,9
E:== 1988 52,2 6,0/5,71989 2,5 0,210,2 100,61990 45,9 4,1/3,9
Source: The South African Diamond Board, 1992
.lt is not possible to determine whether or not De Beers' rough diamond prices have indeed
been higher locally, than in London in this study. The 'parcel-mix' in London should,
however, be more attractive to local siqhtholders as, besides Sauth African diamonds, the
eso in London receives rough diamonds from Botswana, Namibia, the CIS, Australia,
Guinea, Zaire, and other countries and dealers.
Local sightholders claim that De Beets purposely withholds top gem-quality diamonds from
local cutting firms and also increases rough diamond p,r,,~peslocally above the international
level of market prices. Conversely, De Beers holds that all diamonds produced by their
South African mines are offered at local sights but that the quality and size of rough
diamond output have deteriorated Significantly; a situation they cannot alK .
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The following graphical presentations endeavour to address aspects linked to this issue of
whether local cutters could have been paying higher prices for rough diamonds mined
locally than their counterparts overseas.
Fi9ure 6.1 depicts the relationship between the estimated g!'ilm-quality diamonds produced
and sold locally by De Beers in South Africa. Whilst sightholders) purchases more or less
mirrored the trend of De Beers' gelll-quality output. they consumed 10-20 per cent of De
Beers gem-quality production annually from 1980 to 1990. In 1!il82, consumption was the
lowest (1.1%) with 'the highest. that of.~4.6 per cent, in 1988. Bear in mind thatjhose gem
:' , ',:f
diamonds exported are processed overseas WHilst local sightholders consider them to be
uneconomical to process locally. '-'
i
I
To some degree, the crisis experienct~d by the international diamond industry in the late
1970's and early 1980's, is reflected/lin local sighfholdel's' purchases. Locally, consumption
increased from 1985 onwards, correspondinq with record breaking years for OSO (in
, '
London) salesfrom 1985 to 1988.
FIGURE 6.1 - DE BEERS ESTIMATED '~~EM DIAMOND PRODUCTION AND LOCAL
SALES, 1980-1990
BOO()OOO,.--~-~--
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By using the PPI (Producer Price Index), l.e. deflating a time series (in this case the
nominal Rlcarat and $/carat rough diamond sales price of De Beers), the effect of price
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increases in the manufacturing of goods is removed. This is applicable to cutting firms who
produce polished diamonds. Figure 6.2 shows the I, ';I')(lShip betw£ien \ile PPI of South
Africa and 'the PPI of the USA. It simply means that a South African cutting firm needed
about R350 in i91~Oto acquire the g09ds necessary fd'f the processing of diamonds that
cost R100 in 19~0. Conversely, in to?,USA, the price has remained constant due to a
minimal inflation li~te. Figure 6.2 also includes another economic indicator, vlz., the
exchange rate (ch~~ed as a nominal exchange rate inqex). This floating exchange rate
(between Rands a~~ dollars) mirrors the RSI?- PPI. There i$ an obvious relatlonship
, ;~
between the floating e)(change rate of a country and its inflation rate. From middle. 1983 to)
i· if
1986, a period of undervaluatlon occurred, l.e. the adjustment between the RSA Rand and.
<)
the US dollar allowed, for lnstanoe, lJS investors to gain more through Rand purchases in
South Africa than through dollar purchases in the USA. It was also in i9sa that the RSA
Reserve Bank curtailed the use of the finrand in the diamond industry. It was believed that
monies invested locally through the flnrand-meohanlsm was abused by cutters through the
purchasinlJ of rough diarnonds.Le. effectively discounting rough diamond prices by some
40 per cent. This situation could well have discredited local sight holders and De Beers,
.therefore, 'retaliated' by either increasing prices or curtailing supplles,
FIGURE 6.2 - THE RELATIONSHIP OF PPI'S (RBA AND USA) AND EXCHANGE RATES,
1980-1990
3S0
Exchange Rate Index
300
".1;,
,,"
-~.///
T RSA PPI
/'"
",'"",,,,,,,
/'"_-,."..
.,---'_--""'__ USA PPI •••
• .. .. oj, .. ~ "Ii!' II< '" rot oil! "" 1" ""' ,. 10" '"' .. '"
1980 1981 1982 1~83 1984 1985 1986 1987 \989 1989 1990
67
In F,jgure 6.3', the prices per carat (in Rands and dollars) paid by RSA cutters (with De
I'
Be~~s the major supplier of rough diamonds in mass and value terms) are presented. With
diamond prices determined internationally; the effect of inflation rates is for all practical
purposes eliminated. The substantial difference between wHlatsightholders paid for rough
diamonds in Rands (nominal terms) and the corresponding values in US dollars (nominal
\\ terms) is related to exchange rate fluctuations, Local cutting firms do not own dollar
I', accounts and are therefore subject, positively or negatively, to daily fluctuations in
\\ exchange rates. In real terms (using the PPI), no major anomalies exist between Rand
~~Q Dollar purchases, As mentioned earlier, the Rand was undervalued between 1984 to
1986.16~h~~enefit of the local cutting industry.
F=IGURE6.3 ..ESTiMATED PURCHASE PRICES PAID BYRSA CUTTERS, 1980·1990
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It must be emphasised again that the majority of local sightholders are foreign owned and
are therefore financed from abroad. Complaints are rife that RSA's inflation and exchange
rate curb local development and growth in the processlnq indUstry. However, exchange
rate fluctuations allow local dealers and cutters who 'play' exchange rate fluctuations to
earn extra profits.
in summary, Figure 6.4 looks at CSO average price increases from 1980 to 1990 (see
Appendix 4). It is assumed that the categories in question for South Africa concur with the
average price increases. The Rand purchase prices, in nominal and real terms, by RSA
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cutters are shown with and without the CSO price increases. The graph shows that
cutters' price increases in the Rlcarat local purchase price were marginal. Without the
eso price increases, local cutters probably would have paid R50/carat less on their
slqhtparcels,
FIGURE 6.4 • THE EFFECT OF CSO PRICE INCREASE~~, 1980·1990
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It can be concluded that the two factors largely responsible for such high R/car~t rough
diamond prices paid by RSA cutters are; exchange rate fluctuations, and changes in the
parcel-mix of their rough diamond purchases,
It is estimated that local cutters paid (on average) $1 096/carat (1988) and $6431carat
(1990) for imported rough diamonds, whilst De Beers! rough diamond sales locally Were
substantially lower.
Why need RSA cutters pay such exorbit (nt prices for imported rough diamonds? Reasons
cited could be:
(0 The quality of rough diamond purchases locally (mai~lly from De l3ee~) is very
low, l.e, inferior to cut and polish economically in South Africa (Nota: It is
speculated that diamond quality deteriorates as mines proceed deeper).
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However, the RSA's production in 1990 totalled a,7 million carats (De Beers
production = 8,1 million carats) with an estimated 70·15 per cent of the total
output of gem and near-gem quality, l.e. 6,1·6,5 million carats (about 21% of 6,3
million carats), but only 1,3 rnilU"m carats of the RSA's total output was
purchased by local cutting firms.
(ii) De Beers may also offer certain qualities, l.e, 'parcel-mixes' at their sights that
_J c-,
only allows a small proportion thereof to be -edonornically processed by
sightholders.
(iii) De Seer~i may be deliberately decreasing the quality of their rough diamond
supplies in order to 'condition' sightholaers with the idea that non-De Beers rough
diamonds (or De Seers supplies from London, Where a Wider selectior\: of goods
exists) can be more profitably processed.
Qv) Sightholders may also be so dependent on certain rough diamond qualffes to
keep their,~')lctories going. that since it's not available, locally, rough diamonds
need to be imported (at higher cost).
(v) SighthoJders may also be genuinely unproductive, i.e. unable to compete
internationally, and therefore demand top, gem-quality material.
(vi) There is the possibility tha~ 8ightholders could be involved in unlawful practises.
For instance, is it pure coincidence that the volume of imported rough diamonds
correspond with that of the rough diamonda Qx:ported by slqhtholders? From
1988 to 1990, 232 thousand carats (R422,3 million) held been imported and
207 000 carats ('R74 million) exported. It is possible to bring 'low-quality',
overlnvoloed diamonds into the country, which implies a shift in finances
overseas, just to be classified as uneconomical to polish locally, and then
re-exported, .I,e. another form of 'schleppinq' (changing rough for polished
c;t;amondsor visa versa).
6.5.4 Discussion of Non-sightholders
For the three years (1988 to 1990). the total added value realised by non-sightholding
cutting firms were, -10,3X H1,5Y), 3,6X (3,4Y) and 2,8X (2,7Y~ per cent, respectively.
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In terms of mass and value (for rough diamonds processed and polished diamonds
produced). non-siqhtholders only contributed five and nine per cent, respectively to total
processing in 1990.
6.5.5 Polished Diamond ~rts: Quantity vs Caratage
TABLE 6.8 ~POLISHED DIAMOND EXPORTS BY RSA CUITERS, 1988-1990
YR EXPORTS SH NONSH TOTAL
88 Stones 2537611 538 099 3075710
Carats 396112 92848 488960
I'e
Ptlstone 10 17 16
Rand 696101 649 179799827 876501 476
" '0.
89 Stones 4019288 512007 4531295
Carats 445295 84724 ~0019
Pt/stone 11 17 12
Rand 955558078 214943108 " 17050.1 186-
90 Stones 3675317 393361 4068678
Carats 421 150 133821 554971
Ptlstone 12 17 14
Rand 1 013954401 179376427 1. 193330828
I
Source: The South African Diamond Board, 1992
Notes: * Provisional data
Points; '100 points=::1carat
De Seers sightholders
Non-sightnolders
Pt
SH
NONSH
Table 6.8 reflects on the quantity of polished stones that were exported by RSA
sight holders and nor.·sightholders.
In 1990, polished stones exported by sightholders totalled 3,68 million, equating to 421 150
carats. On average, polished diamonds exported by sight holders, weighed 0,12 carats (or
12 points) per stone. DTC supplies to sightholders, same yea:l\ totalled .,,03 million carats,
Processing 1,03 million carats would mean a weight loss, due to sawing of say three per
cent (to 998,1 thousand.carats): and a 42 per cent yield some 419,2 thousand carats of
polished dial nonds, which is on par with the.' )il~O figure of 421,2 thousand carats.
if
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It is,estimated that the DTC sold half of polished diamond quantity, i.e. 1,84 n'.Jion stones
to sightholders, thereby realising an ayerage weight (of rough diamondst of 0,56
carats/stone.
6.6 Diamond Beneficiation: Israel
Israel is recognised as the leading manutaoturer of rough gem-quality diamonds
internationally (first started cutting in about 1948). Its processing industry consumes six
times more rough diamonds (in carats) than does South Africa's. In value terms, South
Africa's local sales to cutters amounted to approximately 22 per cent of the $2168 million
processed by Israel in 1990 (Table 6.9).
Israel's rough diamond purchases for processing dollarl~arat figure for three years
(1988-1990) \1""<:';, lower than South Africa's, the difference ranging between 22 per cent
I )
and nine pa~. _it The average yield between the two countries is similar; around 42 per
cent.
Israeli cutters' value added totalled 7,4 per cent in 1990. South Africa's added value, at
4,1X (3,9Y) per cent amounted to a mere $18,8 million, only 11,8 per cent of Israel's total
value added.
TABLE 6.9· VALUE ADOED BY ISRAEL'S PROCESSING INDUSTRY, 1988-1991-
Year Rough input Polished output Value Added Yield
$M
I)
Mcar $M Mcar $M % %
1988 8,5 2 007 3,4 2141 134 6,7 40,2
1989 7,2 2 066 3,0 2225 159 8,5 41,7
1990 6,5 2 168 2,7 2327 159 7,4 41,5
1991 5,5 1 871 2,3 2076 205 10,9 41,3 .-
Sources: Diamond International, March/April1991, p34
Diamond Internatlonal, MarchlApril1992, p38
Notes: car carats
M Million
6.7 Diamond BEmeficiation: India
India is a typical example of a 'cottage-style' diamond processing indu.stry. It consists of
small manufacturing units (fc:lmily linked industries) working near-gem qualities at very low
(the lowest in the world currently) labour costs. This unique type of industry allows Indian
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cutters to polish mpstly cheap-gem, Australian rough diamonds.
n. . '. .
At present, f~~ il1dustry boasts a wOrkforce of about 400 000; mostly operators. However,
n .',
d!,lrirlg the past boom periods,\th~ labourforce rocketed to some 800 000.
r )
:::::~-:;- ~. rJ
;!
India's,t;rade,1statistiC$,considered as estimates, are reflected in Table 6.10
TABLE 6.10- VAl.uEADDED BY INDIA'S PROOESSING INDUSTRY. 1987-19S9/
Year Rough imports Polished exports Value Added" Yield" "l
i...,....._
Mcar $M Mcar $M $M % %
1987 55,1 1 415 8,5 1740 325 23,0 "5,4
1988 55,4 2 064 0,9 2622 558 27/~,,' 17,9
1989 57,8 2 371 10,2 2922 551 23,2 17,7
Source: Diamond International, Jan/Feb 1991, p32
Notes: carat
Million
Assuming that rough diamond lrnports » rough diamonds locally
processed» polished diamond exports
Immediately evident is the large volume of diamonds cut and polished (more than 50% of
total yearly world natural diamond production). Also,\~e low $Icarat unit polished diamond
price (1987=$25,7/carat; 19BB:;::;$37,31carat; 1989=$41/carat), as well as the very low
car
M
Yield; 18 per cent in 1989 on the rough diamonds. processed.
Ci
However, India's polished diamond export sales, at $2,922 billion in 1989, still betters
Israel's polished diamond sales by 31 per cent, and South Africa's by 514 per cent.
Put in peispective, the value added by South African cutting firms during 1988 to 1990
amounted to about two per cent of-that of India's.
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CHAPTER?
1 PERFORMANCE OF THE DJAMO~DJNDUSTRY
This chapter addresses the contributionmade by diamond producers, dealers and cutters.
to the State and the country as a whole, in the form of taxes, ex~brt dutles, forelifn
exchange, employment and the decentralisation of cutting. films. In particular, anomalies
within these major sectors are hIghlighted.
7.1 Taxation
Direct and indirect taxation applicable to South Af~ica's diamond indLI~try can be outlined
as follows:
DIAMOND Mfi'JING - 276 000 employees' income tax
• Tax on mine supplies (VAT)
- Mining Company income tax
- Royalties
- Rough diamond export duty
.-------1
ROUGH DIAMOND SALES ~Company tax
- Employees' income tax .~------------__--------~ ----.----~
PROCESSING ~Company tax
• Employees' income tax
POLISHED DIAMOND SALES -10 per cent VAT
, , ._---- .....
RETAIL JEWELLERY .,Company tax
- Employees' income tax~.---------------.....~- .....-- -~~-
Taxation data analysed is that of Inland Revenue's assessed direct and indirect taxes, and
not tax collections.
7.1.1 Assessed Taxes of Diamond Producers
Assessed taxes for the diamond mining sector include direct income tax, i.e. mining
incoma tax on profits, and indirect taxation, l.e, royalties (from lease considerations), t9.X
paid by producers 011 the interest of their investments, and the rough diamond export duty.
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Diamond mining income tax for the four years from 1987 to 1990, totalled R2,~ million ....
(Table 7.1), and royalties paid to the State some R175,4 million. OUring this period
Govemment received, from diamond mines' profhs related to diamond mining,
R178,3 million (excluding rough diamond export duties). Although some A70 million tax
.\
was a~\~essed on diamond mining company's interest on investments, this can not be
dirp ...,iY linked to only dilamond actiVities, and ie'therefore discarded. The low income from
mining company income taxes are due to the fact that diamond producers, like any other
mining company, may deduct capital expenditure from their taxable incomes. In the case
of Os Seers, therefore, it is assumed that large capital requirements for mines such as
Premier (mining p~?blems due to geological setbacks, i.e. thf! gabbro-sill that cuts
horlzontally through the kimberlite pipe) and Finsoh (which reverted to underground mining
recently) and Venetia, have significantly decreased De Beers' taxable income, and hence
its company income tax contribution. This is reported in De Beers' Annual Reports (1990,
1991). where the diamond account" totalled R2,33 bilHon. The Company's profit before tax
of RS,11 billion (after deduction of prospecting and research of R292 million) realised a
taxation contributl.'?nof R652 million in 1990, with due aknowledgement of the fact that the
company has made no provision for tax on income from mining operations as it has
unredeemed capital expenditure estimated to be R395 million at 31 December 199.0. This
figure has grown from AJ52million in 1987 (De Beers Annual Report, 19S8, 1989, 1990) to
R74 million in 1988 and R214 million in 1989. With ring-fencing regulations in effect since
1984, l.e. mines within one group may not collectively combine tax deductions fwm one
another, the unredeemed capex is expected to be largely due to the development of the
Venetia diamond mine.
With De Beers, therefore, not contributing to taxation from their mining operations, the
taxation indicated on the Annual Reports should reflect the monies paid on tax from either
De Beers' non-diamond mining income or by its trading companies, Le, the I)TO,
DIAMDEL, DICORP or PURTRA.
(* The diamond account reflects all of De Seers' income from its diamond mining and
marketing operations and therefore includes:
(i) The pre tax profits on the sale of diamonds produced by its own mines.
(ii) The pre tax profits on diamond purchases, either under long term contract or on
the open market.
(iii) Dividends received from associate companies, such as Debswana.
(iv) Dividends received from its holdings in the diamond trading companies (Bright,
1987, p2))
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Following is a simple explanation of the effect of unredeemed capex on the taxable profits
of a diamond mine, and shows why diamond producers contribute less than expected to
taxation.
Two theoretical cases are presented. In case A the diamond mine is considered to be
profitable with:
Diamond mine profit
(profit before capital expenditures, which excludes the
\\
purchase of land and mineral rights)
Oapex
(cost of machinery)
Taxable income (Rt/OQO OOO·R800 000)
Pre tax profit
Taxable inc'o""')
Mining income tax
(standard 50% + 0,88% (diamond mine rnark-up) « 50,88%,
with an eflective taxation ratio of 10,2%)
After tax profit
== R1 000000
= ReOOOoO
== R200 000
== Ri 000 000
=R200 000
L:',
::.::Hi01 760
== H898240
Diamond mine A, therefore, would contribute Ri01 760 to State coffers. In .Q.a~, a
scenario of an unprofitable mine is portrayed:
Diamond mine profit
Capax
(cost of machinery)
Taxable income (Ri 000 OOO-Rit 00 000)
After tax profit
Unredeemed capex
(carried over to the next year)
== Ai 000 000
r:: Ri 100 000
= ·RiOO 00 (RO)
:::Ri 000000
= Ri00 000
It is very important to note that the profit mar~in of diamond producers probably fal' outstrip
those of diamond dealers or cutters (excluding of course the retail trade not discussed in this
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report). What must not be overlooked are the high financial risks involved in starting a
diamond mine. However, when Venetia commenced production, estimates for the costot
mining operations varied between $10-$20/carat with an expected average price/carat
(run-of-mine diamond producticn).:of $100-$130/carat (Kartun, K., Brown, P., 1992, personal
communication).
TABLE 7.1 v TAX ASSESSMENT OF RSA'S DIAMOND MINES, 1987-1990
YEAR MINE INCOME TAX ROYALTIES TOTAL TAX"
R No+ R No+ R
1987 (::.75695 4 34399686 '10 35075581
1988 351000 66 42248544 10 42599544
1989 1693000 55 29746282 4 31439282
1990 '175000 17 68961930 5 69136930
87~90 2894895, \ 42 175356442 29 178251337
~~., <"
Source: Department of Finance, 1991
Notes: + Number of diamond mines assessed for tax purposes
* Excluding non-diem ,,(!~~related taxes
Between 1980 and 1987, RSA diamond producers paid R301 million to Government in the
form at rough diamond export duties. De Beers' contribution is estimated at around 80 per
cent of the total (Table 7.2).
TABLE 7.2 ~EXPORT DUTIES PAID BY DiAMOND PRODUCERS,
1980-1990
YEAR RSA(R)
"i9BO 31365265
1981 24797439
1982 24920168
1983 33328824
1984 39643 573
1985 41364741
1986 56734700
1987 48381319
1988 19069629
1989 15601
1990 2658
TOTAL 319623923
,
Source; Department of Finance, Statistical Bulletin,
Inland Revenue, 1990, Nr 8, p 7
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Since the finallsatlon of agreements between the SADB and De Beers and the SADB and
Trans Hex (provided for by Article 5.9of the Diamonds Act, No 56 of 1986Yfrom 1987 and
1988 onwards, respectively, Government's revenue from export duties declined rapidly to a
mere R2 658 in 1990. Levied at 15 per cent, producers view this duty as another form of a
State royalty. Exports were probably 'underirwoiced' to some extent, as the market price
for rough diamonds plus the export duty would have eroded any competitive edge that
exporters possessed.
7.1.2 Assessed Taxes of Diamond Dealers
Of the 54 rough diamond dealers listed (Table 7.3), four are not registered at the Registrar
of Companies (Pretoria). In addition, from 1987 to 1990, 92 instances of 'no income tax
returns on file' exist. Of these 92, 11 companies (excluding the four not registered) have
never returned any income tax forms.
Eighteen companies reported a nil tax figure, leaving 25 (which totals less tha:. ...vtthe
54 dealing companies) that paid tax worth R113,7 million.
Due to the confidentiality of taxation data, it is believed that numbers 46 to 49 denote De
Beers' companies, DleORP. PURTRA, DIAMDEL and the DTC. though not necessarily in
that order. Also, company number five is expected to be Trans Hex's trading company.
De Beers' contribution (from its SUbsidiaries). therefore. is estimated at 93,7 per cent of the
total tax paid by RSA diamond dealers. Adding Trans Hex's share. the total increases to
99,4 per cent. This means that only five dealers. contributed 99,4 per cent of total taxation
from 1987 to 1990. Conversely, a mere 0,6 per cent, or R682 thousand, was paid by 49
dealers during this period.
This contribution is negligible compared to the volume of trade depicted by RSA diamond
dealers (Table 5.3). From 1988 to 1990, dealers purchased 37,2 million carats of rough
diamonds (excluding high-value polished diamonds) valued at R7,3 billion and sold some
36,9 million carats worth R7,2 billion. At an average price of $78/carat, taking into
consideration the volume of trade of industrial diamonds by DEBID, this average price
equals that of the estimated average price of Venetia's entire production for 1992, which is
considered to be an important supplier of gem-quality diamonds, not only to the local
market, but also abroad (Kartun, K., 1993, personal communication).
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TABLE 1.3 - ASSESSED INCOME TAX OF DIAMOND DEALERS, 1987-1990
Co 1987 1988 1989 1990 1987-1990
1 0 0 a 0 0
2 * ...
,. ... 0
3 - · - - 0
4 7743 12020 ~ - 19763
5 1 272107 3701532 1482031 - 6455670
6 - 392 1008 1168 2568
7 - - - - 0
8 0 0 0 - 0
9 0 0 8283 0 8283
10 - - 27510 37997 65507
11 0 0 0 - 0
12 270654 0 0 - 270654
13 · - - - I)
14 - 102 214 - 316
15 0 0 0 - 0
16 - · 10087 21414 31501
17 - - 0 0 0
18 · · . . 0
"19 ... ...
,. ,. 0
20 - · - - 0
21 · 0 0 0 0
22 0 940 4964 0 5904
23 - · - - 0
24 0 0 0 0 0
25 - · 21312 9905 31277
26 - · 904 646 1550
27 - - - - 0
28 - - 6811 0 6871
29 - 0 0 18007 18007
30 - 0 0 0 0
31 - - 0 0 0
32
,. ,. ... ... 0
33 0 1439 34085 - 35524
34 · - 0 Q 0
35 - · - - 0
36 - - - - 0
37 - - 0 345 345
38 0 0 0 0 0
39 - - 34460 17151 51611
40 0 3205 - - 3205
41 ...
,. '" ,. 0
42 - 0 . 0 0 0
43 · - - - .·0
44 - s sts 14092 4408 24418
45 - - - - 046 - 6 '£<3099 31.,53253 3589829 41529181
47 66423 120381 129225 450235 766264
48 '" - 38733125 24887216 63620341
49 0 0 0 648523 648523
50 - 0 0 0 0
51 0 - - . 0
52 - 7958 3872 10362 22192
53 11181 6322 44284 7660 69447
54 - 3075 . "14367 17442
TO' 1628108 10049383 72309560 29719293 113706364
Source;
Notes:
Department of Finance, 1991
Co Company - individual company names are confidential
• No income tax returns on file
,. Diamond dealing companies that are not re~listered
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Broadly speakIng, every sector handling roughleolished stones is intrinsic~lly involved In
dealing. More ~pecifically, however, diamond dealers' main function (which is also another
reason for their relevan~ in the industry) i~that of supplying diamonds of specifi.Qqualitles
v, , __1
to clients.
Another valuable service a rough diamond dealer renders, is that of supplying cutting firms
with the right volyme (whinh combined with the specific quality) make up the required
t@rcel .•miX (which deterwines also the degree of cross-subsldlsation in the processing
!
ohaln), c;:!
A large proportion of dealers (De Beers and Trans Hex excluded), and lot implying all local
dealers, are in favour of the abolition of Illegal Diamond Buying (IDS). It seems tha.t
dealers that are not involved with (or attached to) either diamond producers or cutters,
believe that lOB lenislation should be scrapped. This indicates their short-slqhthedness, or
re.lher their deslrs for improved profits from the future growth oi the international diamond
industry. Dealers are the best positloned in terms of internatio"el trade, due to their long
and datailed list of contacts (Orange West Coast Diamonds, a comparitively small diamond
dealer, quote a list of 150 contacts), and have the ability to quickly clinch a profitable deal.
It has also been indicated (by dealers themselves) that dealers' profits are often the result
of the financial trading of dollars and Rands (due to the fluctuations), rather than the active
trading of diamonds.
In the analyses of RSA diamond cutters' trading activities, it was found that cutters have
ii
over the perioo between 1968 and 1990 reverted to rough diamond trading, rather than
rough diamond pro(~essing. This decision could only have been made if cutters can realise
higher profits ~hrounh trading than processing. Since a large proportion of RSA's diamond
cutters purchase their rough diamonds from local dealers, then it is obvious that those
dealers should be better able to realise even higher profits. Taylor (1992, personal
communication) of Orange West Coast Diamonds says the company generally lives off a
minimum of two per cent markup (maximum five per cent), where one per cent goes to
overheads and everything linked to the operation of the company, i.e. a one per cent
profit.
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M,ost important is the chain Of events through which a rough diamond must pass from the
mine to the cutter. An example of the posmble price-progress (P1 to P5) of .,~ rough
diamond is given below: (Note: most producers make use of the Rapaport Diamond price
list (treating polished diamond prices as an indication, and not an absolute).
P1 A mining company recovers rough diamonds through open-eest methods at a
cost of $20/carat (Prins, F., 1992, personal communication).
:-\
P2 'The mining~fompal1Y estimates the selling price of the resultant polisheq from its
rough output put out for tender, say $300/carat (using the Rapaport Diamond
Price list).
P3 The mining company discounts the estimated polished diamond s~lIing pr{lZeby
25 .per cent, i.e. $300 - 25% :::$225/carat, Which is the purchase price
(expressed as an average price on sorted rough diamonds) paid by a dealer or
cutter.
P4 A dealer sells this assortment to a cutter at $225/carat plus five per cent (dealer's
markup), i.e. $2361carat.
P5 The cutter (who purchased from the dealer) processes the rough diamond,
!J.s~ortment and, supposedly, sell the resultant polished diamond output at
$300/carat (rouqh) or, having rel:jJjsed a yield of say 45 per cent on the
assortment, at a selling price of $e61lcarat (polished, i.e. $300/carat x 100145).
Diamond dealers are the least subject to large overheads and fixed responsibilities in their
businesses. What also must not be overlooked is the fact that diamond dealers have the
versatility of purchasing the entire production-mix from rough diamond producers, In other
words, they art! tar more competitive in buying power than the common cutting firm that
relies on specific qualities and volumes ''of rough diamonds that can be economically
processed.
Due to the above, diamond dealers can negotiate better prices and. as in the case of
cutting firms, but even more so, make better use ot.oross-eubsidlsatlon in ~h(:1 ~elUng of
their goods.
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As a rule, diamond dealers in South Africa are more competent in rough diamond price
evaluation, particularly of those 'bordellne' cases of economically processable stones, than
the average cutter that for years has relied on a good supply of quality stones.
7.1.3 Assessed Taxes of Sighthok:lers
RSA sightholding groups contributed a me,re R2,1 million to the state Treasury during the
four year period from 119,87to 1990 (Table 7.4).
TASLE 7.4 - ASSESSED INCOME TAX OF SIGHTHOLDING GROUPS, 1987-1990,-
GROUP 1987(R) 1988(R) 1989(R) 1990(R) 87-90(R)
Group A 24100 172370 100 018 0 3624!38
GroupS 163234 96095 74217 0 333546
Group C a 0 a 0 0
Group D 429589 703495 0 0 11330$4
Group E 162586 550f~ 40905 4793 263$16
~.',
~,~
TOTAL 779509 1026992 281 140 4793 2092434.,
Source:
NotE'~:
"
i;/~
Department of Finance, 1991
South African controlled; including six SH's
{i7cutting firms, six trading companies)
South African (non-resident Co director); includi:tlg two SH's (six
CUttii '9 firms, one trading company)
South African owned with substantial foreign interest (40-50%):
including three SH's (six cutting firms, one trading company)
Foreign controlled (Belgium) with minor South
African interest; including two SH's (11 cutting fii'lTls, no trading
companies)
Pully foreign controlled (Belgium (five SH's), Israel (one SH), Hong
Kong (one SH), USA (one SH), England (one SH)i including eight
SH's (16 cutting firms, four trading companies)
Diamond cutting firms and their trading companies that market the
processed (polished) diamonds
SH Sighthcllder
(R) Rand
A
8
C
D
E
*
Qroup 0; foreign controllad sightholding concerns with minor r~SA interest, contributed
Ri ,13 million (54% of the total) to combined income tax,
Group C, South African owned cutting firms with substantial foreign interest (40-50%) paid
no income tax, This implies that from 1ge7 to 1990, all six cutting firms of GI'OUpC
realised nil ptQfits, Bear in mind that from 1986 to 1990 the international diamond industry
boomed, with rough and polished diamond sales breaking all prevlous records.
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The issuing of sightholders licenses has stopped for all practical purposes in 1967. This
,«as the !astda:te when licenses were issued; a total of 13. But in 1975/6, Krochmal and
Cohen received sightholders status, an exception made by De Beers. The sighthclder
structure, as seen today, has been unchanged since the start of South Africa's diamond
cutting indUstry.
7.1.4 Assessed Taxes of RSA Cutters
From 1987 to 1990, 133 diamond cutting firms' assessed Income tax amounted !~.'
R2,23 million (Table 7.5).
. ~~- 1:
-rABLE 7.5· ASSESSISD INOOME TAX OF liSA OUTIJ;~-'!\ ,{ .,..~SO
:- Iir----....---~--.~.........-------....._~.~ ,"':':"'....; ,.~...,_...._-
SECTOR 1987(A) 1988(R) 1989(R)( ..;6(h,. h:~;,~7.90(R)1------1-------+-------- 1--,--......,. ..;..f_,..",._,,,, 1;";"_, -----;
SH 779 509 1 026 992 281 14tJ·-·· J 4793 j 2 092 434
NON·SH na 5.9245 G~ 117,1 23970 I 137335I---------I------+-~--~--I------,~-----.- ....,.,------;
TOTAL~ 779509 1 086237 350291 28163 I 'i~29 769
I-S-H-o-Yo'-i-'-__"1~OO---l----9~5-r-_""'----ao--__.. 17 \' I
94
Source: Department of Finance, '1991
Notes: Diamond firms for the four year period totalled 133
Assessed income tax of 21 De Beers sightholders over the
four year period
NON·SH Non-slqhtholders
SH
The tax contribution of RSA diamond cutters to Government Treasury is insignifioant. Put
if
in perspective, RSA diamond cutters' share totals:
1,3 per cent of RSA diamor!;i mines income tax and royalty contributions
3,3 per cent of RSA's diamond producers export duty on rough diamonds (1981-1990)
2.0 per cent of rough diamQnd dealers income tax contribution
'Some 115 cutting firms (8'7% of '133) portray a nil income tax track record since 1987. In
addition, the taxation data of Houth Africa's diamond cutters reveal the following:
(""I Out of the 133 cutting concerns investigated, 12 companies were not registered
for income tax purposes.
(ii) One firm could not be traced by the Department of Finance.
(iii) Several cases exist where company income t(.l)( returns could not be found in
the Receiver of Hevenue's files. A breakdown of cutting firms' companies that
did not submit incometax returns to the Receiver shows:'
J/
(I,
25 cases where companies failed to submit one year's tax returns
S6 cases where companies failed to submit two year's tax returns
14oases where companies failed to submit three year's tax returns
SO cases where companies failed to submit four year's tax returns
A total of 105 incidents.
(iv) seventeen (of the 133) companies were responsible for all income tax paid to
Government. Of this 17, not one recorded a four year tax assessment period.
Five companies' assessment periods were for three years, seven for two years,
and another five for only one year.
It is worthwhile to note that from 1988 to 1990, South African cutters processed R3,46
billion of rough diamonds. only to pay taxation amounting tQ.R1,5 million, Ie, 0,4 per cent
of the rough diamond purchase value. This implies that RiSA cutters only managed RS
million as taxable income (company tax rate of 50%) for the three year period.
Besides their inability to process those rough diamonds economically that are worked by
other cutting centres abroad, vlz., israel, Singapore, Thailand. India and Sri Lanka, due to
so-called unproductive labour, cultural conflicts between workers, the many holidays and
five day/week routine, one of the major problems in South Africa's processing sector is that
a large proportion of local GLItters have become unprofessional in their trading practises.
The years of spoon-feeding, fostered by the ever helping hand of the State, have isolated
RSA cutters from international competition. The sharpness needed to survive in the cutting
profession has been eroded by complacency that orlqlnated from their belief that South
African diamonds would continue to be of top-quality and aut6;';1atica"y presented at their
request. It is astonishing to note that only over the past five years or so, rough diamonds
have been importer! (mainly by slqhtholders) to be'\pOlished (expected but not.proved)
locally. Non-siqhtholders have stated that rough diamonds that car "'e profitably cut and
polished locally can be imported, identical to the local assortments but cheaper. However,
to date few have embarked on this, and then only on a very limited scale. The immediate
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question that arises is: Why do these cutters continue to process 'more expensive'
diamonds?
From within the processing industry the message communicated, which contradicts that
what is formally reported, is quite clear. Trading practises often borders on emotional
sentiment of the market; only large cutting firms, Le sightholders have structured client
lists; profits are sought from working small volume/highly profitable material. When proflts
materialise, it will not be reflected. As a matter of fact, a very prominent RSA sightholder
confess' -l that all local profits are channelled overseas through means of the cost-plus
system.
It can not be.overernohasised that having said all of this, the fundernental reason why RSA
cutters do not contribute to Stat~ coffers in the form of taxation is because of the inability of
the present income tax structure to enforce payment. Outters are only exploiting the
system, legally. It wouldl be wise to learn from the Israeli Government their taxation
structure based on the value of cliamonds purchased by a cutter. In other words,
\ '
irrespective of whether cutter's opcratlons are profitable or not, an X amount would be
sourced from every cutter who purchased diamonds (the payment calculated on a sliding
scale).
7.1.5 Combined Die.mond IndustlfY Taxation Performance
Table 7.6 and Figure 7.1 depicts the combined taxation contribution by diamond producers,
deelers and cutting concerns to State Treasury from 1987 to 1990.
TABLE 7.6 - R~~A'S DIAMOND INDUSTRY TAXATION CONTRIBUTION (in Rands),
1987-1990
SEOTOR 1987 198a 1989 1990 TOTAL
~
PRODUCERS 35123962 61669173 31454883 69139588 197387606
Mine Income Tax 675895 351000 1693 000 175000 28941395
Royalties 34399686 42248544 29746282 68961930 175356442
Export duty 48381 19 06G629 15601 2658 19136269-
DEALERS 1 628108 10049383 72309580 29719293 113706364
1-'
OUTIERS 779509 1086237 350291 28763 2244800
Sightholders 779509 1 026992 281140 4793 2092434
Non-sightholders 0 59245 6915; 23970 152366
Source: The Department of Finance. 1991
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FIGURE 7.1 - COMPARISON OF THE ASSESSED TAXATION CONTRIBUTION BY
DIAMOND PRODUCERS, DEALERS AND cUnERS TO STATE TREASURY, 1981-1990
"
l:'ROPUCE:RS OE:l\.t.E:RS CUTTERS
7.2. Foreign Exchange
Foreign vxchange encompasses the revenues generated from rough and polished
diamond exports.
1.2.1 Rough Diamond Export. Revenue
During the period of 1986 to 1990, total RSA rough diamond exports, l.e, including all RSA
producers, dealers, cutters and permit holders (those companies which, on special
request, are permitted b}1the SADB to trade in rough diamonds) amounted to 27,3 million
carats valued at A2,3 billion (Table 7.7). In mass terms, the exports were fairly consistent
for 1988 and 1989; 7,3 and seven million carats, respectively. However, in 1990 some 13
million carats (almost twice the two previous years totals) were exported, due"in the main,
to the stockpiled exports by De Beers' trading companies OE810 and PURTRA. The
rnajorit}1of these diamonds were of industrial quality.
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At this point it w<)uld be appropriate to address the very complex pattern of the De 8eers'
trading corspanles, It has been explained that Del Beers Consolidated Mines (Ply) Ltd (the
producer compl~ny), has five trading subsidiaries viz., DESIO, PURTRA, 'DICOtl,P, DTO
c·
and OIAMDEL.. De Beers channels its mines' Pf¥Juction to HOH (in Kimberley) where the
tough tJiamonds are sorted and priced: De 8t:'~'j$sells diamonds, as a producer, on its
own account,>but to a very minor degree. P()Ff;TRA, the principal purchasing cornpany,
buys from theCSO (at HOH) and channels that ~!urchase to the DTC (which sells mainly to
the R$A sightho[ders) and to OIAMDEL, whk:h/!supply RSA non"sightholders': D!AMDEL
Ii
also sells to the RSA diamond toolmaking indu~!ry (not addressed in this report). OIOOR?
j/
buys also from the CSO (in HOH) and from R~iA alluvial diggers and supplies,to PURrRA
as well as ~)E8ID. DESID is p. incipfXUyrespol'1~ible for the export of Industrial diamonds.
What further complicates the sale of De Beers' diamonds is the movement of the various
qualities of rough diamonds bf1iween the cornpani:s. As a general rule, the :DTO is similar
in function to DICORP, with tbe difference that DTO diamonds go to local 'sights' and those
of DICORP are exported to .CSO London.
Continuing from Tabla /'.7, the following is of significance, Those rough diamonds
'i ...
exported only by RSA producers and their connected trading cnmpanles (only C)e Beers
and Trans Hex, in other words) totalled, for the three liear period, between 90 and 9$ per
cent of total rough d:/amond exports in mass and value terms, respec:tively. Only one
11.iHioncarats of ro.ugh diamonds valued at A198 milli6h were exported by non-De Beers
and non-Trans Hex dealers, cutters and permit holders. Though the data is il1sufficif#,nt to
evaluate the quamy of rough diamond exports by mainly cutters and permit holeers, the
(;:;;.
price of some. R20lj/carat (about $80{carat) equates to the mass of one million carats;
which is about the volume of rough diamonds absorbed by the local processing industry
annually.
SomeWhat. unsettling in respect of Government revel~ues from the dvty on rough diamond
exports, eIre the discrepancies in values between thJse' figures supplied 8Y De 8E3ersand
the Departrnerit of Finance when compared with Minerals Bureau arc! SAbB 'figures.
\ \
87
TABLE '7.7 - RSA ROUGH DIAMOND EXPORT REVENUES, 1988·1990
RSA PRODUCER EXPORTS OF TOTAL EXPORTS+ OF
R9UGH DIAMONDS ROUGH OIAMONDS
'~
CATEGORY Year Mcar M Rand Rlcar $/car Meat M Rand! Wear $/car
'~:;
Producers 1988 2,1 444,4 212 93 2,1 444,4 212 93
1989 0,04 7,4 185 81 0,04 7,4 185 81
1990 0,7 131,9 188 83 0,7 131,9 188 83
«'1<;»* 10,8 27,7 10,4 25,3
Dealers 19813 4,9 302,8 62 24 5,2 329,5 63 24
1989 6,7 610,4 91 , 35 7,0 681,9 97 37
1990 11,9 607,9 51 19 12,3 707,7 58 22
(%)* 89,2 72,3 89,6 74,7
Combined 1988 7,0 747,2 107 41 '1,3 773,9 106 41
Totals 1989 6,74 617,8 92 35 7,04 689,3 98 38
1990 12,6 739,8 59 23 13,0 839,6 65 25
88-90 2.6,34 2104,8 80 27,34 23ll2,8 94
EXPQrts# 1.,0 198,0 1&8
Mass Value
1988 95,9 96,5 Producers and their trading
1989 95,7 89,6 companies' percentage share of
1990 96,9 88,1 total rough diamond exports
Source: The South African Diamond Board, 1992
Notes:
*
Includes diamond producers, dealers, cutters and permit holders
Three year average (1988-1989) percentage share of total exports
Exports by dealers (excl. those of De Beet'S and Trans Hex),
cutters and permit holders
+
#
The Department of Finance reported that R301 million (from 1980-1981) were paid by
diamond producers (owing to the 15 per cent e:eport duty on rough diamonds) to the State.
During this period (and before) the Premier, Koffiefontein, Star. Hslam and Rovic diamond
mines were exempted from paying the export duty. Government introduced this practise
as these mines were deemed marginal. l.e. the export duty would have eroded any
profitiblility from the mines' operations and they would have had to shut down,
Consequently, the taxable rough diamond export figure (which declined by 25% (198CI
88
value)',\ .~29 pet' cent (1987's value)) realised a calculated export duty of R447 million, l.e.
an anomaly of Ri 46 million.
Should these figLlres be correct, it would indicate that rough dil?9'0nds exported from the
Republic have been undervalued for taxation purposes. However,'lt also could be that the
data compared with those of the Department of Finance is incorrect.
7.2..'2. Polished Diamond Export Revenue
Polished diamonds exported in 1980 totalled R302 million (278175 carats). In 1990, this
figure had increased by 297 per cent (a quadrupling in value) to ~,i,2 billion in nominal
Rand terms (Table 7.8). Export mass had doubled to 556244 carats.
TABLE 7.8 - RSAPOLISHED DIAMOND EXPORT REVENUE, 1980-1990
IYEAR MASS VALUE Rlcar
11969-
carats R miJlion
278175 301,7 1085
1981''' 178441 188,3 1055
1982'" 135880 127,0 935
1983'" 186814 161,4 864
1984'" 198258 252,8 1275
1985'" 234034 389,8 1666
1986'1- 272524 441,6 162O
198i'+ 359652 579,8 1612
1986+ 486949 875,6 1798
1989+ 530033 1 171,9 2211
1990+ 556244 1 19~,6 2157
Sources:
+
The South African Cutting Board, 1980·1985
The South African Diamond Soard, 1992
Taking into consideration that rough diamond production has remained fairly constant
during this period in mass (around nine million carats/annum) and in its gem: industrial
rough diamond quality relationship, the increase could well be the result of the
dev~lopmant of decentrallsed cutting factories such as Lsppeman, Newcastle and Kim (to
name but a few) since 1l~86.
7.3 EnlP~oyrnent
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TABLE 7.9 ~EMPLOYMENT'" INRSA'S DIAMOND MINES, 1980-1990
YEAR SECTOR TOTAL IN % TOTAL 0/0 MINES+ 0/0
SERVICE SHARE E:ARNINQS# SHARE SHARE
1980 RSA 23371 107869955 57
De Beers 15327 66 87365222 81 11 19
Other 8044 34 20504733 Hl 46 81
1981 RSA
,. 22995 119302838 60
De Beers 14516 63 95519445 80 9 15
Other 8479 37 23783392 20 51 85
1982 RSA 20909 128525057 59
De Beers 12678 61 102152240 19 9 15
Other 8231 39 26312827 21 50 as-"~~
1983 RSA 19592 132835542 59
De Beers 14436 74 104 946 045 79 9 15
Other 5156 26 27 S69497 21 50 85
1984 RSA 18769 144 770 698 63
De Beers 11867 63 115010994 79 11 1'7
Other 6902 37 29759704 21 52 83
1985 RSA 18227 153489392 65
De Beers 11677 64 122779735 80 11 17
Other 6550 36 30709657 20 54 83--
1986 RSA 16374 178693211 66
De Beers 11566 63 140985560 79 10 15
Other 6808 37 37707661 21 56 85
198? RSA 19346 216652814 67
De Beers 12546 65 175516512 81 10 15
Other 6800 35 41036302 19 57 85
1988 RSA 19822 269231216 64
De Beers 13180 66 223616008 83 10 16
other 6642 34 45615208 17 54 84
1989 RSA 22015 385 n5623
,
60
De Beers 15021 68 332 722~23 \,% a 13
Other 6994 32 530528(\Q "I ::. 87~~.,~1990 RSA 2298t? 491j Di6 469 .
De Beers 16045 70 4~5538 093 '\~61 13 20Other 6937 30 69478376 I 14 52 80
Source: The Minerals Bureau of South Africa, 1992
# Salaries/wages paid out to workers (nominal Rand terms)
.. Employees on the mine that are essential to diamond production/sales,
l.c, the workers on the duty list
+ Number of diamond mines operative
Notes!
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The employment figures discussed are those of the workers in the diamond mining,
diamond dealing ana processing sectors.
7.3.1 DianlOnd Producers
From 1980 to 1990, an average of 23 thousand workers, about 70 per cent of whom ate
employed by De Beers, were involved in the mining and recovering of rough, natural
diamonds. \\\\
\\
In 1990, South A1rica'sdiamond mines et1lployed 22 981 workers with wa~Jsfsalaries
totalling R495 million. llilrteen (20%) of the 6$ mines operative were owned ~fDe Beers
(Table 7.9) .. It is estimated that about 10 000 of the 22981 workers in service, 'are directly
involved in the production and treatment of diamonds.
Table 7.10 shows the relationship between the workers remuneration from 1988 to 1990 in
the gold, coal and diamond mining sectors and the values of the exported products.
i)
For the three years considered, gold and coal mine workers received R18,2 and
R3,9 billion in the form of wages/salaries' which amounted to 31,3 per cent and 35,9 per
cent, respectively, of the total export sales values,' i.e. about a third of the value. In the
case of diamonds, the figure is lower at about 25 per cent. As mentioned earlier, diamond
mining is considered to be more profitable than all the other sectors mal<ing up the
diamond industry, and for that matter, could well be more profitable than gold or coal
mining.
TABLE 7.10 • MINING SECTOR COMPARISONS, 1988~1990
,.
FACTOR GOLD COAL DIAMONDS UNIT
Export Sales Value (ESV) 58,1 10,7 4,6* R8illion
Workers Remuneration (WR) 18,2 3,9 1,1 R Billion
Number of Mine Workers# i 534,8 260,1 60,7 Thousand
I(WRlESV)% 31,3 35,9 24,6-
Sources: The Minerals Bureau of South Africa, 1992
The South African Diamond Board, 1992
Notes; * Total Sales Value of Rough Diamonds
Combined total for the three year period#
7.3.2 Diamond Dealers
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Diamohd dealers are the minority by far in th€".Sollth African di~mond industry. This is
normal as the trading practises by der:l:ing companies normally involve only one or two
buyers. In 1990, it is estimated that around 150 dealers wi.-Jreinvolved in the trading of
rough and polished diamonds.
De Beers boasts the largest contingent of deal~rs viz., PURTRA, DIACORP, D10,
DIAMDEL and DEBID of the 54 registered dealing companies in South Africa.
7.3.3 Dlamond Cutters
A decade ago (and more), South African cutters used to cut and polish rough diamonds
w€ighing three to four carats/stone. Journeymen (also referred to as artisans) mainly
firlished these high value gems. These cutters, who were mostly White, underwent a five
year in-house apprenticeship to acquire the necessary polishing expertise. Operators,
those that did not complete the apprenticeship, worked on smaller stones, then considered
to be two caraters and less down to rough diamonds of four stones to a carat (25 pointers,
also referred to as melee). These were mainly processed by bli\ck and coloured workers.
Today, smaller stones (which are increasingly floodil\l9 the industry) force cutters to
improve their technical skills. The economic impetus to train highly skilled artisans has
therefore diminished since operators {instead of artisans), which are paid a lower salary,
can dffectively '~rocess the goods, and also, cuttirg firms are moving towards f':"11I scale
mechanisatiol'1. Workers are only needed to supervise bruting and cutting machines.
In 1990, 542 artisans and 2650 operators (plus apprentices), totalling 3 192 cutters,
comprised South Africa's entire cutting and polishing industry (Table 7.11). (Note: The
cutting workforce in foreign countries totals approximately: Israel=10 000; USA=12 000;
Belgium::::::16000;USSR=6000; India=400 000)
It is of importance to note that of all the sectors of the RSA diamond industry, those
workers involved in the processlfli:J of diamonds are the most skilled and, quite
understandably, are assumed to be highly paid due to the particule.r arts of diamond
marking, -bruting, -cuttlng, -brilliandeering and -crossworkil"-g. Unfor'pnately, diamond
cutters today E).rein reality underpaid for the' quality and quantlLy'of work they produce. The
Diamond Workers Union (DWU) (DWU) reported in 1990, that diamond operators and
journeymen earned about Ri000 and RSOOO per month, respectively. a~1all standards,
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this is considered ':0 be very low compared to the value of polished diamonds produced by
an individual cutter. Also, the djff~rence in salaries earned by operators and journeymen
1/
does not take into account the quelity of workmanship. Diamond operators often cut ana
polish diamonds ,of very high value, i.e. those that would normally be processed by
journeymen, because of an operator's ability. However, due to the fact that an operator
isn't 'academically' qualified in that he has not completed his apprenticeship, operators do
not receive the same salary as a journeymen.
TA8LE 7.11 - EMPLOYMI:NT IN"RSA'$i?RCCESSING INDUSTRY, 1980-1990~,. /"
~~
YEAR JOURNE~YMEN OPERlHORS& TOTAL
(Artisan~l) APPRENTICES
..........._....",.
1980 ~08 1420 2 328
1981 €,,59 &64 1 523
1982 04·94 687 1 181
~963 E07 847 1 354
1984 441 680 1 121
1985 ~,63 999 1 462
1986 5·19 1458 1 977
1987 510 1 soo 2 310
1988 577 2546 3 123
1989 81)5 3025 3 830
1990 542 2650 3 192-
Sources: Diamond Cutting Board Annual Reports, 1960-1985
The South African Diamond Board, 1992
The following analyses (Table 7.12) shows the relationship between the workers
remuneration from 1988 to 1990 in the diamond, chrome, managanese and silicon
beneficiation sectors and the export values of the beneficiated products. The beneficiated
products in the diamond sector would be polished diamonds, and those of the others,
alloys.
()
The chrome, manqenese and silicon beneficiation sectors combined showed that
R7,3 billion of alloys were' exported during the three years from 1988 to '1990, with the
workers' remuneratlon totalling R635 million or 8,7 per cent of the exported value. In th'sse
sectors the combined workers in service totalled about 26 thousand cumulative for the
three years. In the case of polished diamonds, some RS,S billion were exported (which is
the monltored value of the SADB and not necessarily the true value (as explained earlier
by the cost-pius system») processed by 10145 cutters (cumulative) who earned salaries
e
\
\I;,...
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amounting to R165 million, l.e, 4,7 per cent of the polished diamond export value. This is
almost half that of the alloy sectors' calculation.
TABLE 7.1.2~BENEFICIATION SECTOR COMPARISONS, t9a8~1990
FAOTOR CHROME COMaIN~+ IDIAMO,_N_D_S-t-U_N_IT__
r
Export Sales Value (ESV) 4,3 7,3' 3,5*
Workers Remuneration (WR) 39~f 635 165
Number of Workers# i5513 25717 10145
(WA/SSV)% 9,2 8,7 4,7
A Billion
RMlllion
Source: The Minerals Bureau of South/Africa, 1992
Notes:
+
#
Export Sales Value of Polished Di ,monds
Chrome, Manganese and Silicon Sectors
Three years combined
Obviously, the sectors need more in-depth evaluation in terms of capital c:':' labour
intensiveness, But, more than twice the number of alloy workers earned four times more in
terms of salaries. Also, excluding the rough input necessary to produce the beneflolated
product. ailoy manufacturing is more capital intensive than diamond pro':-i13ssing.
The point that needs to be made is that most managements of diamond cutting firm~
continually complain about the unreasonable high cost of labour, This is ali unfounded
statement. With the diamond processlnq indlJstry loss capital intensive than others, a very
low remuneratiol' : sales input, and also the abtihdance of labour available (in 1992 the
DWU stated that the diamond cutling industry has a 42 per cent ourrent-ln-servlce record,
l.e, some 1800 cutters are jobless), it seems that the heart of the problem in South Africa's
prooesslnq industry is to be found with the manaqernent of cutting firms, and not only with
the cutters themselves.
1.4 Decentralisation of Cutting FilmS
Owing to Government's decentralisation programmes several diamond cutting firms have
been erected in decentralised regions. Such cutting factories sometimes undergo structure
changes, i.e. a change in company ownership, or a change in the type of operation
(outting/polishing melee's instead of large stones). Table 7.13 lists ..South African
decentrallsed cutting flrms,
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Date
TABLE 7.13 ~FOUNDING OF DECENTRALlSED CUTTING FACTORIES
Cutting
Firm
Ownership Decentralisation
change Region
New Other
factory ....
Foreign
control
yes
melaM
yes
yes
Kimberley
Pietersburg
Kimberley
Newcastle
George···
EaslLonden
Pietetsburg
Potgietersrus
Bloemfontein
NovsS Kim
Jan\;!a4 Lappeman
NovaS' Request
Jan 85 Newcastle
Apr 88 Shuster
Nov 88 Sl1evils
Jul 88 Bronners
Feb88 Mouw
Jan 88 Quality
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
Notes:
The South African Diamond Board, 1992
Not Applicable -,
+ Change from working Ia.rgerstones to me , (0,3 carat)
From 1983 to 1988, nine cutting factories were founded in various regions throuqhout
South Afr/pa., the largest ones being the Lappeman (Pietersburg) and Newcastle
(Newcastle) cutting firms, This endeavour was successful in that additional jobs were
created (Lappeman accommodates about 700-1000 women cutters), which boosted the
local infrastruture, and that rough diamonds that would have otherwise been exported are
now beneficiated locally.
In addition, these cutting firms could now embark on compeUtive jewellery manufacturing
with the financial assistance provided by Government. Agreed, this form of financial
support, is not solely aimed at the diamond industry but throughout all industries in South
!-\frica.
Unfortunately, this incentive for decentralised processing units can be abused by the
cutHng firms in that very low wages are paid to the workers, taldng into account that the
Stat.e subsidlses every worker. Also, cutters in decentralis~d areas quickly learn of their
fellow cutters' salaries in cities (such as Johannesburg) and migrate to an already
saturated indUstry. Cutting firms exploit this trend by Uliderpfl,ying decentrta!ised cutters
Ep;mployed(with these butters now happier with .an 'increased' salary) at the expense of
, .,
those already in service.
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CHAPTERS"
8 GOVERNMENT SUPPORT AND REGULATION
Govemment involvement, by means of support and regulation in the diamond industry,
purposes fundamentally the optimal utilisation of rough diamond resources,
\{-I1e State bears the responsibility of creating a suitable environment wherein the country
as a whole can derive maximum benefit. Owing to this, Government envisioned a diamond
processing (cutting and polishing) industry to beneficiate rough diamonds, l.e. the adding
of value to the primary product. in order to foster growth within the industry. Ideally, as the
industry expands, Government's share of profits (through taxation) should increase, but as
important, the South African community should ukimately ben~fit. Such expansion has
occurred in South Africa's diamond industry.
However, the extent of Government's lnvolvement.and the resultant effeot on the d1dustty,
has not been analysed. Has the State gained interest (so to speak) on its supporting and,
regulating investment in the diamond industry?
These aspects are subsequently addressed to eV~,luate the State's positive, or negative,
role in the diamond industry.
8.1 Support
Govemment support include mainly taxation incentives, decentralisation subsidies and
export incentives. Other, less obvious supporting measures, are also discussed !(I this
chapter.
8.1.1 Tax&tion Incentives
From a taxation viewpoint, the diamond industry of South Aflica is not treater, differently to
any other industry. Up to about 19S3!1984, the diamond mining sector was taxed at 56 per
cent on profits compared to 56 per cent fer most other sectors (gold mining excluded).
Today the tax rate is 50 per cent (piUS a mark-up of 0,86%). It was argued.that diamonds
generally get'lerate higher profits than other commodities.
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At present, diamond mines (as with all other mines) may deduct 100 per cent of all capital
goods USE)P in its mining operations for taxation purposes, excluding capital used to
purchase land and mineral rights, Since diamond trading and processing enterprises do
not qualify for this 100 per cent deduction (as is me case with any company involved in
trading and beneficiation), opinion has it that diamond mines are assisted by Government.
Buildings erected by diamond producers, however, don't have any saleable value similar to
for instance an in·town buslness property owned by a dealer.
8.1.2 Decentralisation Subsidies
Diamond cutting firms receive incentives under the Government's decentralisation
programme. A factory needs to qualify for(lsubsidy A (relocation costs) and subsidy a
(interest on buildings and rent thereof (1$%), stocks, commercial vehicles) to receive any
such provision, .An allowance per worker is also part of .the scheme. Decentralisation
r~gions also dictate the share of state input. For instance, a worker at a cutting factory in
Pietersburg (Lappeman receives approximately RgO/worker; R!:Jh, R., Blndernan, 13"
1992, personal communication) would receive more than one in Johannesburg.
Since 1986, nine diamond cutting factories qualified for decentralisation subsidies (in the
process of being phased out) (Table 8.1). Up until 1991. R1,74 million (under subsidy A)
and R10,6 million (under subsidy B) were provided by the State. Combined, total
decentralisation subsidies paid out to the cutting industry amounted to 1112,3 million.
Notably, the analysed 133 cutting firms in RSA contributed through taxation (from 1987' to
1990) only 18 per cent of the R12,3 million, l.e, A2,21 million to State Treasury.
8.1.3 Export Incentives
,1
Export lncentives are calculated as a fixed percentage on the value of polished diamond
exports under the General Export Incentive scheme' (GElS). .Government set different
levels of incentives on lntermediats and finished products, with the higher subsidy paid orr·
tile latter, Polished diamonds are entitled to a 2,5 per cent export subsidy.
Oonslderatlon was given in declaring polished diamonds a finished product, in which
instance it might have been eligible for up to seven per cent subsidy. However, it Wf),S
feared that polished diamonds would be smugglf:d into SQuth Africa, only to be re-exported
officially.
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TABLE a.1 ~DEQENTRALISATION SUBSIDIES PAID TO RSA'S PROCESSING
INDUSTRY, 1986-1991
COMBINED COMPANIES* YEAR SUBSIDY A SUBSIDY 13
Subtotal 86-91 1741075 1601811
Total 12342 a86
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, 1991
Notes: Subsidy A: Relocation costs, Le. the cost of disconnection,
connection (Customs and Excise duties), shipment,
transport, packaging and clearing of goods
Interest on the buildings, rent thereof (15%), stocks,
commercial vehicles
Nine companies combined, Le. Shevils (2). Shuster,
quality, Newcastle, Kim, Request and Lappeman (2)
diamond cutting firms
Subsidy B:
*
From 1980 to April 1990, export incentives paid on exported polished diamonds totalled
R47,5 millioD(under A and B categories) (Table 8.2).
Some Ri,4 million of this total, or three per cent (which is also more than half of what
diamond cutters paid in the form of income taxes), went to non-cutting firms.
TABLE 8.2 ~POliSHED DIAMOND EXPORT PAYMENTS (PRE APRIl.. 1990)
YEAR NON-CUTTERS CLAIMS TOTALCLAIM;-j
A(R) 8(R) A(R) B(R)
1980 0 0 297 117668
1981 986 247319 7245 2077227
1982 576 480510 5956 1961761
1983 535 39849 7250 1945737
1984 86 341605 6838 3019014
1985 353 64757 100S6 4147548
1986 721 1169$3 14715 54~~7116
1987\:, 1100 30725 22978 474~462
1968 227 25196 63820 6519626
1989 16927 44037 71353 e 778 094
1990* 0 14246 19193 8505934
Total Q1517 1405177 229701 47243187
A+B i 426694 47472888~-
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, 1991
Notes: A,B "Denotes th~ two categories of GElS
* From Apri11990 a new GElS system was
introduced
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Liaison with the Department of Trade and Industry confirmed that ineffective control in the
administering of the programme exists. Firstly, no specific standards exist in respect of
those companies that qualify for export incentives, and secondly. there's an obvious lackot
communication between the Department of Trade and Industry and those institutions who
are directly involved in the diamond industry, vlz., the SAnS and the Minerals Bureau
(Department of Mineral and Energy Affairs). The latter point is crucial since verification of
those companies requesting export lneentives is imperative.
Export incentivescpaid under the GElS scheme (from April 1990 onwards) amounted to
ae.s million (Table 8.3).
Only four of the 40 companies which received incentives were diamond cutting firms.
Non-diamond cutting firms received R586,1 thousand from Government (9,4% of the total).
TABLE 8.3 - POLISHED DIAMOND EXPORT PAYMENTS (POST APRIL 1990)
COMBINED COMPANIES#- CLAIM PERIOD: CLAIM VAL.U'=
4/90 to 2/91 (Rand)
T01AL 6262067
Source: Department of Trade and Industry, 1991
Note: # A total of 10 companies received polished
diamond export payments
Total export subsidies paid by Government since 1900 amounted to R54.7 million, of which
R2,O million (4% ofthe total) was,absorbed by non-datrond cutting firms.
8.1.4 Oll.er Support
Besides the direct programmes implemented by Government to assist further development
of the industry the State has introduced. through the years, several additional support
programll1e$ to assist various sectors of the dil:lmond industry, the most important being:
(I) The 10 per cent price decrease on rough diamonds mined locally Which cutters
deemed profitable to process (from about 1915-i9e{lj. (10%); 1984-1988
(1,5%), abolished by Government in 1'988). In effect, this meant a discount on
world market prices.
(Ii) The permission and authorisation of a 'pick-and-choose' mentality by the
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cutting industry. Local cutters could select and request those diamonds which
they had need of.
(iii) The introduction of the rough diamond export duty, which increased from five
per cent in 1915 (to 10% from 1919-1965; from 1965 set at 15%) to its current
15 per cent. The present practise compels producers to offer their diamond
first locally before allowed exportation. Should producers demand immediate
exportation, the acceptable market value of the goods is determined by using
the tender system on the OSSA.
(iv) The deregulation of the secondary industry (dealers and cutters) since !the
inception of the SAOS. Historically, rough diamonds were 'importedfexported'
from Johannesburg, Kimberley and Bloemfontein and so monitored by the SAP.
Also, rough diamond trading between cutters was not allowed. At present, the
SADS has deregulated this sector to the extent that dealers and cutters may
trade rough diamonds freely.
(v) The use.",·' financial rands to attract foreign investors. This incentive was
abused by I~I sightholders in that De Beers diamonds were acquired through
monies exohanqed at.the financial rand rate, Le, a 40 per cent price discount.
(vi) The continual issuing of new diamond cutting licenses.
(vii) The establishment of the Diamond Bourse of South Africa (DSSA) in
Johannesburg, to facilitate rough diamond trading locally. and its subsequent
upgrading through the lntroduotion of an open-floor trading system.
(viii) The abolition of the ad valorem excise duty of 20 per cent on retail jewellery,
(ix) The 25 per cent import duty on polished diamonds, Which in effect 'protected'
the local cutting industry.
(x) TM in~too~..."m of an 'Article 59 Committee' whereby a group of industry
representatives Visits a De Beers rough di(:',i'i)Ondlayout (every six months) to
establish the quantity and quality of De Beers rough diamond, l.e, the
parcel-mix. This jnform~tion is the~channelled to the processing sector.
ij
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8.2 Regulation
.1
The South African Diamond Soard, a corporate body instituted by the G6:~. rnent of
South Africa as a result of the Diamonds Act (No 56 of 1986), controls, regulates and
monitors all spheres of the local diamond industry. The South African Police (throughits
Gold and Diamond Branch) assists the Board by enforcing Illegal Diamond Buying (108)
legislation.
To summarise, the State demands that all rough diamond possession be controlled and
monitored and that local rough diamond production be first offered locally before allowed
exportation (without paying 15% export duty). Rough diamonds imported are not subject to
any duty, and whilst polished rR}monds may be freely traded, importation thereof (set or
It ",et) is subject to a 26 per cf ilC Import duty.
Detailed activities of the SADe are listed in Appendix 5.
8.2.1' lOB Legislation
The laws pertaining to lOB are covered under Sections 18-25 in the Diamonds Act (No 56
of 1986). Appendix 6 portrays the illegal diamond trade in the RSA between 1980 and
1990.
The relevance of lOB legislation in South Africa is irltensely debated as a point ot
contention between prominent, diamond producers, dealers, cutters, the SAP and the
Govemment, and arguments for and against the continuation of lOB legislation in South
Africa have been propounded. Those against IDB legislation motivate their standpoint on
the following:
(i) Diamonds are not different to any other commodity and do 'not qualify for
preferential treatment. As such, diamonds should be allowed to be traded on
the free market where competition dictates prices. It remains the responsibility
of the diamond owner to protect his property.
(ii) Th&$tate ca(:.;ies,thefinancial burden of enforcing lOB. In addition, the method
\' .
.. of lOB trapping employed by the SAP is regarded as not only unethical, but
unacceptable.
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(iii) The abolition of rOB would. lead to expansion of the industry which is
desperatelyneeded. Foreign dlamantaires would also flock to South Africa and
assist industry growth.
f\
(iv) Contraband of rough diamonds form part of the intrinsic nature of the industry,
which led to the development of the informal sector thereby creat~ng·the
necessary infrastructure for further economic development.
However, the arguments requesting lOB's abolition are considered shortsighted for a
variety of reasons. In effect the lOB laws are there to protect;
(i) The cjiamond mining companies (producers).
(il) Llcenseddiarnond diggers.
(iii) Manufaoturers of synthetic diamonds.
(iv) Diamond licensees, dealers and cutters.
(v) Government revenue.
(vi) Foreign currency,
Repealing these laws wpuld create an uncontrolled rough diamond market since it would:
(i) Become Iflgal to have unpolisher diamonds in one's possession without having
to disclose their source.
(ii) Legalise trade in unpolished diamonds.
(iii) Enable rough diamonds to be processed without any control,
(Iv) Enable all and sundry to export rough diamonds without any source documents
and without a repatriation of foreign currency.
(v) Encol.lrage thaft from mining areas, processing plants (synthetic) and factories.
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(vi) Attract undesirable people from abroad who would, in turn, encourage greater
theft.
(vii) Provide an acceptable international currency for illegal practices such as, the
purchase of arms, trafficking of drugs, or moving currencY.C;lbroad.
(viii) Oestabilise the South African diamond industry and risk rendering marginal
mines unpayable.
i .'
(Ix) ResuH in considerable fiscal loss to the State and also reduce the flow to South
Africa of much needed foreign currency that is currently being returned to the
RSA.
(x) The producers and SAP are havln~l major problems even with the laws in place
8;1d the abrogation of the laws would rather be an incentive to increase illegal
activity.
The common law alone is inadequate to protect diamond producers, as wrongful
ownership must be proved which would make it difficult to apprehend a thief unless caught
in the act. However, under the cmrently operative laW:$:)lIeg~1possession of-a rough
diamond is sufficient prima facie proof of guilt. The success of the international diamond
industry depends largely on the control of tough diamond volumes (and their related
prices). By effectively dismantling rough diamond controlling laws, an unwanted supply of
polishable goods could filter unto the market and disrupt market prices for rough diamonds.
It should be noted that Sierra Leone and Angola are currently experiencing a pll1ndering of
\\
their diamond resources (resulting in little benefit in revenue to their Govetnmel)~s) owing
to the repeal of diamond legislation. Conversely, 80tswana introduced controlling laws
which coincided with the commencement of diamond mining (the opening of the Oiapa
mine), Whilst Namibia did not abolish those laws established ~lnder the previous
administration.
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CHAPTER 9
9 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this study titled "Government Int~rventi()n ana the Resultant Sector Performance of
SOllth Africa's Diamond Industry" a two-sided approach has been attempted. Firstly, the
performer ...:e of the various sectors were evaluated in terms of production and sales,
taxation contribution to the State, employment, the beneficiation of rough diamonds and
other, less obvious, factors:~, Following this, an evaluation of State support (financial and
other) and regUlation, historically and presently in effect, was 0:" .:le.
Of South Africa's six diamond sectors, viz., diamond production, -tradinq, -processlnq as
well as synthetic diamond m6.'11ufacturing,diamond toolmaking anoths Jewellery sector,
only the most important, i.e, the first three, were analysed.
Before the final conclusions and recommendations of the study are considered, the
following facts of the RSA's diamond industry are reviewed.
For the 1980 to 1990 period under consideration, approximately 70 diamond mining
companies (excluding the 400 alluvial diggers) produced about 8·10 million carats I.'f
natural, rough diamonds annually of which 70-75 per cent were ,conSidered
gem: near-gem quality material. In terms of mass, rough diamonds from kimberlite,
alll.lVial and marine deposits totalled 85, 14 and one per cent, respectively. De Beers
Consolidated Mines alone contributed 95 per cent on average to total production.
Some 54 dealing companies are registered in South Africa which traded 35 million carats
of rough diamonds, valued at Rt billion during the three years of 1988 to 1990.
Diamond cutting firms registered total 133, with some 45 cutting firms controlled by the..
approximately 20 De Beers sightholders (similar to those found overseas). Of these
sightholders, South Africah owned cutting factories absorb about 25 per cent in mass and
17 percent in value of the total rough diamonds purchased by sightholders from De Beers.
In total, about 10-15 per cent of rough diamonds mined per annum locally are lOcally
consumed by cutters.
The major conclusions and recommendations are subsequently listed.
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It can be said that not only was De Beers .Ctm$o!:~ted Mi~ rnSpol1$ible for placing
South Africa on the world map as a diamond producino country, hut it ~ •.is De Beem who
also ma<;1eit P<'JS,.~ib!efor the establisi'lment of El. dialTlr.md trl'1ding ancl. processing industry
as is seen today. Expar ...ion of the diamond mloir~g$®tor (taking note of the fam that
South Africa's primary sector, and t~ a far lasset degree the secondary sector ~re
governed by laws arid regulations) thrtmgh the attmcOOn of foreign investo~ could weI!
occur if prodUOOi"S be allowed to mark~J their rough diamonds at. their own discretion. At
present, producers offer their production first to the local industry to avoid paying the 15
per cept ~xport duty on rough diamonds. Deregulation of Souto Africa's diamond mining
sector followed, with specific emphasis on the re-evaluation of Section 59 of the Diamonds
Act No 56 of 1986 (whereby diamond producers, in an agreement with the SADS, have to
first offer their total production to the local cutting/dealing industry). Also, hopefully, fO\'eign
investol'$··would be attraoied to expand eXisting mines or &.art-up neW mines in South
Africa. In this regard, it is recon'lhlended that the current s~(stem v,hereby De Beers,
through the C8Qjio Kimberley), supplies rough diamonds to RSA. sightholders should be
abandoned in favour of the direct suppiy of rough diamonds to RSA sightholders from the
esc in London Importantly, an agreement between the SADS (or similar C9ntrolling
body) and producers (assuminillhat others would also partake in the agreement) should
be sought. whel'eby effective monitoring of rough di§mond exports coul~ be mad,~
possible. This recommendation addresses the i$SU9 of 'economical processir,~ capability'
by local Gutters of South African rough diamond supply. Since local cutters, particularly De
Beers sightholders, largely depend on local rough diamond production, it is envision.~d that
a restructuring in the supply method (and therefore the so-called 'parcel-mix), ma~~\\b!'lfter
the RSA's entire diamond industry. Not only will the usual South African gooq~be c>n':pffer
: <'. "; .. , ,'i
to the local indUstry, but in addition, a grflj:lter variety of rough diamonds (i~size, shape
and colour) sourced by the eso (in London) from Botswana, Angola, Guinea, Namibia and
the CIS. As a result, the non-De Beers sightholders should also benefit from this exercise
since the current, more deregulated processing industry could expand due to higher
volume's of rough diamond trading locally. This should allow the RSA)s entire dlareond
industry to grow.
From a workforce viewpoint, the diamond mines are much more able to create jobs than
either the diamond trading or diamond processing sectors. It has become obvious that the
diamond industry, due to the un: ~~a properties of diamonds, should be regulated and
monitored to some degree, the SAD8 (through the Diamonds Act) is doing exactly that,
by controlling sector trade activities, by the monitoring of statistics and very importantly,
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liaising with the various participants to foster groVl{th in the diamo~')d industry. ti
recommpodeg that thMi.lst bQ continued. parti¢w~rly the enforcemant of IDe legislation.
The continued deregulation or the secondary industry by the SADB and the subsequent
increase in trade (mainly from diamond dealers), suggests that deregulation of the rough
diamond tra,de, if done ~onsibly, shpuld -Pontinue. It is the growth in trade in th~
industry tbat s!y~d be stimulsded. Together wi1h this, improvements in the monitorinQ.,Qf
statistics should be trade.
Concerning statistics, the study was hampered in that only limited and somewhat
questionable statistics could be used, Not questionable in the sense of compilation
accuracy (by either the SADB or the Minatals Bureau), but in the submitting (as the State
requires) of these data. Ths. method of data capture by the SADB allows either
misinterpretation or manipulation. Also, only data from 1988 onwards for' diamond dealers
and cutters was available. Probably ths most important conclusion reaohed was that
statistics furnished by dealers, but particularly those from cutting firms, had probably been
manipulated. This means, in effect, that these sectors are performing quite handsomely
I.~. highly profitable, bUl it won't show on paper. In fact, what is reported formally through
their statistics is often contradicted by Informal QOmmunication. At the same time, it needs
to be said that dialnond producers should not be excluded from this charge of data
manipulation.
It is reoomm~.!1d?d th;at thf;! SADI? ypgr&i§ll)~resent s~m whioh ey;aluate$ I2rjQE!s9f
mQ_:lQrtedpolished dia~, Through this, the post-plus eystem used by slghtholders to
process their diamonds. can be better monitored, as well as the foreign exchange that
should be realised from tho export of polished diamonds.
In terms of GOVernmental support to the diamond industry, it was found that 21ili! the
diamond processing sector was financially supported. This sector received R12,3 million in
the form of decentralisation subsidies and R55,2 million under (~EIS. In addition, the
State's other (indirect) forms OTsupport had been, and still are, chiefly directed at the
cutting and polishing sector. The processing industry had, to date, absorbed these
incentives but never performed. This is also proved by the many Commissions of Enquiry
directed at theprocesslnq indut:;JY, Since GElS :3 applicable to many other commodities
besides polished diamonds, it is r~CQmm~nli.gdjh§t b~1ter @dminjstraticm.•.J!ndJenewed
re-@yahJro.iQo,of expo~ntive $cb~J.Uld..d.®entrali~tj90 progmmmes applicable to
the diamond indu~try shQuld be .done inBo.IJ witb the SADB allQ.jb.IL~
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.Min.ruW. and ,!;nwgy Affairs. iJL the Minersll2 Mesu. In ler~_of 'atlministratiol)' the
authenticftY..Qf..claims should be checked .. In terms of re-evaluation, thbse requests by
CLottingfirm§ to eX.QQri their polished diamonds under difWrent GElS catAgories should be
discussed fjrst with the GADB and the_Minerals Bureau, before finalisatioJ1..;~~,0r ali, ~
GADS monitors the activities of each and every cutter aru;Ldeal§lr and is best equiRped to
evaluate such a re~st. In addition, since f!!1Y.0neis allowed to eXJ,?0rtpo!ished diamond$
aog qualifyfot the 2;5 ~er cent payment on the export value. it is .rtilth~rrecommended that
.. N
the scheme be limit~ to diamantaires.
Historically, competitiveness as a prerequisite far future economic survival, rarely surfaced
in South Africa's processing industry. With only white labOur involved in the sector (this
changed re«;ently). subskliM and incentives from Govemment led to 'spoon-feeding', and
i$Olation from growing cutting industries worldwide. The industry failGd to respond to
changing t;ltamatjonal markets. In addition, continued modemisation of equipment within
the cutting industry would only further diminish the importance of the p~ng sector in
respect of job creation (the wqt!dorce has contracted over the past five years).
Conversely, diamond mines" production is far less reliant on international changes in
consumer markets, and therefore more dependable in terms of job creation,
The fact that South AfrkJals diamond cutting industry is incapable of e<xllw:nically
processing local roUgh gem-quality d~mond production, implies either that local rough
diamond prices are too high, or thbt !ocaJ cutters have stagnated through 'good tilllfjt~land
have become technically inept to process the goods. Another factor may lou. \.(9
~lOacceptable (determined by outters) ~'fOfltmargins on local oU'lput. Ana~/ses havei~~t,,;ft
that RSA cutters have somewhat negated their role of rough diamon-i pt'OOe$Sing. I~o""ead
cuttars are far more involved in rough diamond trading. The three year period (1988-1990)
showed that 65 per cent (value) and 15 per cent (volume) of the diamonds produced in this
period were purchased by Gutters and the total added value amounted to R105 million, l.e.
some four per cent. In fact, after examination of RSA cutters' 1990 statistics, it was found
that the cost and proeesslnq of diamonds amounted to R1,32 billion but were sold for
R1,28 billion, l.e. b. .OSS of R37 million. In terms of performance, the cost-plt$,systam
employed by cutters definitely hinders performance.
It is deduced that due to the operating structure of the cutting firms of De Beers
sightholders, l.e, their policy of working on a cost-plus basis combined with the tam th~,t
the majority are foreign owned, sighthokiers will continue to rnal(6 use of State incentives
whenever possible, whilst still underperfonning In terms of tax contributions. the adding <>f
value ar.d job creation.
\Iv/
)/
(the taxation contrlbutk n to State Treasury by diamond producers, dealers and cutters
differ remarkably. Taxation from producers' will shortly deteriorate even further due to the
implementation of the new Minerals Bill. From the end of December 1993, the State will
receive no income from lease agreements, whilst producers will continue to lower their
taxable incomes through unredeemed capital expenditure. De Beers' dealers are
responsible for 96 per cent of all RSA dealers' taxation contribution, l.e. only four per cent
of non-De Beers dealers (which amount to 50 of 54 dealers) contributed R7,1 million (from
1987-1990) to State coffers. Worse still, local cutters (the 133 analysed) contributed just
over R2 million to State Treasury for the same period. A reVised taxation struoture for !h~
diamond cutting icdustry should to be introduced. The, system used' by Israel (see
8tmendix Z) QQyld be agSlpted to suit the South Africah industry. It is suggested that the
lLUrchii!§~ vol~~ues of ,fqygh di~ by cutters from De [:leers/non-De 8e~rs
ru!P~rs shoyld bf;) monitored as such st!;ltistic§ are '~e only data. that (,tan bQ accumtslly
g_Q!:re.!gmd by the SADB. and hence by thill~
Though not directly addressed in this report, the lacklu$'re growth of Sooth ,1\frica's
jewellery indootry. from the viewpoint that a minima! amount of polished diamonds locally
processed is actually absorbed by the jewelleN industry (since the majority of sightholding
'"\ ,.'
cutting firms are foreign owned and consequently export their polished diamonds), could
be assisted by means of the abolition of the import duty of 25 per tent on polished
diamonds. It has been suggested in the report that the 25 per cent import duty in effect
protected local cottam in that no coftl!l6t~ion to improve productivity materialised.
The reoomO'l!; ~@dderegulation of the entire ind.lJs!..rywould affect lOB legislation. A stm;h!
should al§Q be undertaken on the importat!QSLAOdeffgctiYE1neS$Qf the SAP's role in '!~
~pplicatiQn Of lOB legi§latiQO, a§ 'WAil as the moral ethics of lOB law enforcemont.
It '$ further concluded that the OSSA has proved invaluable in determining the acceptable
market pries of a rough diamond parcel but U recommended thet tbe 'BEl~Slrv~Price'
§Ystem used by the DBSA shOUld al!Qw tE1nd~ret$on the rough diC\mond parc~ls, to hC\Vb
i.I:!.§lght itl!Q the price §let by the seller.
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To summarise, the stl.ldy, showed that State supPort faVOlJrs (and has histolically favoured)
the processing sector at the expense of the other sectors. Given the negligible
performance of the procesSing industry, continued state support cannot be justified.
C·'
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RSA DIAMOND PROOUCTION BY TYPE OF DEPOSIT (,incarats)
YEAR KIMBERLITE % ALLUVIAL % MARINE % TOTAL
1980 (3703479 78,7 1111 847 20,6 45002 0,5 8520328
1981 7935411 83,3 1550291 16,3 40175 0,4 '9525877
1982 7781 231 85,0 1339535 14,6 32120 0,4 9152886
1983 8957753 86,9 1 315987 12,8 38039 0,4 10311 779
1984 8140841 86,4
--
1332370 '13,2 47496 0,5 10120113 ....
1965 :3 916321 87,4 1241612 12,2 48003 0,5 10205936
.1986 ' 9995626 88,0 1·193699 11,7 37638 0,4 1'0226963
1987 7686011 84,9 1 323868 14,6 41113 0,5 9050992
1988 7217 fW.2 64,9 1216'178 14,3 70026 0,8 8504016
1989 7784571 85,4 1 264546 13,9 66763 0,7 9115 ~80
\;
'1990 7380 112 84,7 "I 198055 13,6 130064- 1.5 8708231
-.---
80-90 88 099174 8$,2 14747988 14,3 S96439 0,6 103443601
',
Source: Mil!1eralsBureau of South Africa, 1991
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APPENDIX 2
ILLUSiAATION OF THE COST-PLUS SYSTEM
Following is an illustration of the cost-plus system, assuming a 'plus' factor of two per cent.
A purchases an ashtray at iJ. retail price ()f R30 (rough input). Paint, brushes, labour, time
etc, i.e. his processing cost totals Ai O. A finishes a piece of art, which he sells for R60,
l.e, a markup of R20. A.'s operatlnq expenses total R30 (procasslrig costs plus markup)
and combined with rough input (R30) are equal to the selling price (R60) of the final
product. His added value equals 'IOOX'" per cent (SOY'" per cent), i.e. R30. A's profit is
R20 (R60·R30+R10), which in this case, is equal to his markup.
A's total cost to purchase and complete the product for final sale is R40 (R30+R10), and
with an additional two per cent, which is the 'plus' factor, amounts to R40,8 (R40+2%).
Assuming that A is financed by B (a principal company overseas) A therefore sells. his
product(s) to B and would, jl'l'espedtiVv Jf his selling price, in this case R60, receive R40,8
from 8. A's profit of B2,0 is therefore absorbed by B.
Should the ashtray crack while being painted, the selling price drops, say to Ass. The
added value decreases now to 16,7X per cent (14,3Y), or R5. A realises then a profit ()f
-R5 (R3S-(R30+R10). i.e. a loss of AS. However, the minimum amount of money he'll
receive from S, his financial source, is still 840,8.
l
il
(Note: The relationship (and difference) between labour cost and th~ competitiv~lQf
k\.bQ.Yt is vita'!. From above, the workers operating cost is RiO. His labour eost is, say R3
of the R10. However, should someone else complete the article (lower skille~n and waste
paint. break the brushes, take I11()retime etc, the compemive cost would increase, l.e, his
competitiveness will deteriorate, and RS could become RS, whioh increases the operating
cost from RiO to A12)
'r X::; [(SP·RI)/(RI)]% and Y:=: [(SP·RI)/{SP)]%
where SP :=:Selling Price of the final product, and RI = Rough Input
.')
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APPENDIX 3
SADBVALUE ADDEDSTATEMENt ~~MMS
\)
The SADS monitors the value added figures by RSA CL\i'i.f.!!'$ through SADS ·Value Added
Statements (VAS)' which are completed by all local cUitars (verified by a Chartered
Accountant (CA» and submitted 19the SADS on a financial year basis.
The following poir; 'emp.hsslse the 'loopholes' of the VAS (an example is attached) and
J". . \ ;
({
how it can be exploit6d.
(i) Fill' r.~~ialyear statistics, though easier for the cutting concern to compile, make
correlations intricate (for entire industry). Furthermore, as in other industries;
the data collatlon should be done monthly, not annually.
(ii) It is unacceptable that only cutting concerns, i.e those that make up various
cutting firms, need to submit information that entail the sum of all the individual
.:.)
fi' uvltles,
(iii) . An auditors cerWicate is of no value. A specific assessor(s) (or group) should
..be tasked to validate cutting firms' valued added statistics. AI$O, CA's should
be held actid~ntable for irregulariUes.
(iv) The four month period, after the end of a financial year, that cutting firms ~r~
allowed to finaliSE! their statistics (,:lllowsroom for data manipulation. This is
also unacceptable as non-diamond lndustrles dq not enjoy this convenience.
(v) No provlslon is made for 'work in. progress', i.e, those diamonds in the
operating process that are not part of rough inventories nor finished products,
(vi) Most importantly. the ~1..®ID. factor (demandec!Jor rough and polished) leaves
• \'1
wiqe margins far error. This could lead to all sorts {Jf misinterpretations, which
inflU~nce$ added values, operating expenses etc, dramatically.
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APPENDIX 4
C$O AVERAGE PRICE INCREASES: 1980-1990
YEAR CSOAVEAAGE
PRICE. INCREASES
1980 Feb-12%
1981 None
1982 $ep-2,5%
1983 Apr-3,5%
1984 None
1985 None
1986 MaylNov-14,5%
1987 Qct-10%
1988 MaYw13,5%
1989 Mar-15,5%
1990 Mar-5,5%
Source: De Beers Consolidated Mines, 1992
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APPENDIXS
r:
ACTIVITIES dF THE SOUTH AFRICAN D!JI.\40ND BOARD" ",.
The Diamonds Act and/or the Regulations commlsslcned thereby, make provision for the
following a.ctivities: "
1
'-::~::,(i)
\\
(tli)
(iii)
(]
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
Control of rough diamond exports;
this entails the verification of export values,
the physical inspection of the contents of the parcels,
the checking 6f export documents to ensure that the requirements of the R~serve
Bank and Customs and Excise have been complied with,
the collecting of export taxes or the granting of exemptions or the postponing with
regard to export taxes
the allocation of export permits, where such permits are demanded,
the verification of the manner whereby rough diamonds intended for export. have
been offered to the local cutting lndusiry,
the regulating and identification of South Afric~n diamonds which are temporarily
sent out of the Republic, i.e. not exports that entail any foreign exchange,
2 Control over exports of polished diamonds;
(i) this entails the controlling of export values,
(ii) the physical inspection of the contents of the parcels, mainly to ensure that the
diamonds have been fully polished,
(iii) the checking of export documents to ensure that the requirements of the Reserve
Bank and Customs and, Excise have been complied with,
(iv) and the verification and id~ntific<'\tion of-polished diamonds that could have, if still
unsold,b~rn sent back to the Republic(re-imports).
"
3 Allocation and issuing of licenses that authorise holders to do business as
diamond cutters. dealers in rough diamonds, diamond toolmakers or diamond
researchers.
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4 The exercising of control over the granting of permission to suitable natural
persons (particularly, in respect of principals of ventures and natural persons) to
trade in rough diamonds;
5 Allocation of miscellaneous permits (to own, to purchase, to sell, to export etc)
and certificates for the registration of suitable persons and premises, in
accordance with the provisions of the Act.
6 Administration of agreements with diamond producers, whereby SL.~,llproducers
are committed to, in a specified manner, offer their production to the local cutting
industry and whereby certain qualities (of rough diamonds) are exempted from
such tender and export taxation. Stemming from these agreements, it naturally
follows that the activities of those that benefit from these agreements, are closely
monitored to ensure that they add a fair value to the product.
7~ Continuous monitoring of the activities of the diamond producers, -dealers,
-cutters and -toolrnakers to ensure that they fulfil the requirements of the
Diamonds Act, that they adhere to the prerequisites of the Soard or the
stipulations of agreements, that they act in the national interest and in the interest
of the industry, and also to be generally informed and acquainted with the
developments and needs of the industry. This entails the checking of information
submitted to the SADS, and regular Inspections by, and contact with, such
persons.
8 Other activities the AADB undertakes which are not specifically' advocated by the
Diamonds Act are;
(i) the verification of the sorting and valuation of all rough diamonds that are
channelled through the Govemment Valuator (Professional Diamond Valuations
CC (PROVAL»,
(ii) identification and valuation of diamonds that serve as documentary evidence in
court cases,
(iii) furnishing of recommendetlonszadvlce/lntormaflon concerning diamonds and the
diamond industry, to: producers and prospective procucers: license holders and
prospective license holders; exporters and prospective exporters; importers and
prospectlve importers; prospective investors; State Departments and other
Govemment organisations; the general public; and of course the Minister.
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(iv) controlling of i~~ports of tougn diamonds: Control market value of the diet.monds
to prevent 'tram3fer pricing'. Data capture of rough diamond Imports,
(v) continuous lialsen with the Diamond Workers Union (DWU). in respect to aspects
such as, the number of diamond employees, the standard of workmanship, the
importation of foreign diamond cutters, the role of the DWU in the workforce
administration of South Africa's diamond cutting firms.
,,;> " l;~j
A breakdown of the financial structure of the SADB is as follows:
/ )
\ I
SOUTH AFRICAN DIAMOND BOARD FINANCIAL STATISTICS
I
YEAR LEVIES'" LlCENSES# STATE FUNDS INTEREST TOTAL
R'OOO % R'OOO % R'OOO % R'OOO % R'()()O
86·87 219 91,5 2,3 1,0 6\ 0 18 7,5 239,3
87-88 693 85,9 15,1 1,9 50 6,2 49J 6,0 807,1
88-89 10,1
,
2 600 93,2 0,4 120 4,3 60 2,1 2 790,1
89-90 2 600 88,1 10,1 0,3 120 4,1 220 7,5 2 950,1
90·91 2 700 90,8 7,1 0,2 0 0 200 9)0 2 973,1- ...... -,-"-._--
86-91 8 812 90,3 44,7 0,5 290 I rMj 613 6,2 9 759,7 I-- ~
Source: The South African Diamond Board, 1992
Notes: \), Gurrent levy structure == on basis of EXPORTS of rough and polished
diamonds
For rough diamonds: De'Beers levy == 0,34 per cent of the marketvalue
Non-De Beers:::: 0,19 per cent of the market value
For polished diamonds: All:::: 0,04 pet cent market value
:it Dealerslcuttil1glicenses ::::.R500each
\,
'"
'~
\\
/-'\
'--
~
ILI..EGALDIAMOND TRADE.IN THE RSA
~::; (I
~ACTIV:Tlt::$ 7J80-6/81 7181-6/82 7/82-6/83 7/_83_-6_'_8_4f-7_/8_4_-~_8_5",-!1f-;_'_':-'-_~_8_61-_19_S6+~--+----t--","--"'-!I-----I
iL,_ ~'1AL PURCHASES OF UNPOLISHED DIAMONDS I
Nu:nt· of persons arrested' 466 374 490 4031 3171 3301 37°1--' 3721 340
Casl1amountconfi~ted (R~~d) 1 807 315 6~8521198S249h 394743 58467311 719 865~652710~ 536182
PERIOD
ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND/O!-"! THEF ::IF
UNPOLISHED PIAMONDS
Number of persons arrested
Mass of unpolishecJ<diamondsconfiscated (carats)
Value of unpo,»-~l1eddiamonds confiscated (REIlJei)
PlCK UP ANOfO.M FOUND UNPOLISHED DIAlviONDS
Nur.tber of uriPOlishGddiamonds
Mass of unpollshed diamonds (carats)
Value ot unpollshed ditIDl0nds (Rand}
;
273 3001 2481 ~5
'11061 1 ree 1 335
411126.;);79 96Sl330 669
329l 297 '\ 355
26.347' 3498 13::::-28
0432 054 sec 3611 os: 531
Source: 'The. Diamond and Gold Branch of the SAP (Annual Report), 1990
_ ~.' ,"- ._~--"i-~.:._:..::_____________.,...---.....,....
I
I 3883,1938~75
259! 442
4540[' 27B~
1162 6~1r763@)51
2380
502 849 h 062 460
22 48 8684 6821' ao
26 30 559 1441 71
I, 14800 2356 582795 216757 54091
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APPENDIX 7
TAXATION OF iSRAEL'S DIAMOND INDUSTRY
The present nature of the specialized taxation treatment of the diamond industry was
determined in 1981 by a public commission headed by the Deputy Attorney General of
Israel. The Oommisslcn set forth special rules for the keeping of account books. The rules
" were designed for an industry, many of Whose transactions are made by oral agreement,
and in Which the items of stock can prove difficult to valuate and yet which can easily be
transported from country to country in such a manner as to make border inspections most
difficult.
1 Provlslons as to the Keeping of Account Books
"1,1
\\,
New booki<eepil:'lg,,requirernents were set forth in the "Provisions for the Keeping of
Account Books" Which require diamond merchants to maintain accounts according to the
double entry system and in one of the accepted-gccountlnq systems which is suited to the
\\
szs, scope, and nature .of the particular business.\\
1.1 Book of Transactions
Such a book will be bound and will record ~~tailed descriptions of \be type and quantity of
diamonds involved in each transacticn, Agciltionally, the names of the parties involved will
be listed together with the dates of receipt of payment, the amounts paid and the
identifying numbers of the receipts recorded by each of the parties.
I',.I
1.2 Internal Documents
Internal documents which are supplemental to invoices must include the name of the
customer, the number and date of the invoice to which it relates and also a description of
the size, type, quantity and individu,al price of the diamonds as well as the sum total of the
invoice. Such documents must be signed by the assessee or a representative.
1.3 Valuation of Item in StQck
o
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A diamond merchant Is required to file a list of diamonds in stock. The list must sPecify the
type and size of each diamond. The cost value of the stock will be valuated according to
documents of purchase. If it is not possible to determine the cost of the stock according to
the documents then the cost will be set according to the valuation supplied by the
assessee. The dialTlond merchant will also be required to declare the stock which he has
abroad. The list must be served to the Chief Assessing Officer withlh 30 days from the last
day of the tax year.
A diamond merchant is entitled to maintain his books in US dollars or other foreign
currency should he so choose. This privilege is gl'anted him by the income tax regulations.
2 Assessments for the Diamond Industry
In order to make possible a reasonable level of tax collection from the industry critetia were
established as to levels of income which can be reasonably eXPected. These criteria were
set out in. 1985 in an agreement Which was reached between the Commission and
representatives of the industry.
DE:i$pitethe determination Of the criteria, the Chief Assessing Officer is entitled to make
inspections in the workplace in cases-where he has received information which indicates
that an assessee's file is incorrect or Where the return is unreasonable. In such cases the
Chief Assessing Officer may deti/mine the level of income based upon the findings of the
/"
inspection.
The criteria for establlshing the taxable income of diamond merchants is determined on the
basis of an inspectior - -nducted by the Economic Division of the Income Tax Commission.
Various factors ari .sn into account in arriving at the criteria, including the scope of
expert, the ratio of the turnover to export and expenses for the production of income
includ;ng labour costs and financing costs.
:3 Dedlarations of Wealth
Diamond merchants, as other assessees, are required to file declarations of wealth once
every four years. Such deolarations will set forth the assets and liabilities of the assessee.
In such cases Where an unexplained difference in wealth is found between two such
declarations filed by an assessee the amount of the difference will be added to the
assessee's taxable income. The arrangement wHh representatives o~ the industry is
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renegotiated every year so a~ to give expression to changes which have taken place in the
industry's activity.
Tax payments are fixed (as a percentage of volume) regarclless of profits or expenses
incurred. It is a simple payment system, which tells cutters, in advance, what they are'
expected to pay (Table 1).
TABLE 1."ISRAEL'STAXATION REGULATIONS
1989 Tax agreements 1990
"
Minimum income lE;!velof dlarnantaires $21 500
for taxable putm)ses _J
~ __ .__ ~ __ (lo~W_e_s_t_tax_.. a_bl_e_in_c_b_m_e_) ~ __ ~~, •
Earnings greater (or equal) to $10M
,
$20500
15% Subcontractors (cornmislon workers)
estimated eamings to turnover
14%
Assessed
at 1,35%
Assessed
at 1,23%
------~~--------------------~-.----------~--.------~
Source: Mazal U'Bracha, no 42, Oct 91, P 61
It is estimated that for a turnover of between $5 million and $50 million, a manufacturer will
be taxed at between 0,43 per cent and 0,53 per cent of sales turnover. Besides this,
irrespective of the level of income, companies pay a flat tax rate of 43,5 per cent (1990)
(Table 2).
TABLE 2 -ISRAEU.s TAXABLE INCOME RATES, 1990
Turnover (in million dollars) >10 10-20 20-$0 30+
Diamond Manufacturers (in %) 1,23 1,07 1,07 0,96
Diamond Merchants (in %) 1,10 1,05 0,92 0,92
Source: Mazal U'Braoha, No 41 , Oct 91, P 64
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